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This thesis presents two essays on real earnings management and future 
performance. The first essay draws on empirical studies that examine the three 
types of real earnings management activities in the United Kingdom (UK) for firms 
that are more likely to manipulate their earnings to avoid missing earnings targets. 
These targets include the zero earnings, and last year’s earnings. Also drawing from 
empirical studies, the second essay investigates the impact of real earnings 
management on firms’ future operating performance in the UK.  
In the first essay, I examine earnings management through real activities 
manipulation by using a sample of UK firms over the period 2009-2013. According 
to the transaction cost theory and opportunistic perspective of earnings 
management, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK suspect firm-
years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings management 
activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically. Specifically, I find that 
(1) firms which manage upward earnings have unusually low cash flows from 
operations by offering price discounts or/and more lenient credit terms to increase 
sales; (2) firms that manage upward earnings have unusually low discretionary 
expenditures by cutting/reducing expenditures spending to improve reported 
margin and (3) firms which manage upward earnings, incur unusually high 
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production costs by producing more products to report lower costs of goods sold in 
order to achieve their targets.  
Further, I find evidence that UK firms’ meeting/beating earnings benchmarks 
around zero earnings and last year’s earnings engage in sales-based manipulation 
and reducing/cutting discretionary expenses simultaneously; they also engage in 
overproducing products and reducing discretionary expenses at the same time. 
Furthermore, I do not find, however, evidence that managers in UK firms are 
associated with high real earnings management through sales-based manipulation 
to meet/beat last year’s earnings. On the other hand, I find evidence that manager 
in UK firms engage in income-increasing earnings management through 
accounting choice (e.g., accrual-based earnings management) to meet an earnings 
target. 
Motivated by agency conflicts of real earnings management (e.g., opportunistic and 
signalling perspectives), the second essay investigates whether there is an 
association between UK firms that manipulate their business operations to meet 
earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings, last year’s earnings) and subsequent 
operating performance. I implement Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression 
analysis to examine the effects of the magnitude of real earnings management on 
firms’ future performance. Empirical test results show that manipulation of 
operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production costs 
to meet earnings benchmarks has a significant positive consequence for firms’ 
subsequent operating performance and signals firms’ good future performance. 
Further, I find evidence that firms that manipulate their operating activities in the 
absence of meeting/beating earnings benchmarks experience a decline in their 
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subsequent operating performance. The findings of this research lend support to 
our understanding of the process that management follows to evaluate costs and 
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1.1 Overview of First Essay  
Previous literature has studied three types of earnings management: accrual-based 
earnings management (AEM), real earnings management (REM), and classification 
shifting. Accrual-based earnings management occurs when managers adjust 
revenue or expenses accrual to alter the financial report; AEM has no direct cash-
flow consequence and is therefore less likely to destroy long-term firm value 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010). Examples of AEM include 
provision for bad debt expenses and delaying asset write-offs.  
On the contrary, real earnings management is another indirect way to manage 
earnings, which refers to the purposeful altering of reported earnings in a particular 
direction by changing the timing or structuring of financing, operating, and 
investing activities; REM influences the operations with direct effects on cash 
flows. While AEM and REM change in the bottom-line Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) of income statement, classification shifting simply 
moves certain revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to different line items on the 
income statement; it does not actually change net income and has no impact on 
GAAP earnings (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). Further, classification shifting 
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occurs when other earnings management tools are constrained (Abernathy et al., 
2014).  
Since earnings are, however, the sum of accruals and operating cash flows, earnings 
can be manipulated through accruals and/or operating cash flows. Actually, 
earnings management research involves both accrual-based earnings management 
and manipulation of underlying real business activities. Prior literature extensively 
investigates accrual earnings management and presents evidence on the 
pervasiveness of accruals manipulation where it has been hypothesised that 
managers have incentives to manage earnings (e.g., Schipper, 1989; Dechow and 
Sloan, 1991; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995; Teoh et al., 1998a; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al., 2001; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Dechow et al., 2010; Alissa et al., 2013; 
Wongsunwai, 2013).  
The earnings management literature has turned its attention towards an analysis of 
real earnings management after survey evidence supported by Graham et al. (2005). 
Graham et al. (2005) report that managers in United States (US) firms prefer to 
engage in real earnings management compared to accrual-based earnings 
management to manage earnings upward, regardless of whether it is detrimental to 
the firm’s value in the long term. Real earnings management as an earnings 
management tool has been a primary topic of accounting research for decades. 
Later, after providing a comprehensive overview of real earnings management of 
operating activities, Roychowdhury (2006) develops an empirical method for real 
earnings management. This was motivated by Cohen et al.’s (2008) findings that, 
lately, real earnings management is becoming more prevalent than accrual-based 
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earnings management lately, reflected in a growing body of real earnings 
management studies (Xu et al., 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Alhadab, 2015; Cohen et al. 2016; Kothari et al., 
2016).  
Recent literature in real earnings management suggests that managers care about 
three thresholds when they report net income as a motivation for engaging in real 
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; 
Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006;  Osma, 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 
2012; Mindak et al., 2016). They do this to meet or just beat zero earnings such as 
avoiding a loss; to report earnings that are above zero; to meet or just beat last 
year’s earnings such as sustaining recent performance; and to meet analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecast. Real earnings management includes manipulations of 
real activities such as operating, investing, and financing activities. Specifically, it 
includes the following actions. First, the provision of more price discounts or more 
lenient credit terms boosts sales (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 
2010; Kothari et al., 2016). A second action involves cutting/reducing the 
discretionary research and development (R&D) expenses and cutting/reducing the 
discretionary selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses (Graham et al., 
2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 2016). A 
third action is overproducing to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS), and 
finally, timing the sales of fixed assets to report profit (Hand et al., 1990; 
Roychowdhury, 2006;  Xu et al., 2007; Gunny, 2010). 
 Furthermore, recent studies find that US firms that manage earnings upward to 
meet/beat important earnings benchmarks use aggressive real earnings 
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management activities as a tool for earnings management. It is also found that trade-
off real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management as 
substitutes (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Kothari 
et al., 2016). 
1.2 Overview of Second Essay  
To address how real earnings management may influence future operating 
performance, the second essay of the current study examines the consequences of 
real earnings management on firms’ subsequent operating performance. 
Specifically, the study investigates whether UK firms that manipulate their sales, 
discretionary expenses and production around zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings to report higher earnings realise an impact from these activities on future 
financial performance or not. I adopt Roychowdhury’s (2006) and Gunny’s (2010) 
criteria to identify firms that are more likely to manage earnings, and I also utilise 
two criteria to identify firms potentially engaged in real earnings management. 
Specifically, I achieve this based on the firms’ ability to meet or just beat (1) zero 
earnings, and (2) last year’s earnings.  
Literature reveals two oppositional consequences of real earnings management. 
One view is the ‘opportunistic earnings management’ argument that managers who 
use real earnings management deviations from normal business strategy to manage 
reported earnings opportunistically mislead outside investors on their assessments 
of firms’ performance (Healy and Palepu, 1993; DeFond and Park, 1997). Further, 
agency conflict such as adverse selection implies that managers have better 
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information that outside investors do not, and thus may not reflect all they know 
about the firm to shareholders. This may lead managers to engage in earnings 
management (e.g., accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management) in order to attain private gain (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Specifically, firms reduce R&D expenditures to increase production to report lower 
cost of goods sold and boost current sales via price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms to reduce current sales and increase current earnings. Consistent with this 
view, when managers alter the timing and/or structure of an operation, investment, 
and/or financial transaction to meet/beat important earnings benchmarks, they 
apply sub-optimal business strategies and thus may experience deterioration in 
subsequent operating performance (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Literature documents that firms that engage in real earnings management 
experience a negative impact on subsequent financial performance and firm value 
(Bens et al., 2002, 2003; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 
2005; Francis et al., 2016). For instance, Bens et al. (2002, 2003) find that firms 
that manipulate their earnings by reducing R&D experience a marginally negative 
impact on future operating performance, and that future operating performance 
declines for several years. Gunny (2005) examines the consequence of real earnings 
management and finds that subsequent operating future performance shows a 
negative relation to real earnings management activities. However, the results 
reported by Gunny (2005) are based on her criteria for identifying firms engaged 
in real earnings management. Moreover, Francis et al. (2016) examine whether 
firms that utilised real earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks are 
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associated with subsequent stock price risk, which is due to mispricing of stock 
under REM.  
Moreover, previous papers observe a decline in future performance among firms 
that engage in higher real earnings management to meet/beat the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (Zhang, 2008; Leggett et al., 2009; De Jong et al., 2014). Apart from 
future performance, previous studies document experience deterioration in 
subsequent operating performance among firms that engage in income-increasing 
earnings at the time of issuing equity offerings (Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and 
Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)). Previous literature also finds that firms which 
engage in income-increasing real earnings management at the time of issuing SEOs 
have a negative future operating performance in the post-offering period than other 
firms that engage in accruals-based earnings management do (Mizik and Jacobson, 
2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016). Further, prior literature has 
found that IPO firms that manage up earnings using real and accrual earnings 
management during the IPO year have a higher probability of IPO failure and lower 
survival rates in subsequent periods (Wongsunwai, 2013; Alhadab et al., 2015).  
The opposite view is the ‘signalling earnings management’ argument; this claims 
that firms utilise real earnings management to signal their future good performance 
and distinguish themselves from the poor performance (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Due to the information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors, investors 
usually do not have as much information as the managers. Therefore, managers 
may use earnings to communicate their private information on firms’ future 
performance and thus improve earnings’ informativeness (Demski, 1998; Kothari 
2001; Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001; Arya et al., 2003; Louis and Robinson, 
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2005). Real earnings management may not necessarily experience more significant 
decline in firms’ subsequent performance. For instant, manipulations of operating 
activities are less likely to significantly affect the operations of firms that occupy 
strong financial and market positions and intend to use earnings to communicate 
favourable private information about future performance (Zang, 2012). Consistent 
with this view, Gunny (2010) finds evidence that firms that manage earnings 
upward in order to meet/beat earnings benchmarks achieve a more positive impact 
on the client’s cash flow and subsequent operating performance than do those that 
use REM.  
Zhao et al. (2012) support Gunny’s (2010) findings in their study, suggesting that 
used-only real earnings management offers more positive signalling effects about 
future firm performance than those firms that used only accrual-based earnings 
management, which supports the signalling argument that firms use real earnings 
management to signal good future performance. Moreover, previous papers have 
observed good future performance among firms that manipulated earnings to 
meet/beat the analysts’ earnings forecasts (Bartov et al., 2002; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Koh et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010, Taylor and Xu, 2010). 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
Recent literature in earnings management suggests that manager care about three 
thresholds when they report net income: to meet or just beat zero earnings (avoiding 
a loss, report earnings that are above zero); to meet or just beat last year’s earnings 
(to sustain recent performance avoiding a negative earnings surprise); and to meet 
analysts’ consensus earnings forecast. Graham et al. (2005) document that specific 
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motives are among the most important reasons for earnings management behaviour. 
Research focusing on real earnings management is becoming more common as an 
alternative mechanism to test earnings management on the part of managers. 
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the manipulation 
undertaken by firms that are more likely to manage earnings by focusing on three 
types of real earnings management activities in the UK, and to contribute to the 
existing body of knowledge, as most studies in this field are US-based. Another 
aim of this work is to determine the association between real earnings management 
and firms’ operating performance in the UK. 
In order to achieve these aims, the following research objectives are determined: 
 To examine whether managers in UK firms are utilising earnings 
management through three types of real earnings management to meet or 
beat important earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings). 
 To investigate whether UK firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary 
expenses, and production costs around zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings to report higher earnings realise an impact on future financial 
performance or not.   
1.4 Research Questions 




Research question 1: Do UK firms engage in income-increasing real earnings 
management activities, specifically operating activities such as sales, discretionary 
expenditures, and production to meet/beat important earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
Research question 2: Operating activities cause deviation from normal operational 
practices and thus could potentially lead to a decline in subsequent performance 
(Gunny, 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Bhojraj et al., 2009; 
Leggett et al., 2009; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). Other evidence from prior studies 
suggests that real earnings management’s effect on future performance is not 
uniform across firms. However, occasional and modest levels of real earnings 
management may not necessarily have a significant negative impact on firms’ 
future operations; it could signal a brighter future performance (Gunny, 2010; 
Taylor and Xu, 2010). Further, manipulations of operating activities are less likely 
to significantly affect the operations of firms that hold strong financial and market 
positions and intend to use earnings to communicate favourable private information 
about future performance (Zang, 2012). Therefore, an important empirical question 
is whether manipulations of operating activities in the presence of meeting/beating 
important earnings benchmarks have, on average, significant negative or positive 
consequences for UK firms’ subsequent operating performances. 
1.5 Research Problem and Motivations  
There is a lack of research on the important phenomenon of earnings management 
using three types of real activity in the context of the UK. Earnings management 
affects stakeholders not only in the US but also in other countries, including the 
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UK. However, research on the case in the US shows that since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was introduced, there has been a decrease in the use of accruals earnings 
management. However, this encouraged managers to rely on real activities 
manipulation to deliver earnings (e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Zang, 2012). If the presence of real earnings management activities is documented 
in this research, UK regulatory bodies could incorporate such a finding in future 
reforms to mitigate the possibility of the same negative outcomes that the US has 
experienced, thus avoiding undesirable consequences such as those that exist in the 
US and improving the reliability of accounting numbers. As a matter of fact, no 
research is found considering the costlier real activities earnings management in 
United Kingdom. To address this research problem, this study is motivated to 
examine the real earnings management activities in the UK. The potential findings 
of this analysis would be important not only to stakeholders of the firm but also to 
accounting regulators and investors. REM is one potential consequence of 
regulations intended to restrict the discretion of accounting earnings management 
(Gunny, 2010). There is, therefore, a strong incentive to investigate, empirically, 
the manipulation of real earnings management in different environment.  
In addition, many economists have used earnings benchmarks to evaluate firms’ 
performance and financial position; such benchmarks are viewed as key reference 
points for such assessment. Generally, managers will try to meet earnings 
benchmarks through normal business practices. However, they will resort to the use 
of earnings management if expected earnings fail to meet the desired threshold. 
Prior literature shows that managers use earnings management to meet a number of 
earnings benchmarks. These include the avoidance of reporting losses 
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(Roychowdhury, 2006; Osma, 2008), and avoiding reporting earnings decreases 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Furthermore, achieving earnings targets helps 
firms to keep or enhance their credibility and reputation with stakeholders. 
However, real earnings management through sales based-manipulation to meet or 
just beat last year’s earnings are still empirically untested. Therefore, this study is 
motivated to enrich the literature by providing evidence regarding whether 
managers manipulate real earnings management through sales based-manipulation 
to meet or just beat specific earnings benchmarks (last year’s earnings).  
Finally, the empirical evidence to which real earnings management affects future 
operating performance is limited to US data. Furthermore, some studies show 
negative impacts, while others show positive impacts (Gunny, 2010; Chen et al., 
2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al. 2012). In addition to the above, it has not 
been addressed in prior literature in the UK. Therefore, an important question is 
whether such deviations from the normal business strategy due to real earnings 
management have an impact on firms’ future performances or not. Answers to the 
question can provide evidence on the consequences of real earnings management 
activities and enhance our knowledge about how management evaluates the costs 
and benefits of accounting standards that may interact with the use of real earnings 
management. In addition, examining the implication of REM on operating 
performance is important, given the significance of future performance to the firm 
and its stakeholders. Taylor and Xu (2010, p. 129) note that “If real earnings 
management leads to a significant decline in these firms’ future operating 
performances, the negative consequences would at least partially offset benefits of 
the heightened regulation and potentially defeat the purpose of SOX”. Therefore, 
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UK market regulators should pay close attention to mitigate and prevent such 
earnings management activities. 
My study is motivated to conduct an examination of the research questions in the 
context of the UK, which offers an interesting background against which to address 
these. 
First, the UK environment differs from USA in many ways that could affect the 
inferences of this research. For example, the mandatory adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is compulsory in the UK.1 Research has 
shown that IFRS has had a significant effect on company measurement and 
reporting methods, as documented by previous research. Barth et al. (2008), Chen 
et al. (2010) and Zeghal et al. (2012) offer evidence that firms in those countries 
that adopt the international accounting standard or IFRS tend to manage reported 
earnings less than those firms do in countries that do apply the domestic standard, 
thus leading to more timely loss recognition and more value relevant accounting 
measures. This infers that firms applying IFRS generally show an improvement in 
accounting quality of earnings management between the pre- and post- adoption 
periods, leading to more timely loss recognition and to more value relevant 
accounting measures.  
                                                          
1 Since 1 January 2005, all listed companies from EU member countries are required to submit their 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS (EC Regulation 1606/2002), so all UK firms have 
decided to comply with IFRS from 2005. The implementation of IFRS by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), targets improving the earnings quality and obtaining 
comparability and transparency of financial reports. Moreover, and as suggested by JeanJean and 
Stolowy (2008, p. 483): “IFRS should reduce the amount of reporting discretion relative to many 
local GAPP, and in particular, push firms to improve their financial reporting.” Further, IFRS 
adoption tends to increase the firm’s market liquidity and a lower cost of capital and increase its 
equity valuation (Ball, 2006; Daske et al., 2008). 
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Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) provide evidence that the presence of tighter 
accounting standards and less accounting flexibility lead managers to substitute 
accruals earnings management with real earnings management. Recent research has 
observed evidence consistent with a substitution between AEM and REM, 
depending on the relative costs and benefits (Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). 
Furthermore, Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou (2016) examine AEM and REM 
before and after the adoption of IFRS, and find evidence that firms shift from AEM 
to REM after IFRS adoption, suggesting that firms switched from AEM to REM 
following the enactment of stricter legislation. Related studies (e.g., Chi et al., 2011) 
indicate that the level of real earnings management increases with a higher level of 
audit quality.  
It is, however, more difficult to track REM for outsiders as it can be masked in the 
form of everyday business transactions, by involving, for example, decisions about 
changes in the timing or structuring of a transaction (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). 
Under IFRS, for instance, research and advertising costs are expensed in the period 
in which they are incurred. Therefore, reducing these costs reported affects income. 
Developments costs are, in the first instance, expensed rather than capitalised due 
to uncertainty issues regarding the developing product (International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB) 1998). Therefore, the postponing of development projects 
can also increase earnings. 
Second, the incentives of earnings management are different to those found in the 
US. Ball et al. (2000) assert that, among common law nations that they have studied, 
the UK has the least regulated accounting, and least regulated litigations. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that regulates firms in the US has a 
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higher standard compared with the UK, which is regulated by common law.2 
Moreover, Browns and Higgins (2002) find evidence that UK firms have smaller 
holdings of stock than their US counterparts do, and thus suggest that managers in 
those UK firms have less incentive to manage earnings to avoid reporting bad news. 
However, in their 2005 study, Brown and Higgins suggest that differences in the 
expectations of management behaviour in different countries may go some way to 
explaining the differences in earnings management incentives. That is, there is no 
fixed status for earnings management behaviour; rather, it is context-dependent. 
1.6 Methodology  
I test two major hypotheses here: (1) UK firms that meet/beat important earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s earnings) are more likely to engage 
in real earnings management activities to achieve earnings targets.  (2) There is an 
association between UK firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses, 
and production costs to meet/beat earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last 
year’s earnings) and future operating performance. 
This study employs both descriptive/univariate and multivariate analyses to test the 
research hypotheses. The dataset is collected from Datastream and Worldscope 
databases for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 
2009-2013. Due to the requirement for data to measure subsequent operating 
performance, I extend the sample to 2014. Excluded from the sample are firms 
belonging to the financial and bank institutions, and communication, transportation 
                                                          
2 In addition, Ball et al. (2000) show that the impact of accounting standards on the valuation of 




and utility industries, firms without sufficient data to calculate the proxies of real 
earnings management. The final sample consists of 4,487 firm-year observations.  
One acquisition of the appropriate data, regressions analysis is employed and run 
by each industry-year to measure earnings management manipulation. Specifically, 
models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) – and as implemented by 
Roychowdhury (2006) – of abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs, and the two aggregate measures 
of real earnings management (REM_1, REM_2) and Kothari et al.’s (2005) model 
of abnormal accrual are run to measure accrual-based earnings management.3 
Finally, in order to measure the association between real earnings management and 
firm future performance, following Bens et al. (2002) and Gunny (2010), a 
regression model controlling for determinants of subsequent operating performance 
is used.   
I use STATA 13 software to analyse the data, and implement univariate analyses 
to report the summary statistics for the variables used in the multivariate analysis. 
I employ the Fama-MacBeth approach to test empirically the research hypotheses 
of the first essay regarding income-increasing earnings management; that suspect 
firm-years are more likely to manipulate earnings compared with the rest of the 
sample. For the second essay, I employ pooled ordinary least squares (time-series 
cross-sectional) regression to empirically test the research hypotheses regarding the 
                                                          
3 The first aggregate measure of real earnings management (REM_1) is the sum of abnormal 
production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. The second 
aggregate measure of real earnings management (REM_2) is the sum of abnormal cash flows from 
operations multiplied by negative one and discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. 
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consequences of real earnings management on firms’ future operating performance. 
Chapter Four comprehensively explains the applied research methodology.  
1.7 Summary of Findings  
To examine whether managers in UK firms manipulate their financial reporting by 
utilising real earnings management activities in order to meet/beat important 
earnings benchmarks, I perform a series of analysis tests. The results indicate that 
managers in UK firms engage in three types of real earnings management activities 
(e.g., sales, discretionary expenditures and production costs) in order to achieve 
their targets around zero earnings and last year’s earnings. Specifically, compared 
to other firms, firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero earning 
and last year’s earnings show lower cash flow from operations, discretionary 
expenditures, and higher production costs than the rest of the sample. In addition, 
UK suspect firm-years that utilise accruals-based earnings management have high 
abnormal accruals that are in line with income-increasing accruals management.  
This supports the hypothesis that firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks 
around zero earnings and last year’s earnings exhibit unusually low cash flows from 
operations, discretionary expenditures and high production costs, and are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management activities. In other words, these 
results lend support to the income-increasing real activities manipulation 
hypotheses. According to the transaction cost theory and opportunistic perspective 
of earnings management, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK 
suspect firm-years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings 
management activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically.  
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To investigate whether UK firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses 
and production costs around zero earnings and last year’s earnings to report higher 
earnings realise an impact on future financial performance or not, this study 
examines the association between real earnings management and UK firms’ 
operating performance. The results indicate that managers in UK suspect firm-years 
who engage in sales-based, discretionary expenditures and overproduction 
manipulations achieve better subsequent performance than other firm-years do, and 
convey a signal of superior future performance to the market. The results also 
indicate that UK firms’ managers who engage in three types of real earnings 
management activities – by offering sales discounts or/and more lenient credit 
facilities, cutting discretionary expenditures, and producing more units in the 
absence of meeting/beating important earnings benchmarks – experience a decline 
in subsequent operating performance and perform worse in signalling future 
performance (value-destroying).  
These results support the signalling earnings management argument that firms that 
meet/beat earnings benchmarks utilise real earnings management activities to 
convey their private information to signal their future good performance and 
distinguish themselves from poor performance; this subsequently enhances 
investors’ ability to predict firms’ performance. In the absence of meeting/beating 
earnings benchmarks, the results also support the opportunistic earnings 
management argument. Therefore, investors are misled on their assessment of firms’ 
performance.  
To determine whether the impacts of real earnings management on subsequent 
operating performance extend beyond one year, I perform additional tests. 
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Additional analysis suggests that firms that meet/beat earnings benchmarks by 
engaging in real earnings management activities perform better in subsequent 
operating performance in year two as well as in their performance in year one. 
Moreover, firms that miss earnings benchmarks but engage in real earnings 
management activities experience deterioration in subsequent operating 
performance in year two as well as in their performance in year one. Lastly, to 
correct the cross-sectional and time-series dependencies in the data, the Newey-
West (1987) corrected Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedures are used in primary tests.  
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis contains seven chapters. The current chapter (Chapter One) presents a 
brief outline of the thesis topic. It explores the research background of the study. It 
explains the aim, objectives, research motivations, and research questions. In brief, 
the research methodology adopted to accomplish the main aim and objectives is 
outlined, followed by a summary of the findings. The structure of the thesis is also 
outlined by providing a brief note on each chapter. The rest of the thesis is as 
follows: 
Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework: This chapter explains the most common 
theories behind earnings management, such as information asymmetry, agency 
theory (e.g., signalling and opportunistic perspectives) and transaction cost theory, 
that researchers have employed to explain and analyse the association between 
earnings management and firm future performance.  
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Chapter Three – Literature Review: This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
definition of earnings management and earnings management methods, and 
distinguishes between various types of earnings management that can be used to 
manipulate earnings in accruals-based manipulations, real activity manipulation, 
and classification shifting. The next section of this chapter highlights the 
motivations that influence the earnings management choice of firms; this includes 
a discussion on the benefits of earnings management. The subsequent section of 
this chapter reviews prior literature related to earnings management and the 
association between real earnings management and firm future performance.  
Chapter Four – Research Hypotheses and Methodology: This chapter formulates 
the hypotheses regarding the manipulation in firms’ financial reporting through real 
earnings management activities and the consequences of the real earnings 
management activities on firms’ future operating performance. This chapter also 
presents an overview of the data used in the empirical analysis; identifies the data 
sources; describes sample selection criteria; sets out definitions of the variables; 
and clarifies the implementation of independent variables. Further, statistics for the 
samples used in the two empirical chapters are presented and described, and the 
methods used to measure the dependent variable (real and accruals-based earnings 
management and future operating performance) are clarified. 
Chapter Five – First Set of Empirical Results: This chapter is devoted to the first 
empirical essay that examines whether UK firms manipulate financial reporting 
through real earnings management activities to meet or just beat important earnings 
benchmarks. In addition, this study also examines whether UK firms manipulate 
financial reporting through accruals-based earnings management (Kothari et al.’s 
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2005 model) to meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks. The results of 
data analysis for the research hypotheses through both univariate/descriptive and 
multivariate analysis are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Six – Second Set of Empirical Results: This chapter presents the second 
empirical essay. This research question examines the relationship between real 
earnings management and future performance; that is, whether real earnings 
management activities have an impact on future operating performance of UK firms 
that meet and/or miss earnings targets. Additional analysis is also performed to 
investigate whether the reported results are sensitive to different variables’ 
measures. The findings from the data analysis for the research hypotheses of the 
second empirical test results through both univariate/descriptive and multivariate 
analysis are presented in this chapter. This chapter also contains the first study to 
examine the magnitude of real earnings management on UK firms’ future operating 
performance.  
Chapter Seven – Conclusions: This chapter completes the thesis by providing a 
brief summary of the literature, research hypotheses and methodology, the results 
of descriptive and multivariate analysis, and sensitivity tests. Then, it outlines the 
contributions of the current study to the real and accrual-based earnings 
management and future performance literature along with the implications of the 
study. Finally, the research limitations and recommendations for further research 















Literature reports the use of a number of theories to explain the role of earnings 
management as an aspect of accounting. Theories that offer an appropriate 
framework to explicate the effects of earnings management may be more applicable 
to some environments or even countries than others (Gray et al., 2015). Figure 2.1 
summarises the key theories underpinning prior research and of the dominant 
theories that have played a key role in advancing earnings management. These are 
asymmetry theory, agency theory, and transaction cost theory. Accordingly, the 
chapter is structured as follows: section two briefly discusses the accounting choice. 
Section three reviews these three theories and their applicability to the research 
question of this study. Following this, section four discusses the two perspectives 




















2.2 Accounting Choice 
The primary purpose of accounting choice, however, is to influence the output of 
the accounting system in a particular way4, including real decisions of increasing 
production to reduce cost of goods sold and/or reducing R&D expenditures to 
increase earnings (Fields et al., 2001). Where firm managers are responsible for the 
preparation and publication of external accounting information, they must 
undertake the accounting choice processes based on their inside knowledge of the 
existing situation of the firm, in order to provide an objective portrayal of the 
financial status and performance of the firm. With respect to real decisions, the 
managerial intent is the key dominant factor in the accounting choice, whether the 
impetus behind the decision is to affect the output of the accounting system or 
whether the impetus emerges from other motives (Fields et al., 2001). Managers 
make accounting choices based on their decisions about what, how, and when to 
apply certain principles. This can influence perceived performance – the 
consequences of accounting choices. If the accounting choice is executed correctly, 
it could prove invaluable for facilitating the decision-making process of a range of 
interested parties, from investors, lenders and authorities to customers, suppliers 
and employees, with regard to investments, jobs and taxes, amongst other matters. 
 
                                                          
4 According to International Accounting Standard Board 1 (IASB 1), the purpose of accounting is 
to provide information about the entity’s financial performance, and the financial position of the 
entity, to assist decision makers to make economic assessments. However, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to enforce the accounting standard in the United 
State (US); this authority is stated in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In the European 




2.3 Theories of Earnings Management 
The prime theories employed in the earnings management literature and dominant 
theories that have had the greatest influence on the use of earnings management are 
asymmetry theory, agency theory, and transaction cost theory (Akerlof, 1970; 
Mitnick, 1973; Christenson, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Trueman and 
Titman, 1988; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Jiraporn et al., 2008; Deegan, 2013).  
2.3.1 Information Asymmetry Theory  
In our world of imperfect and incomplete markets, efficient markets do not always 
prevail. Sun and Rath (2008) interpret the two types of market imperfections –
information asymmetry and agency costs – to formulate the basic conditions for the 
existence of earnings management.5 Asymmetric information refers to situations in 
which some agent in a trade possesses information not held by other agents 
involved in the same trade (Spence, 1973). This suggests that managers possess 
private information about the firm and its current and prospective earnings streams 
that current and potential shareholders do not have, which may allow them to 
manage earnings (Mirrless, 1999). The superior knowledge possessed by managers 
regarding firms’ prospects is often the source of information asymmetry. The 
uninformed group tends to be the firm’s investors (Copeland et al., 2005). This 
resulting power imbalance may affect the transactions concerned, leading to, at 
worst, and market failure. An example of such failure, provided by Wilson (2008) 
is adverse selection, while Ledyard (2008) suggests that two conflict outcomes may 
                                                          
5 Akerlof (1970) discusses the problem of information asymmetry through studying the market for 
used cars, and brings the problem to the front of the important economic issues. 
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be moral hazard or information monopoly. In the case of moral hazard conflicts, 
which is one of the most common, managers’ activities may affect negatively on 
the shareholders’ interests as a result of information asymmetry between the two 
groups (Nygaard and Myrtveith, 2000). Concerning the second most common 
conflict type, adverse selection, means that managers may not reveal everything 
that they know about the firm to those external to the firm (e.g., shareholders) (Scott, 
2003). 
Literature, however, asserts that firms that are more information-ambiguous may 
engage in a higher degree of earnings management. This is because the more 
asymmetric the information is, the more difficult it becomes for stakeholders to 
monitor managers and hold them to account. Subsequently, it is easier for managers 
to manipulate earnings (Jiraporn et al., 2008). In contrast, if more information is 
known about the firm and its earnings, this may limit the extent of earnings 
management performed by firm managers (Richardson, 2000). Also, resource or 
incentive insufficiency, or inadequate access to information that sheds light on 
managers’ activities can increase information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Schipper, 1989; Warfield et al., 1995).  
In fact, specific analytical models in several studies (Dye, 1988; Trueman and 
Titman, 1988; Christensen et al., 1999) highlight the importance of information 
asymmetry between a firm management and its stakeholders for managing earnings. 
Schipper (1989) reinforces this idea, although she proposes a less stringent version, 
suggesting that it is possible to eradicate the block communication by implementing 
contractual arrangements. Actually, the importance of information asymmetry for 
managing earnings was extended to posit that the level of earnings management 
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increases as the level of information asymmetry increases. When information 
asymmetry is high, stakeholders may not have the necessary information to undo 
the manipulated earnings. According to Richardson (2000), it may be that the fact 
that some firms have high levels of information asymmetry reflects the fact that 
their shareholders lack resources, incentives and/or the relevant information to 
monitor managers’ actions. This may result in the practice of earnings management.   
In terms of managing earnings over a prolonged period, a prime example lies in the 
instance where firms with debt contracts could potentially be motivated to evade 
debt covenant violations by managing their earnings over a prolonged period. In 
cases of high information asymmetry, the firms could undetectably adjust their 
earnings management around the debt contracts. As such, firms with high levels of 
information asymmetry present greater monitoring challenges than firms with less 
information asymmetry do. Generally, both the agency theory perspectives 
(beneficial and opportunistic) focus on the role of information asymmetry, as it 
causes an adverse selection problem by benefitting firm insiders to the detriment of 
outsiders. Essentially, the two groups will be privy to different information, with 
one having more accurate data than the other does. Thus, unlike the insiders who 
can ascertain the level of risk within the firm, the outsiders cannot assess the 
relevant information to draw their own conclusions (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 
1997). Managers, referred to as signallers, may feel driven to disclose information 
that best serves their own goals, particularly if their goals are entwined with the 
market value and activity of the firm. As explained by Cohen and Dean (2005) and 
Bruton et al. (2009), information asymmetry between the firm owner and potential 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) investors could lead to the top management signalling 
 
27 
data to the group of investors most likely to enhance the firm’s value within the 
IPO procedure.  
2.3.2 Agency Theory  
An agency relationship is one in which “one or more persons (the principals) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 5). Moreover, Mitnick (1973) identifies the problems of agency 
as (1) the principal’s problem; (2) the agent’s problem; and (3) policing 
mechanisms and incentives. Perhaps the most recognisable form of agency 
relationship is that of employer and employee, principal and agent (Mitnick, 1973) 
or shareholders (principals) and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), associated with 
common solutions and a range of incentives contracts – these are debt contracts, 
management compensation contracts and employee contracts. Based on accounting 
numbers, contracts can diminish agency costs and increase the firm’s value. 
Earlier literature identifies that information asymmetry drives the agency problem, 
resulting in two agency-conflict types from the economic perspective. These are 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Scott, 2003).6 As a 
result, agency theory considers executive compensation one of the most effective 
solutions to address the impact of internal agency conflict and align the interests of 
the parties concerned (managers and stakeholders) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). This is because the financing structure influences 
                                                          
6 Another classification for the agency conflict; namely, internal agency conflicts – executive 
compensation and external agency conflicts – bond covenants (Field et al., 2001).  
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the agency relationship between the shareholders and the managers whilst their 
conflicts of interest correlate with the executive compensation structure. 
In their role as agents, managers are sometimes responsible for acting in their own 
interests, as opposed to meeting the interests of the principals – the shareholders. 
Therewith, managers have several reasons for maximising wealth, including their 
own status, remuneration and job security (Weir et al., 2002). It is therefore crucial 
that the shareholders firmly handle the agency problem as the conflict between the 
shareholders and the managers could adversely affect the performance of the firm. 
This is because the managers are more concerned with advancing their own wealth 
instead of that of the shareholders.  
Confirming this view, prior literature shows that managers manipulate reported 
earnings upward utilising earnings management activities to meet performance-
based compensation targets (Healy, 1985; Dechow et al., 1995). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) support this theory, confirming that the endurance of a company depends 
mostly on the control of agency problems. Briefly, the owners offer the managers 
compensation plans: if the management compensation value encompasses the 
anticipated managerial discretions, compensation contracts tend to increase the 
managers’ expectations, thereby enhancing the level of the actual discretions 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Scott (1997) references this “unexpected” 
managerial discretion, as it leads to aggregate shareholder wealth. Conversely, 
within a contracting partnership, compared to other contracting parties, managers 
are less inclined to take risks. They will continue attempting to advance their own 
interests within the limits imposed by these contracts. 
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On the other hand, the external agency conflict-bond covenant involves another set 
of groups that have an important agency relationship between bondholders and 
shareholders, also dominated by a conflict of interest. Here, the bondholders 
attempt to increase the value of the firm’s debts, while the shareholders try to 
increase the value of the firm itself (Brander and Poitevin, 1992).7 To make sure 
that the debt expected return is the same as the return from other investments, the 
principals (bondholders) are dependent on the agents (shareholders) to enhance the 
debt value (Brander and Poitevin, 1992). This can result in the agency cost of debt 
covenant (for instance, a company’s risks dictate the interest rates at which that 
company issues bonds or borrows debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, 
subsequent to the issue of bonds, managers could elect to engage in investment 
projects with higher risk attached, thereby increasing the shareholder value whilst 
decreasing the bondholder value. This is facilitated by the payoff structure, since 
bondholders can only share a fixed profit from projects, while their shareholding 
counterparts are the receptors of all the residuals. This means that, when the 
projects are successful, shareholders reap practically all the benefits and, when they 
are unsuccessful, the shareholders’ losses are minimal, whilst bondholders could 
lose their loans (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Smith and Warner (1979) also point out that the firms that engage in higher risk 
endeavours are consequently seen to be riskier themselves, and so the bondholders 
should apply greater interest rates. As such, the ex-post change of asset risk level 
can lead to an over-investment increasing the bondholders’ opportunity costs, 
                                                          
7 Debt contracts could preserve a minimum amount of net assets to ensure the backing of outstanding 
debt by restricting dividend payments. Consequently, managers and shareholders will be less able 
to promote their own interests (Li et al., 2014).  
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whilst it could also take the wealth from the bondholders and transfer it to the 
shareholders; this effect is known as ‘wealth transfer’ or ‘asset substitution’ (Smith 
and Warner, 1979). 
To control the consequences of the agency problem and the managers’ earnings 
manipulation, though, a new cost called ‘agency cost’ arises. Agency costs are 
incurred when managers and other parties seek to enhance not the firm’s value, but 
their own pay-off. This required monitoring the managers/agents to reduce the 
earnings management against the firm wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Hence, 
there are two types of bonding cost borne by the agent and wealth loss, which are 
borne by the principals when the agent’s actions do not maximise stakeholders’ 
welfare. Overall, agency theory assumes that managers are likely to act in their own 
self-interest, so, to ensure a successful organisation, and drawing from contract 
theory, mechanisms need to be introduced that ensure the interests of all concerned 
are met.  
2.3.3 Transaction Cost Theory  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) explicate that, based on transaction and information 
costs, investors derive economic decisions on heuristics or reference points such as 
zero level or earnings changes, as well on the ‘surprises’ that zero earnings generate. 
In this way, a loss, or decrease in earnings may send a negative signal to outsiders, 
particularly credit ratters and stock analysts who are assessing the firm. This signal 
in turn negatively affects a firm’s credit ratings and the costs of the debt, according 
to Dechow et al. (2000). However, outsiders may attach different weights to such a 
signal, depending on the firm’s previous signals. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
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suggest that transaction cost theory could underlie the reason why companies report 
profit to avoid decreases in earnings. Two assumptions underpin this theory: 
i) “…Information about earnings affects the terms of transactions between 
the firm and its stakeholders and, more specifically, terms of transactions 
are generally more favourable for firms with higher, rather than lower, 
earnings.” (p.122) 
ii) “…The costs of storing, retrieving, and processing information are 
sufficiently high that at least some stakeholders determine the terms of 
transactions with the firm based on heuristic cut-offs at zero levels or zero 
changes in earnings.” (p.122) 
Underpinning this theory is the assumption that people evaluate their choice against 
a point of reference, such as zero profit.  Therefore, if we assume that the cost of 
managing earnings to attain a specific target figure is more or less constant, and 
that managers manipulate measures of profit to change the value assigned by the 
shareholders, we would expect management behaviour that intends to raise 
earnings above a particular point of reference. This represents zero-level profits 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  
Research supports the assumption that firms with higher earnings face lower costs 
in their transactions with stakeholders. Bowen et al. (1995) look at incentives to 
report higher earnings in the case of all stakeholders concerned (e.g., employees, 
customers and suppliers). Although there are other factors that imply disincentives 
to report higher earnings (e.g., regulated firms) the initial assumption is that the 
overall net effect incentivises the reporting of higher earnings.8 
                                                          
8 Cornell and Shapiro (1987) attest that the value of the implicit claims of stakeholders (which is 
directly related to the firm’s market value) reacts to information regarding the financial condition 




The second assumption is that stakeholders employ heuristics to work out the 
transaction terms with the firm; using heuristics is often in response to the 
information costs within economic models (Conlisk, 1996). Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) suggest that some stakeholders employ heuristic cut-offs at zero 
changes in earnings, or zero earnings, when it is costly for them to acquire and 
process earnings’ details of all the firms they do business. DeAngelo (1988) 
investigates the choices that incumbent managers make regarding accounting 
during proxy conflict, and concludes that these managers avoid earnings decreases.  
DeAngelo also refers to evidence that is “... consistent with the hypothesis that 
incumbents exercise their accounting discretion to avoid reporting a net loss during 
an election campaign, perhaps because of the emphasis that dissidents accord these 
losses.” (p. 26) 
2.4 Perspectives of Earnings Management 
Non-perfect conditions in the market influence managers to engage in accounting 
discretion in pursuit of their own self-interest, to the detriment of the shareholders.  
They also find opportunities to employ accounting discretion, which they then use 
to communicate information on their companies’ performance to their investors 
(Trueman and Titman, 1988; Schipper, 1989). In the context of earnings 
management, these perspectives are reflected as opportunistic and beneficial. 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) examine two competing views to explain the relation between 
earnings management and the agency theory. They investigate the beneficial use 
vs. the opportunistic use of earnings management presented under the positive 
accounting theory (PAT), as Watts and Zimmerman (1986) propose. The focus of 
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PAT is on how individuals collaborate/cooperate to provide resources to an 
organisation, and how accounting assists such relationships. In addition, because 
self-interest underpins individuals’ actions and they will then act in an opportunistic 
manner to increase their wealth, this suggests that organisations will put in place 
mechanisms that align the interests of the managers and the owners. PAT offers 
some explanation for why managers choose certain accounting methods, based on 
self-interest, stakeholder relationships, and how financial accounting can reduce 
costs through the aligning of varying interests.  
2.4.1 Opportunistic Perspective 
In general, the opportunistic concept explains the discretionary behaviour of 
managers in relation to financial reporting. It clarifies top managers’ job security 
and their incentives to manipulate earnings when they are faced with the possibility 
of losing their respective jobs. In addition, when CEOs also tend to reduce spending 
on research and development in their final employment years, possibly to increase 
reported earnings (DeAngelo, 1988; Suh, 1990; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Guay et 
al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Christensen et al., 1999; Bradshaw et al., 2001). 
Simply, opportunistic behaviour is the incentive for the choice of accounting 
methods, techniques, and policy decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Christenson, 1983; Deegan, 2013), which leads the managers to manipulate 
earnings opportunistically to enhance either their compensation or their benefit. 
Healy (1985) supports this argument when he delineates the limits wherein 
managers are naturally more inclined to distort information in keeping with bonus 
schemes based on accounting earnings. 
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Therefore, earnings management practices are summarised by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) as three methods: bonus plan, debt covenant hypothesis, and 
political cost.9 These methods seek to deceive the stakeholders and distort the 
actual economical state of the firm, thereby affecting contracts and allowing for 
more personal gain (Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Later managers 
may apply practice to distort earnings via the existence of information asymmetry 
between them and external parties. Earnings may also be managed to meet capital 
market expectations. Consequently, several studies investigate whether managers, 
with incentives to manipulate earnings due to the nature of their compensation 
contracts, actually manage earnings (Jiraporn et al., 2008). Healy (1985) and 
Holthausen et al. (1995) find evidence that executives manage earnings downwards 
when their bonuses are at their maximum. Jiraporn et al. (2008) suggest two 
contradictory stances regarding the correlation between earnings management and 
the agency theory, concentrating on the use of earnings management in an 
opportunistic way, on the one hand, and in a beneficial way, on the other. 
Furthermore, the first stance suggests that managers can take advantage of earnings 
management to maximise their own interests, with an adverse impact on 
shareholder wealth (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Kothari et al., 2016). 
Jiraporn et al. (2008) consider that managers are more likely to engage in 
opportunistic behaviour if their firm is facing with high agency costs. Essentially, 
managers aim to increase the value of earnings by making use of earnings 
                                                          
9 Bonus plan assumes that if a manager is rewarded in terms of a measure of performance such as 
accounting profits, the managers will attempt to increase profits. The debt/equity plan assumes that 
managers exercising discretion by choosing income increasing accounting method to reduce debt 
constraints and the costs of technical default. Political cost assumes that firms will tend to show 
their profits lower by using different accounting methods and procedures so that the firm does not 
attract the attention of politicians (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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management to convey private information to shareholders and the general public. 
Gunny (2010) reinforces this notion, indicating that, in the long-term performance 
is favourably shaped by earnings management.  
2.4.2 Beneficial Perspective/Efficiency Theory 
From the beneficial perspective, managers can utilise earnings management to 
communicate private information to both the shareholders and the public to 
improve the information value of earnings (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
This is what Jiraporn et al. (2008) argue relating to the use of earnings management 
in a beneficial way, where managers can enhance the information value of the 
earnings by utilising earnings management to convey private information to 
shareholders and the wider public and therefore help bridge the information gap 
between them (the managers) and the capital market. This in turn provides more 
timely measures of a firm’s future performance (e.g., Holthausen and Leftwich, 
1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Guay et al., 1996; 
Subramanyam, 1996; Demski, 1998; Arya et al., 2003). 
Subsequently, Jiarporn et al. (2008) postulate that when facing high agency cost 
levels, managers will act in self-interest and apply earnings management for the 
single purpose of disclosing private information. Nevertheless, the information 
perspective supports the notion that outsiders derive information about a firm’s 
outlook and situation from earnings management. First developed by Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1983), this is also known as the signalling perspective, as the 
managers ‘signal’ the future of the firm to stakeholders. According to the 
information perspective, the purpose of accounting methods is to outline the 
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managers’ expectations regarding the firm’s cash flow and, if it were in their best 
interests to communicate information about their firm, they should be rewarded for 
providing information about the prospective cash flows of the firm. 
Mulford and Comiskey (2002) observe that the managers’ selection of accounting 
methods is informative for account users. They also report that earnings 
management “actively manipulates accounting results for the purpose of creating 
an altered impression of business performance” (Mulford and Comiskey, 1996, p. 
360). Such an impression is not necessarily indicative that the earnings are any less 
pertinent. For example, it could be that the managed earnings are more indicative 
of the anticipated earnings than the unmanaged earnings; better depicting the 
financial risk that a firm faces.  
Overall, the notion that earning management conveys helpful information implies 
that those using financial statements – particularly the shareholders and investors –
would request earnings management. Two main factors underpin the shareholders’ 
demand for earnings management. First, as predicted, a steady flow of reported 
earnings is seen to reduce capital costs of the firm. That same flow is also bound to 
influence potential investors’ perceptions of the firm value. Consequently, share 
prices are likely to increase due to managers’ manipulation of their reported 
earnings at a time when the current shareholders are in the process of selling to 
future shareholders. Hence, earnings management is beneficial to current 
shareholders as it helps them to secure higher sale prices later on (Dye, 1988). 
Whether this is done for their own interests (opportunistic) or for the firm’s interest 
(beneficial), this decision is ruled by the contracting arrangements, compensation, 
and agency cost. However, this opportunistic or beneficial behaviour will either 
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result in harm to the firm and stakeholders’ wealth (Kothari et al., 2016), or lead to 
a better future performance (Gunny, 2010).  
2.5 Summary 
Among the various theories discussed, information asymmetry and agency theory 
are the most popular and have received the most attention from academics and 
practitioners in the literature, specifically as a type that lead to market imperfection. 
In turn, information asymmetry leads to two main types of market failure – adverse 
selection, and moral hazard (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Scott, 2003; Bruton et al., 
2009) – which are considered as necessary conditions for earnings management, 
and incentives to make accounting choices. However, the earnings management is 
significantly correlated to the information asymmetry level, particularly over 
prolonged periods. Agency theory has developed along two lines presented under 
PAT: opportunistic and beneficial perspectives (Harris and Raviv, 1978; Jensen, 
1983). The latter stream finds that earnings management that is utilised 
opportunistically has a negative impact on shareholders’ wealth (Teoh et al., 1998a; 
Fan, 2007); but that beneficial behaviour has a positive impact on shareholders’ 
wealth (Jiraporn et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010). Consequently, to reduce the earnings 
management against the firm’s wealth, new costs associated with monitoring and 
bonding with managers as well as with the residual losses arise – these are referred 
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3.1 Introduction  
Graham et al. (2005) survey 400 US corporate executives and find that half of them 
cite earnings as the most important measure reported to the firm’s stakeholders. 
Further, they present evidence that managers prefer manipulation of real operating 
activities to accruals management as earnings management tools. Since earnings 
play an essential role in valuation, contracting, and regulation, they are often the 
main target of managerial discretion. The role of accounting earnings is accepted 
in both accounting practice and research. For instance, Dechow et al. (1998, p. 133) 
note that,  
“Earnings occupy a central position in accounting. It is accounting’s 
summary measure of a firm’s performance. Despite theoretical models that 
value cash flows, accounting earnings is widely used in share valuation 
and to measure performance in management and debt contracts.” 
This chapter clarifies the concept of earnings management. The chapter begins with 
a discussion of the definitions of earnings management and the factors that may 
encourage managers to practice it. After that, a brief clarification of the main 
methods of earnings management – i.e. accrual-based earnings management, real 
earnings management, and classification shifting – is stated. As the focus of this 
study is real earnings management activities, the subsequent section of this chapter 
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reviews extant literature related to earnings management and the association 
between real earnings management and firm’s future performance.  
3.2 Definitions of Earnings Management 
Managers have the discretion to select reporting methods and estimates, and such 
discretion can be either firm-value maximising or opportunistic. Thus, two types of 
earnings management – opportunistic and informative – are employed to meet the 
objectives of management or shareholders. Earnings management is choosing an 
accounting treatment that is either opportunistic to benefit themselves by 
maximising their own utility and/or economically efficient (the market value of the 
firm) (Fields et al., 2001; Scott, 2003).  
Another common definition is offered by a number of scholars (e.g., Ronen and 
Sadan, 1981; Demski et al., 1984; Suh, 1990; Demski, 1998; Sankar and 
Subramanyam, 2001). They observe that beneficial earnings management enhances 
the transparency of reports. In other words, earnings management involves taking 
advantage of the flexibility in the choice of accounting treatment to signal the 
manager’s private information on future cash flows. Furthermore, under the 
information perspective of earnings management, “managerial discretion is a 
means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s 
future cash flows” (Beneish, 2001, p. 3). Stockholders benefit when earnings 
management is used to signal managers’ private information (Healy and Palepu, 
1993) or to reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
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Studies in the filed extend evidence in support of the fact that the managers apply 
accounting discretion in general accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to 
manipulate accruals, largely via accounting choices and estimates (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Beneish, 2001; Fields et al., 2001). On 
the other hand, accruals and operating cash flows can be used to manage earnings, 
which are made up of these two components. Indeed, studies in the past concerning 
the management of earnings have focused on both accruals management and the 
management of underlying real business activities. Three distinct definitions of 
earnings management have been formulated:  
(a) Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines earnings management as “a purposeful 
intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gains (as opposed to say, merely facilitating the 
neutral operation of the process).” He further asserts, “a minor extension of 
this definition would encompass “real” earnings management, 
accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to alter reported 
earnings or some subset of it.” 
(b) According to Davidson et al. (1987, cited in Schipper, 1989, p. 92), earnings 
management is “a process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints 
of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of 
reported earnings.”  
(c) The third, similar, definition of earnings management suggests that 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
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the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999, p. 368).  
These definitions imply that accrual-based earnings management takes place when 
managers control their reported earnings through exploitation of the accounting 
discretion associated with GAAP. On the other hand, real earnings management 
involve managers’ efforts to alter their reported earnings by making suboptimal 
decisions on the timing and scales of underlying business activities. To distinguish 
accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management, Ewert and 
Wagenhofer (2005, p. 1102) note that accrual-based earnings management 
“includes the way accounting standards are applied to record given transactions and 
events” whereas real earnings management “changes the timing or structuring of 
real transactions. Real earnings management implies that the manager deviates 
from another wise optimal plan of actions only to affect earnings, thus, imposing a 
real cost to the firm” and is more harmful to the firm’s future value. They further 
argue, “that an accounting standard setter can tighten standards to restrict the 
discretion for accounting earnings management, but can do little to restrict real 
earnings management.” Roychowdhury (2006, p. 337) uses a similar definition and 
summarises real earnings management as  
“departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ 
desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial 
reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. These 
departures do not necessarily contribute to firm value even though they 
enable managers to meet reporting goals.” 
Xu et al. (2007, p. 3) also distinguish between accrual-based earnings management 
and real earnings management by mentioning that 
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“accrual earnings management occurs when management manipulates 
reported earnings by exploiting the accounting discretion allowed under 
GAAP. In contrast, real earnings management involves management 
attempts to alter reported earnings by adjusting the timing and scale of 
underlying business activities.” 
 Xu et al. (2007) classify real earnings management into two categories. The first 
involves operating and investing activities manipulation, such as discretionary 
expenditures, including research and development (R&D), selling, general and 
administrative expenses (SG&A), postponing of a new project, marketable 
securities, production, inventory, sales of long-term assets, and restructuring of 
investing transactions to take advantages of alternative accounting choices. The 
second category involves financing activities manipulation – for example, stock 
repurchases, financial instruments, and structuring of financing transactions. 10 
Further, the reason for merging operating and investing activities is that many 
operating activities reported in cash-flow statements can be considered as investing 
activities. For instance, R&D is an example of such dual categorisation.   
As argued by Roychowdhury (2006), in order to manage up earnings, managers 
make use of real earnings management activities such as reduction of R&D 
expenses, the timing of asset sales, overproduction, and providing more price 
discounts or/and more lenient credit terms to avoid reporting annual losses. In line 
with Roychowdhury’s definition of real earnings management, managers’ use of 
real earnings management to achieve various targets has been highlighted by many 
                                                          
10 An example of a deviation in financing activities is stock repurchases. Stock repurchase reduces 
the number of shares outstanding and thus may increase earnings per share (EPS) under certain 
conditions. Hribar et al. (2006) mention that the only way that stock repurchase increases EPS when 
the earnings price ratio is larger than the foregone rate of return on cash paid for the repurchase. 
Further, timing may also affect the impact of repurchases on EPS. 
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studies, both theoretical and empirical (e.g., Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Cohen 
et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
Beneish (1999, p. 24) defines earnings manipulation as “an instance where 
management violates GAAP in order to beneficially represent the firm’s financial 
performance.” The question of whether earnings management activities violate or 
occur within the bounds of GAAP has also been studied. Beneish (1999), for 
instance, concentrates on earnings management activities, particularly earnings 
overstatement, that violate GAAP. He finds that, compared to firms that did not 
overstate their earnings, firms practicing overstatement were associated with a 
greater degree of insider trading. He also demonstrates that earnings manipulation 
is in violation of GAAP – a finding that corroborates previous definitions of 
earnings management proposed by Healy (1985) and Schipper (1989). Furthermore, 
Schipper (1989) observes that earnings management is a deliberate action, and that 
it includes any sort of manipulation that can affect financial reporting either through 
earnings numbers or any other accounting items, and can be either legitimate 
(within the bounds of GAAP) or illegitimate (in violation of GAAP).  
The findings of the above-mentioned studies raise the question of whether earnings 
management activities do indeed violate GAAP, and if earnings management is 
actually a form of accounting fraud.11 Addressing this issue, Dechow and Skinner 
(2000) outline the key differences between the two practices. From Figure 3.1, it is 
clear that earnings management activities do not violate GAAP. Thus, if earnings 
                                                          
11 According to the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (NACFE) in 1993 (p. 12) 
Fraud is “the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or accounting data, 
which is misleading and, when considered with all other information made available, would cause 
the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or decision.” 
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manipulations are legitimate (within the bounds of GAAP rules), this is considered 
earnings management. If it does not follow GAAP rules, it is considered accounting 
fraud. Moreover, such activities can be categorised into two types: accounting 
choices and real cash flow choices. Whilst the former (accrual-based earnings 
management) happen within the bounds of GAAP at the end of the fiscal year, the 
latter (real activities-based earnings management) have implications not only for 
current but also for future cash flows and take place throughout the fiscal year 





Figure 3.1: 12 The Distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management
                                                          
12 Source: adopted from Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 239) 
Reporting Type Accounting Choices Real Cash Flows Choices 
 Within GAAP  
“Conservative Accounting” 
Overly aggressive recognition of provision or reserve Delaying sales 
Overvaluation of acquired in-process R&D in purchase acquisitions Accelerating R&D or advertising expenditures 
Overstatement of restructuring charges and asset write-offs  
“Neutral Accounting” Earnings that result from a neutral operation of process  
“Aggressive Accounting” 
Understatement of the provision for bad debts Postponing R&D or advertising expenditures 
Drawing down provisions or reserves in an overly aggressive manner Accelerating sales 
“Fraudulent Accounting” 
Violates GAAP  
Recording sales before they are “realisable”  
Recording fictitious sales  
Backdating sales invoices  
Overstating inventory by recording fictitious inventory  
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3.3 Earnings Management Methods  
Since reported earnings are the outcome of accounting choices and the underlying 
business operations, firms may utilise alternative tools to manipulate their earnings. 
As observed by Lin et al. (2006), US firms utilise earnings management tools to 
meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts. They find that such firms would inflate 
their accrual-based earnings management, manipulate their business activities, 
influence the operating cash flows, and opportunistically shift their expenses from 
core expenses (cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses) to special items in order to enhance reported earnings. 
Based on the definitions of earnings management set out in section 3.2, earnings 
however can be manipulated in a number of ways. Literature has observed three 
different types of earnings management. Accounting choices include a technique 
that biases financial reporting through (1) accrual-based earnings management (e.g., 
Schipper, 1989; Dechow et al., 1995; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Fields et al., 2001), 
(2) classification shifting  (e.g., McVay, 2006; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Fan et al., 
2010; Hawa et al., 2011; Shirato and Nagata, 2012; Zalata and Roberts, 2016) and 
(3) real earnings management that deviates from normal business activities to 
enhance earnings  (e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham et al., 
2005; Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Gunny, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Alhadab, 2015; Cohen et al., 




3.3.1 Real and Accrual Earnings Management  
Earnings management can be classified into two common categories, namely 
accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). 
Neither type of earnings management violates the generally accepted accounting 
principle (GAAP). Occurring at the end of the fiscal year and before the issuance 
of the financial statement, the former consists of generally GAAP accounting 
choices that attempt to “obscure” or “mask” the real economic performance 
(Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Dechow et al., 2010). 
Accrual-based earnings management occurs when managers adjust revenue or 
expenses accrual to alter the financial report; AEM has no direct cash-flow 
consequence and is therefore less likely to destroy long-term firm value. There are 
a number of examples of accrual-based earnings management. These include 
under-provisioning for bad debt expenses (e.g., McNichols and Wilson, 1988; 
Admas et al., 2009); changing the depreciation methods for fixed assets (e.g., Teoh 
et al., 1998a; Skinner, 1993; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004; Admas et al., 2009); 
deferred tax (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a; Philipps et al., 2003); and delaying asset write-
offs (e.g., Elliott and Shaw, 1988) that can bias financial reported earnings in a 
particular direction without changing the underlying transactions.  
There are two situations where managers may have incentives to reported income 
increasing or decreasing by utilising accrual-based earnings management. First, 
when estimated change or expected future earnings fall short of the desired 
threshold, income-increasing accrual-based earnings management could be 
employed to ensure that earnings benchmarks are met, or even slightly exceeded. 
Second, in addition to income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, 
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managers may manipulate earnings through income-decreasing accrual-based 
earnings management to create a reserve that helps them to report a profit in the 
subsequent periods, which subsequently makes future targets more easily 
achievable (Scott, 1997; Levitt, 1998; DeGeorge et al., 1999; Barton and Simko, 
2002, Nelson et al., 2002). For example, Levitt (1998) draws the attention of 
accounting scholars and practitioners to pervasiveness of income-decreasing 
accounting gimmicks including “big bath” and “Cookie Jar reserves”. Healy (1985) 
defines “big bath” as the act of taking greater income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, such as accelerating write-offs, or deferring revenues when the firms 
expect to miss earnings targets. Under this status, firms show to “save up 
discretionary losses or accruals and then record several in the same period or in a 
period in which the firm has already experienced below normal earnings” (Zucca 
and Campbell, 1992, p. 35). 
Besides using accrual-based earnings management to manage/manipulate a firm’s 
earnings, real earnings management is another indirect way to manage earnings. 
Further, real earnings management can be classified into three groups based on the 
classification of activities in the cash-flow statement include manipulations of (1) 
operating activities, (2) financing activities, and (3) investing activities. 
Specifically, this includes boosting sales by providing more price discounts or more 
lenient credit terms, cutting/reducing the discretionary research and development 
(R&D) expenses, cutting/reducing the discretionary selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses, overproducing to report lower cost of goods sold 
(COGS) and timing the sales of fixed assets to report profit (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
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Gunny, 2010). As this study focuses on real earnings management activities, I 
discuss its features and techniques in more detail in the rest of this chapter. 
3.3.2 Classification Shifting 
Recent research finds evidence of another activity of earnings management, 
classification shifting; and this occurs within the bounds of GAAP, but is not 
considered as real or accrual earnings management (e.g., McVay, 2006; 
Athanasakou et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has explicitly indicated that the issue of classification shifting 
is important by stating, “The appropriate classification of amounts within the 
income statement is as important as the appropriate measurement or recognition of 
such amount” (SEC, 2000). However, increasing current earnings using the former 
two methods has the potential to reduce future earnings. Since classification 
shifting simply moves certain revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to different line 
items on the income statement, it does not actually change net income. As a result, 
classification shifting is likely to be less costly and less scrutinised by auditors and 
regulators (Nelson et al., 2002). 
Managers’ usage of classification of items in the income statement for purposes of 
earnings management was examined by McVay (2006), who concludes that 
managers opportunistically shift expenses from core operating expenses (e.g., cost 
of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses) to special items. 
As such, the “street earnings”, which are the earnings numbers specified by analysts’ 
forecasts, are overestimated by the expenses outlined in the statement. Managers 
use classification shifting as a tool of earnings management to meet/beat earnings 
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benchmarks (McVay, 2006). McVay (2006) sets out some of the reasons for 
managers’ greater willingness to use classification shifting than accrual and real 
activity as an earnings management tools. First, while real and accrual earnings 
management change in the bottom-line GAAP of income statement, i.e. reported 
earnings, classification shifting manipulates core earnings without having any 
impact on GAAP earnings (McVay, 2006; Fan et al., 2010). For instance, a shift 
can take place from a non-operating item to an operating item with the purpose of 
showing better performance. Second, classification shifting is less likely to draw 
auditor or regulatory scrutiny. Examining whether internal corporate governance 
constrains classification shifting, Zalata and Roberts (2016) find that high-quality 
internal governance mitigates classification shifting. This suggests, therefore, that 
robust internal governance tends to act as a substitute for strict accounting standards. 
Finally, manipulation of earnings through accruals or real activities affects future 
earnings, with no ‘settling up’ cost of sacrificing economic benefit in future periods, 
which makes it less costly compared with the other two types.  
Fan et al. (2010) find that managers tend to report core expenses as special items to 
inflate earnings, and this is more pronounced for firms that are motivated to 
meet/beat earnings benchmarks. Specifically, they further report that manager 
increase reported earnings by utilising classification shifting in the fourth fiscal 
quarter to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. In addition, Abernathy et al. (2014) find 
that managers are more likely to use classification shifting when other earnings 
management tools (e.g., real and accrual earnings management) are constrained. 
Moreover, classification shifting has also attracted attention on an international 
level because firms often have greater discretion over classification of revenues and 
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expenses under the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) (e.g., Hawa 
et al., 2011; Shirato and Nagata, 2012). Further, there has been a great deal of 
discussion about the practice of classification shifting by UK firms. For example, 
focusing on three earnings management tools – i.e. – real earnings management, 
accrual-based earnings management, and classification shifting, Athanasakou et al. 
(2011) provide evidence suggesting that UK firms’ earnings forecast guidance and 
classification shifting be utilised to meet analysts’ expectations. In addition, 
Athanasakou et al. (2009) find evidence suggesting that large UK firms utilised 
classification shifting of core expense to non-recurring items to manage earnings 
upward to meet/beat earnings benchmarks to avoid negative earnings surprise. 
3.4 The Difference between Real and Accrual Earnings 
Management 
There are many reasons that may prompt managers to choose real earnings 
management instead of accrual earnings management. First of all, ex-post 
aggressive accounting choices with respect to accruals are at higher risk for 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) scrutiny and class action litigation 
(Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Graham et al., 2005).13 Cohen et al. (2008), for 
instance, find that managers changed their approach following the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 (SOX), generally switching from using accrual earnings management to 
real earnings management following its implementation.14 Their results explain 
                                                          
13 Firms that aggressively manage earnings by utilising accrual-based earnings management have 
higher risks of regulatory scrutiny (auditor litigation) and shareholder lawsuits (Dechow et al., 1996; 
DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Heninger, 2001).  
14 The collapse of companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and the auditing firm Arthur Andersen 
increased investors’ concerns about the integrity of financial reporting. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
was issued by the Securities Exchange Committee on 30th July 2002 after the big accounting 
scandals in the US to remedy corporate governance failures that had allowed the scandals to occur. 
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decisions in terms of the restricted ability to manipulate accrual accounting. Second, 
the firm may be restricted in its ability to manipulate accruals. Real earnings 
management, in contrast, is more flexible15, since its activities can be managed all 
through the fiscal year (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010). 
Real earnings management is associated with actions taken by managers to 
manipulate the timing or structure of an operation, investment, and/or financial 
transaction, usually in an attempt to impact upon the accounting system’s output. 
That is why prior literature has often focused on analysing managerial discretion in 
relation to a number of actions. These include reduction in expenditure on research 
and development (R&D), advertising expenses, selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) activities, and boosting sales by offering greater price discounts or more 
lenient credit terms. Other actions include timing the sales of fixed assets to report 
profit, and overproduction of inventory to report lower cost of goods sold expense 
to enhance current-period earnings (e.g., Baber et al., 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Bartov, 1993; Bushee, 1998; Cheng, 2004; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 
2010; Sohn, 2016). Although both types of earnings management are associated 
with the managers’ endeavours to manipulate their earnings, they differ in that one 
type influences the operations (with direct effects on cash flows, whereas the other 
has no effect whatsoever on operation activities. 
                                                          
given that the purpose of SOX is “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures.” 
15 Cheng (2004) finds that firms which manage earnings upward through accrual-based earnings 
management with less accounting flexibility are more likely to miss their own analysts’ earnings 
forecasts consensus as real earnings management becomes relatively less costly (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Zang, 2012). 
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Further, Graham et al. (2005) find strong evidence that CEO firms choose real 
earnings management instead of accrual earnings management to avoid the scrutiny 
of regulators and thus to improve accounting appearances. Further, some 
economists (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Chi et al., 2011; Zang, 2012) examine the 
trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings management for firms using a 
high-quality auditor. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) document a trade-off between real 
and accrual-based earnings management for seasoned equity offering firms, and 
find that SEO firms that are audited by high-quality auditors (Big N audit) are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management around the time of seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) because their ability to manipulate accrual-based earnings 
management is constrained. Similarly, Chi et al. (2011) document a trade-off 
between real and accrual-based earnings management for firms that have strong 
incentives to inflate earnings in order to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. 
They find that the probability of these firms to employ real earnings management 
increases when they are audited by high-quality auditors to avoid monitoring of 
accrual-based earnings management; and they also show a negative association 
between accrual-based earnings management and Big N auditors.  
Furthermore, Sohn (2016) examines the effect of accounting comparability on 
AEM and REM and finds that, when their firm’s accounting is more comparable 
with that of other firms, AEM decreases but REM increases. Conversely, Zang 
(2012) does not find a trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings 
management around earnings benchmarks, and finds that managers use the two 
common types of earnings management as substitutes in managing earnings. In 
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other words, she does not find a positive association between real earnings 
management and Big N auditors.  
Furthermore, accrual-based earnings management is constrained by the ability that 
managers have to manage earnings upward by business and accrual manipulation 
in previous years (Barton and Simko, 2002). Moreover, managers cannot be sure 
about the accounting methods sanctioned by their auditors, since accruals 
management occurs at the end of the fiscal year (or quarter). Unlike operating 
decisions, accounting choices are not controlled by the managers, but by the 
auditors. Conversely, since accrual earnings management occurs after the end of 
the fiscal year, when earnings transparency is most necessary, it might be a better 
option than real earnings management, which takes place before the end of the 
fiscal year. In addition, accrual-based earnings management is more costly in the 
short term, whereas real earnings management affects a firm’s cash flows, which 
has negative consequences on a firm’s operating performance and stock return 
performance in the long term (Graham et al., 2005; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Kothari et al., 2016). 
3.5 Earnings Management Motivations 
In order to achieve a good stock market performance and financial position, 
managers are incentivised to manage earnings based on accounting numbers not 
only to maximise the value of firms but also to extract private benefit (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). However, an enormous body of literature that explains the 
association between earnings management and different motivations. In turn, this 
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association may influence the earnings management choices of firms. According to 
Healy and Wahlen (1999), the three reasons to motivate earnings management are: 
(1) Capital market incentives such as meeting or beating important earnings 
benchmarks, e.g., report positive profit, avoiding earnings decrease and 
avoiding negative earnings surprises (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Degeorge, et al., 1999; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Graham et al., 2005), 
and manipulating earnings around specific stock market situations such as 
an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO) (Rangan, 
1998; Teoh et al., 1998a, 1998b).  
(2) Contractual incentives such as meeting performance-based compensation 
targets, or to avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). 
(3) Political cost and regulatory incentives (Jones, 1991; Hang and Wang, 1998; 
Efendi et al., 2014).  
There is, however, no crucial evidence on the best activities of earnings 
management to meet/beat a particular goal over others. In the following sub-
sections, I review and discuss these incentives issues.  
3.5.1 Capital Market Motivations 
3.5.1.1 Earnings Benchmarks 
Prior literature documents three important earnings management benchmarks that 
managers employ in their choice to meet or beat benchmarks: (1) reporting positive 
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profit (Roychowdhury, 2006; Osma, 2008); (2) avoiding earnings decrease 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997); and (3) avoid reporting negative surprises 
(Dechow et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Graham et al., 2005). 
In terms of stock market motivation, managers manipulate earnings to report 
positive profits and avoid negative earnings surprises. Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) find that using earnings through accrual accounting and cash flows from 
operations to report positive profit and avoid earnings decline. More specifically, 
they find that more than half of firms manage earnings to report positive net income 
or to raise small earnings. Degeorge et al. (1999) present similar evidence on 
earnings management manipulation to meet earnings benchmarks and find that 
managers may report positive profit but, once profitability is reached, they attempt 
to meet analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. Roychowdhury (2006) also 
supports the findings from Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) study. Based on a 
sample of 4,252 firms from 36 industries, he finds that managers in US firms 
manage earnings upward by using price discount and more lenient credit terms to 
achieve a number of outcomes. These include temporarily boost current sales, 
reduce/cut discretionary expenditures and increase production to report lower cost 
of goods sold to meet/beat two earnings benchmarks: analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts, and report positive profit.  
Furthermore, firms can manipulate their real earnings management activities 
depending on whether the need is to meet/beat analysts’ consensus earnings 
forecasts. For instance, R&D expenditures are not capitalised but usually classed 
as expenses. However, firms that capitalise R&D spending do not cut R&D 
expenditures. One British Pound spent on R&D means one British Pound less in 
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reported earnings. When managers are under pressure to meet/beat analysts’ 
consensus earnings forecasts, they may cut R&D expenses spending to boost 
current earnings. Osma and Young (2009) examine the relation between two 
earnings benchmarks: positive earnings and earnings growth and change in R&D 
expenses. Using a sample of 700 UK firms’ capitalisers and expensers over the 
period 1989-2002, they find evidence that the probability of subsequent cutting of 
current R&D spending increases when firms fail to report positive profit and 
earnings growth. They also find evidence that managers in UK firms cut strategic 
investment, such as current R&D investments to meet earnings targets. In a recent 
study, Mindak et al. (2016) examine whether firms manage earnings upward or 
downward to beat three important earnings benchmarks; namely zero earnings, last 
year’s earnings, and analysts’ forecast. They find that firms that meet or just beat 
important benchmarks are managing earnings upward. 
3.5.1.2 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
Most empirical research supports the view that firms on average opportunistically 
manage up earnings before or during a specific stock market situation, such as an 
initial public offering. This evidences that IPO firms manipulate earnings upward 
on both real earnings management and accrual earnings management in order to 
increase the IPO stock price (Ritter, 1991; Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 1994; 
Teoh et al., 1998b; DuCharme et al., 2001; Roosenboom et al., 2003; Morsfield and 
Tan, 2006). Teoh et al. (1998b) find evidence that US IPO firms – on average – 
opportunistically manage up earnings by utilising income-increasing accrual-based 
earnings management during the year of IPOs. However, IPO firms with high levels 
of accrual earnings management significantly underperform in the market for three 
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years following the IPO and thus lead to misled investors during IPOs by earnings 
management. Furthermore, Morsfield and Tan (2006) who examine the effect of 
participation of venture capitalists on earnings management by IPO firms, find 
evidence consistent with Teoh et al. (1998b); they also show that utilised earnings 
management (discretionary accruals) of IPO firms that are backed by venture 
capitalists manage earnings less than other IPO firms. 
DuCharme et al. (2001) examine earnings management and subsequent 
performance of IPO firms. They show that abnormal accrual earnings management 
during the IPO year is negatively related to post-IPO stock returns and is positively 
associated with initial firm’s value. Roosenbooma (2003) finds that managers of 
IPO firms manage accrual earnings management aggressively in order to increase 
the share price of IPO in the first year after the IPO but not in the years before the 
IPOs. Further, they find evidence that IPO firms with high levels of accrual 
earnings management experience significantly negative stock performance for 
three years following the IPO. 
Some research interprets high levels of earnings management as aggressive, 
pernicious earnings management. A different perspective exists against 
opportunistic earnings management around IPOs and there is empirical evidence to 
support this view (Ball and Shivakumarb, 2006; Fan, 2007; Armstrong et al., 2009). 
Fan (2007) examines the interaction between earnings management and owners’ 
retention of shares and finds that discretionary accruals are the highest in the IPO 
year. His finding shows a positive correlation between discretionary accruals in the 
IPO year with future earnings leads him to conclude that accruals are a credible 
signal from high-quality IPO firms. His finding also provides further support that 
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earnings and owners’ retention of shares are positively priced in valuing an IPO 
firm.  
Ball and Shivakumarb (2006) study earnings quality around the time of IPO in the 
UK and they find that UK IPO firms begin reporting more conservatively prior to 
IPO. In addition, they find no evidence that managers in UK IPOs firms 
opportunistically inflate earnings prior to IPO. Moreover, Armstrong et al. (2009) 
examine the magnitude of discretionary accruals around IPOs and find no evidence 
of a relationship between accruals manipulation and the four incentives for 
managers to manipulate earnings (e.g., IPO issue price, post-IPO stock return, 
insider trading, and CEO compensation). Specifically, they attribute negative 
correlation between accrual earnings management and the year of IPO issue price 
and post-IPO stock return performance to cash-flow mispricing. Further, Alhadab 
et al. (2016) examine REM and AEM during the year of IPOs in both UK markets 
(Main Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM)) and find that IPO firms 
engage in REM during the year of IPOs. Specifically, IPO firms on the AIM 
manage earnings upward through manipulating their sales and accrual earnings 
management, and engage in lower levels of discretionary expenses linked to IPO 
firms on the Main Market. 
3.5.1.3 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) 
A large body of research has presented evidence that firms engage in income-
increasing earnings management activities to enhance reported earnings before 
issuing stocks (SEO) (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; Yoon and Miller, 2002; 
Lee and Masulis, 2009). For example, Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998a) 
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examine the relation between discretionary accruals as a proxy earnings 
management and the performance of seasoned equity offering; they find that US 
firms make SEOs manage earnings upwards in the quarter of, and the quarter after, 
the SEO to meet the threshold of stocks offering. Specifically, they provide 
evidence that discretionary accruals grow before the offering, peak in the offering 
year, and decline subsequently, resulting in earnings increasing before the offering 
and being highest in the SEO year and declining afterwards. Further, they also find 
evidence that earnings management (e.g., firms with a high level of accrual 
earnings management) which takes place during offer years is negatively associated 
with post-SEO stock market performance. 
Further, Lee and Masulis (2009) investigate the effect of accounting information 
quality (measured by discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones 
Model) on SEO underwriting fees. Based on a sample of 963 US SEOs over the 
period 1990-2002, Lee and Masulis (2009) provide evidence suggesting that US 
firms aggressively manage earnings upward through income-increasing 
discretionary accruals in the year prior to the equity offering (SEOs). Further, they 
provide evidence that a firm with poor accounting information quality is associated 
with higher flotation costs in terms of (1) larger underwriting fees, (2) larger 
negative SEO announcement effects, and (3) a higher probability of SEO 
withdrawals.  
Earlier literature has focused on discretionary accruals, total accrual and specific 
items of accrual-based manipulation during the year of SEOs (e.g., Teoh et al., 
1998a; Ragan, 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; DuCharme et al., 2004; Marquardt and 
Wiedman, 2004). However, managers also have the option to increase reported 
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earnings through real earnings management activities before issuing stocks (Cohen 
and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari 
et al. (2016) present new evidence that managers of SEO firms engage in both 
income-increasing real-based and accrual-based earnings management 
manipulations during the year of issuing stocks (SEO). Further, they find that the 
SEO firms that manipulate earnings in both income-increasing real earnings 
management activities and accrual earnings management have poor operating 
performance and stock return performance in the post-offering period while the 
decline assigned to real earnings management is greater than that assigned to 
accrual earnings management.  
3.5.2 Contracting Motivations 
The empirical studies on the contractual motives for earnings management focus 
on two important contracts affecting firms’ discretion. These are compensation 
contracts of the firm’s executive and lending contracts of the firm, and they are 
created to reduce potential agency problems. Compensation contracts of a firm’s 
executive typically consist of base salary and earnings based-compensation deal 
with the conflicts between managers and shareholders of a firm. Further, 
compensation contracts of a firm’s executive include incentives that encourage 
managers to maximise the firm’s value (Smith and Watts, 1982). Lending contracts 
are concerned about the potential conflicts between shareholders and debt holders, 





3.5.2.1 Management Compensation Contracts 
Under the opportunistic perspective, managers exercise their accounting discretion 
not to maximise the value of the firm but to transfer wealth and make themselves 
better off at the expense of other contracting parties by selecting reporting methods 
and estimates that do not accurately reflect their firms’ underlying economics 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Healy and Wahlen, 
1999). However, under the bonus-maximisation hypothesis, Healy (1985) shows 
that managers utilise earnings management (e.g., accrual-based earnings 
management) to maximise the value of their bonuses award under the firm’s 
compensation plans. Consistent with this view, previous studies find evidence that 
performance-based compensation motivates managers to manage up earnings 
utilising earnings management activities (e.g., Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007), and other studies find a 
decline in shareholders’ wealth (e.g., Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 
2016).   
Some studies examine the effects of CEOs’ equity incentives on the earnings 
management to meet/beat important earnings benchmarks and income smoothing. 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) examine the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives 
derived from stock-option-based compensation such as option grant and earnings 
management to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts that not only reduce 
agency cost but also motivate managers. Based on a US sample over the period 
1993-2000, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that US firms with high equity 
incentives manage up earnings using accrual-based earnings management to meet 
or beat analyst consensus forecasts. They also find a negative relationship between 
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equity incentives and strong positive earnings surprise (indicative of income 
smoothing). These results are consistent with CEOs’ firms that manage earning 
upward to increase stock price to sell their own shares by meeting/beating the 
analyst target when their share price could be damaged by failing to value option 
pay-outs.  
Similarly, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find evidence that US firms’ equity 
incentives of CEOs derived from stock-based compensation (option) are 
significantly positively associated with management utilising accrual-based 
earnings management activities and sell more shares during the years of higher 
accrual manipulation. However, Johnson et al. (2005) provide evidence that only 
firms with unrestricted stock holdings are positively associated with the occurrence 
of accounting fraud – at the same time they report that fraud firms do not achieve 
greater incentives from the stock option grants or restricted stock. Further, Erickson 
et al. (2006) and Armstrong et al. (2010) examine whether higher levels of equity-
based incentives (e.g., compensation) are linked to earnings management, and find 
evidence that equity-based incentives of CEOs are not associated with accounting 
fraud. 
The information asymmetry that exists between managers and principles (e.g., 
shareholders) affords managers opportunities to take actions to increase their own 
wealth at the cost of principles’ wealth. Many studies of earnings management have 
documented real earnings management as managers’ choices that deviate from 
optimal business decisions to increase firms’ current earnings but harm firms’ 
future value. Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine the association between the 
abnormal real earnings management through reduction of R&D expenses and CEOs’ 
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performance-based compensation. They find evidence that CEOs in their final 
years of office reduced R&D spending to improve short-term earnings performance. 
Given that Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) are likely to be in a position to strongly 
influence accounting choices, a number of recent studies examine whether earnings 
management is associated with equity incentives of CFOs. Jiang et al. (2010) find 
evidence that equity incentives of CFOs have a greater impact than equity 
incentives of CEO in determining earnings management, measured by accrual-
based management and the likelihood of beating analysts’ forecasts. On the other 
hand, CFOs may become involved in material accounting manipulations because 
of pressure from their powerful CEOs. 
Further insights into the extent to which US CFOs are implicated in earnings 
management are provided by Feng et al. (2011) who examine the reasons associated 
with CFOs becoming involved with non-GAAP accounting manipulation. They 
find that the CFOs of manipulation firms have similar equity incentives compared 
to the CFOs of control firms (e.g., non-manipulating firms), but that the CEOs of 
manipulating firms have greater equity incentives and more power than the CEOs 
of control firms. Thus, Feng et al. (2011) suggest that CFOs mainly yield to 
pressure from CEOs motivated by equity incentives to engage in material 
accounting manipulation. 
3.5.2.2 Lending Contracts 
Since violation of debt covenants is costly, debt contracts that define a default in 
terms of accounting numbers may incentivise firms’ managers to engage in 
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earnings management where a firm is close to violating a debt covenant; and thus 
reduce the probability of a default (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).16 
A number of studies have shown how avoiding the violation of debt becomes a 
motivation for firms to utilise accrual-based earnings management, and present 
evidence that firms engage in accrual-based earnings management in order to avoid 
violation of debts covenants (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994; 
Dichev and Skinner, 2002; HassabElnaby et al., 2007).  
Sweeney (1994) investigates accounting policy choice in a sample of 130 US firms 
reporting covenant violation in annual report during the period 1980 to 1989. She 
provides evidence that in firms with larger debt-to-equity ratio managers are more 
likely to use income-increasing earnings management techniques in the year prior 
to covenant violations in order to mitigate the unexpectedly high default costs and 
improve their bargaining position; this is consistent with the debt covenant 
hypothesis. Specifically, she contends that managers may manage up earnings 
through earnings management techniques while in technical default to resolve the 
default, if they have sufficient accounting flexibility that they lacked before 
entering the technical default and imposed cost by lenders.  By using a large sample 
of US firms, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find evidence that the closeness of 
managers in US firms to debt covenants use income-increasing accrual-based 
earnings management to avoid technical default of debt covenant. Further, they also 
provide evidence that violations of debt covenants are not necessarily associated 
with financial distress. 
                                                          
16 Technical defaults occur when the borrower has failed to remain in compliance with a loan 
covenant, and do not imply financial distress. 
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DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find similar evidence to that reported by Sweeney 
(1994). They examine the association between debt covenants’ violation and firms’ 
accrual earnings management in a sample of 94 listed firms that report a debt 
covenants violation in their annual reports during the period 1985 to 1988. This is 
after controlling for audit going-concern qualifications and management change 
findings in the year of violation and in the year prior, abnormal working capital 
accruals and abnormal total accruals were significantly positive. In addition, 
HassabElnaby et al. (2007) report that firm continue to manage up earnings even 
after technical default. Moreover, other studies do not find evidence to document 
earnings management surrounding technical default (Healy and Palepu, 1990; 
DeAngelo et al., 1994). 
Earnings management and debt contracts studies focus on accrual earnings 
management but do not address whether firms engage in higher levels of real 
earnings management to avoid debt covenant violations. By using a sample of 653 
firm-year observations over the period 1987-1989, Bartov (1993) finds evidence 
that firms time their sales of long-term assets as tools of real earnings management 
activities by managing earnings upward to avoid debt covenant violation. Recently, 
Roychowdury (2006) finds that firms increase reported earnings by engaging in 
real earnings management activities and thus avoid covenant violation. 
Further, Kim et al. (2011) examine the relationship between closeness to net worth 
covenant slack and a firm’s real earnings management. They find that firms engage 
in greater real activities manipulation when debt covenants slack is tighter. They 
also find when a firm’s ability to re-negotiate the debt covenant technical default is 
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restricted; it is more likely to manage earnings upward through real earnings 
management activities in order to avoid violation of debt covenants.  
More recently, Franz et al. (2014) examine both real and accrual earnings 
management using a US sample consisting of 2,195 loans over the period 1992-
2007. They find that firms close to violation or in technical default engage in higher 
levels of total earnings management (e.g., accrual and real earnings management 
together) than other firms do with least incentive from debt covenants (e.g., firms 
distant from violation). Although firms with stronger debt covenant incentives (e.g., 
firms close to violating covenants or firms in technical defaults incentives) are 
significantly more likely to use both accrual-based earnings management and real 
earnings management, they tend to use real earnings management more than 
accrual-based earnings management. 
In summary, studies to date indicate that accrual and real earnings management 
when they are close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants firms’ 
earnings management generate the incentive to manage earnings upward and thus 
to mitigate the costs of technical default or to avoid technical defaults of their debt 
covenants. Moreover, these studies suggest that compensation and lending 
contracts induce at least some firms to engage in higher levels of earnings 
management activities to increase bonus awards, improve job security, and mitigate 
potential violation of debt covenants. 
3.5.3 Political Cost and Regulatory Motivations 
When earnings of specific companies are likely to be influenced by governmental 
intervention, managers have an incentive to adjust their earnings to avoid, 
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encourage or influence governmental interference. This influence could be indirect 
because earnings seem to be “excessive” (potential future regulation), or directly 
through existing regulation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Based on the “political-
cost hypothesis”, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) show that, during periods of 
heightened political cost, motor carrier firms engage in income-decreasing earnings 
management when faced with potential industry deregulation. 
Jones (1991) and Cahan (1992) show that firms have negative abnormal accruals 
during periods of investigation by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) 
or the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), respectively. By examining a sample 
of 23 US firms, Jones (1991) observes income-decreasing earnings management 
during import relief investigations to obtain favourable regulation (import relief - 
e.g., tariff increases, quota reductions, marketing agreements, and/or federal 
adjustment assistance). Cahan (1992) and Gill-de-Albornoz and Illueca (2005) 
show that managers in firms investigated for anti-trust violations engage in income-
decreasing earnings by utilising accrual manipulation during periods of heightened 
political costs, implying that such firms seek to avoid non-favourable regulation.  
In terms of industry regulations and deregulation, Key (1997) and Cho and Sachs 
(2012) find similar results within the US cable and US motor carrier industries. 
Focusing on the period of Congressional scrutiny (1989-1991), Key (1997) 
examines whether the US cable television (TV) industry engages in income 
decreasing using accrual-based earnings management in order to avoid 
congressional scrutiny and potential regulations, and shows that the US cable TV 
industry has negative abnormal accruals during the congressional scrutiny period 
of 1989-1991. Furthermore, Cho and Sachs (2012) find that US motor carriers 
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manage earnings downward during the political-cost deregulation period of 1975-
1979 by using Dechow et al.’s (1995) accruals model in an effort to avoid 
deregulation.    
Further, Hang and Wang (1998) assess the situation during the 1990 Persian Gulf 
Crisis by examining a sample of 76 oil and gas firms. They find evidence that oil 
firms during this period were motivated to decrease their reported earnings for the 
third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year by engaging in income-decreasing 
accrual accounting in order to avoid political costs generated by potential adverse 
political actions such as regulations, anti-trust and government. Furthermore, 
Monem (2003) hypothesises that, during the period from June 1985 to May 1988, 
Australian gold-mining firms are expected to engage in downward earnings 
management (accrual-based earnings management) in order to avoid political costs 
that will be imposed on firms reporting high profits. 
3.6 Empirical Evidence of Real Earnings Management  
The high-quality disclosure system is defined as “information about the reporting 
entity that is useful to present and potential equity investors, lenders and other 
creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers” (IASB, 2008). 
The quality of the disclosure system and financial reporting is of vital importance 
not only to make capital markets more efficient and manage their liquidity level 
(Levitt, 1997, 1998), but also to support the elimination of information asymmetry 
and agency problems that could emerge between managers and stakeholders (Core, 
2001; Heal and Palepu, 2001). As reported in the literature managers are more 
likely to utilise earnings management to serve their personal interests if there are 
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higher levels of information asymmetry and agency problems between insiders 
(managers) and outsiders (shareholders) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Trueman and Titman, 1988; Schipper, 1989; Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). 
A higher level of information asymmetry suggests that managers are more 
cognisant of the firm’s current and future operation than outsiders are. This makes 
it easier for them to manipulate reported earnings by engaging in earnings 
management, particularly if they have strong incentives. For example,  meet or just 
beat important earnings benchmarks (to report positive net income – that is, report 
earnings that are above zero; to maintain recent performance – that is, make at least 
last year’s earnings; and to avoid reporting negative surprises – that is, meet 
analysts’ expectations, particularly the analysts’ consensus earnings forecast), debt 
covenants, and executive compensation.  
Real earnings management began to attract growing research attention following 
the studies of Graham et al. (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006), with particular focus 
on the effects of real earnings management in the long term. However, firms are 
found to manage earnings upward through manipulation of the following real 
earnings management activities: 
 Discretionary expenditures, including research and development (R&D), 
advertising expenses and selling, general and administrative expenses 
(SG&A) 
 
 Securitisation  
 Stock repurchases 
 Sales of long-term assets 
 Derivative hedging and debt-equity swaps 
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 Production, inventory and sales 
 Structuring of business transactions to take advantage of alternative 
accounting choices 
3.6.1 Manipulation of Discretionary Expenditures including Research and 
Development (R&D) 
Research and development expenditures play a significant part in earnings 
management, and they have been analysed extensively within prior studies. Under 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.2, October 1973, 
R&D expenditures are expenses immediately, rather than capitalised, and managers 
could adjust the R&D expenditures to meet their earnings targets. The managerial 
discretion over R&D expenditures represents the main concern of the majority of 
these papers (Baber et al., 1991; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Bange and De Bondt, 
1998; Bushee, 1998; Cheng, 2004; Gunny, 2005).  
Baber et al. (1991) examine a sample of 438 US industrial firms, with 4,818 firm-
year observations over the period 1977-1987 and find that US industrial companies 
ordinarily reduce their R&D expenditures when spending, thereby jeopardising 
their ability to post positive earnings or augment their earnings. Such a reduction 
in R&D expenditure cannot be attributed to disparities in investment opportunities. 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine a sample of 405 US manufacturing firms with 
large R&D spending over the period 1974-1988 and illustrate that, as their tenure 
draws to an end, CEOs with earnings-based incentives tend to reduce R&D costs. 
This implies that managers are driven by earnings-based incentives to enhance 
performance in the short term by cutting back on discretionary expenditures 
(advertising and SG&A spending, for example, along with R&D). Bushee (1998) 
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examines a US sample of 13,944 firm-year observations over the period 1983-1994 
and finds that institutional ownership reduces management’s incentives to reduce 
R&D spending to avoid an earnings decline.  
Bange and De Bondt (1998) examine a sample of 100 US firms with large R&D 
expenditures over the period 1977-1986, and provide evidence that CEO stock 
ownership and large institutional investors also mitigate opportunistic R&D 
reductions. Using a sample of 160 US firms over the period 1984-1997, Cheng 
(2004) investigates whether executive compensation committees respond to 
opportunistic reduction in R&D expenditures. She finds a significant positive 
association between change in R&D and changes in CEO annual compensation that 
discourage CEOs from reducing R&D when they approach retirement and when 
the firm faces small loss or decline in earnings. Her finding indicates that 
compensation committees understand and deter opportunistic manipulation of 
R&D spending.   
In contrast, Shon and Yan (2015) examine a US sample of 19,944 firm-quarters 
observations to establish whether they either meet or beat earnings benchmarks 
over the period 1989-2011. They find that firms reported earnings downward 
(upward) by reduction of R&D expenditures in the fourth quarter. They interpret 
this result as consistent with the relative cost of real activities manipulation 
decreasing in the fourth quarter while the cost of accruals management increases as 
a result of annual audit. 
Oswald and Zarowin (2007) investigate the extent to which the ability of UK firms 
to meet their earnings targets is affected by their attitude to R&D expenditures. 
Their findings reveal that the typical earnings management practice employed by 
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UK listed firms is to reduce the amount of R&D expenditure. It is worth noting, 
however, that companies that capitalise their R&D expenditure avoid reducing said 
expenditure.17 In fact, they increase their earnings through accruals – essentially 
reducing the R&D expenditure by capitalising a larger proportion of that 
expenditure. Such findings indicate that managers resort to real earnings 
management involving greater costs if accruals management is limited by more 
stringent accounting regulations. 
 Moreover, Osma (2008) examines a sample of 3,438 UK firm-year observations 
for the decade between 1990 and 2002 and finds that UK listed firms manipulate 
reported earnings by cutting R&D expenses to meet earnings benchmarks. 
Specifically, he finds that board independence reduces the probability that a firm 
will cut R&D spending as a result of previous period disappointments, or to push 
the earnings into meeting current-period targets. Dinh et al. (2016) investigate how 
firms that beat earnings benchmarks capitalise on R&D expenditure under IFRS 
(e.g., analysts’ forecasted earnings and last year’s earnings). They find a negative 
association between market values and capitalised R&D for firms that are likely to 
employ capitalisation to beat benchmarks. 
                                                          
17 Oswald and Zarowin (2007, pp. 709-710) state that UK firms have the option to expense or 
capitalise R&D expenditures subject to certain restrictions. “UK GAAP permits, but does not 
require, the capitalization and subsequent amortization of development expenditures if five 
conditions are met: (1) there is a clearly defined project; (2) the related expenditure is separately 
identifiable; (3) the outcome of the project is examined for its technical feasibility and its ultimate 
commercial viability considered in light of factors such as likely market conditions (including 
competing products), public opinion, and consumer and environmental legislation; (4) the aggregate 
of deferred development costs, any further development costs, and related production, selling and 
administrative costs is reasonably expected to be exceeded by related future sales or other revenues; 
and (5) adequate resources exist, or are reasonably expected to be available, to enable the project to 
be completed and to provide any consequential increases in working capital (Statement of Standard 
Accounting Practice (SSAP) No. 13, 1989). Any expenditures on research (pure or applied) must 
be expensed in the period incurred. In summary, the five conditions are intended to ensure that an 
asset is indeed created by the R&D expenditures.” 
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3.6.2 Earnings Management via Securitisation 
Another example of a type of real earnings management activity is the timing of 
transactions. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009, p. 99) define securitisations as:  
“a form of financing that has several advantages over traditional 
bank financing. For example, firm no longer has to wait for 
customers to pay to obtain cash flows, and they often can obtain 
these cash flows at lower interest rates than required from a 
traditional bank.”  
Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) investigate earnings management associated with 
gains from assets securitisations and examine the timing decisions of firms that 
used a ‘gain on sale’ method of recording securitisation transactions. Under this 
method, assets such as accounts receivable are taken off the books and their place 
is taken by the cash that a retained asset represents in the firm’s claims to future 
cash flows. In order to balance the accounts, a gain or loss is calculated, but usually 
a gain is recorded (Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009). Dechow and Shakespeare 
(2009) focus on two common earnings benchmarks, reporting a profit and reporting 
an increase over last year’s earnings, and explain that firms that report gains 
sufficient to beat the benchmarks are more likely to engage in securitisation 
transactions. They find that most of the gains from securitisation were clustered in 
the third month of the quarter (41%) and almost half of these occur in the last five 
days of the quarter. This indicates an attempt by management to use transactions to 





3.6.3 Stock Repurchase as Tools of Earnings Management 
In addition to R&D and securitisation manipulation, other types of real earnings 
management activities that have been explored include stock repurchase. 
Specifically, managers take advantage of the flexibility in controlling the time and 
scale of open market stock repurchase programmes and are not required to disclose 
details of their repurchase transaction to increase reported earnings 
opportunistically to meet the desired threshold. In contrast, financial economists 
confirm that firms buy back stock to signal managerial optimism (Vermaelen, 1981) 
or to reduce agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000).  
The most common way in which US firms repurchase their stock is through an open 
market repurchase programme (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Cook et al., 2003).18 
In addition, Hribar et al. (2006) examine a sample of 26,480 US firm quarters with 
more than $10,000 stock repurchases over the period 1988-2001. They consider the 
effect of stock repurchases as a means to affect the earnings per share and meet the 
consensus analyst forecast. They observe that the market discounts this earnings 
management attempt. Such firms have a premium for beating expectations that is 
about 60% lower than the one for firms that do not use stock repurchase to make 
up the number. However, using the repurchase to avoid missing the analyst forecast 
appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.  
Bens et al. (2003) find that firms repurchase their stock to mitigate the dilution 
effect of employee stock options on diluted earnings per share, and to achieve the 
desired rate of EPS growth. Specifically, they find that stock repurchases increase 
                                                          
18 Grullon and Ikenberry (2005) note that “Open-market programs accounted for 94.3% of all 
repurchases announced during 1990s and 95.2% of the total dollar value of shares repurchased.” 
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in years when options-related earnings per share dilution increase, and annual 
earning is below the level required to sustain past earnings per share growth rates. 
3.6.4 Earnings Management via Sales of Profitable Assets 
The timing of assets sales is a manager’s choice, and because gains are reported on 
the income statement at the time of sale, the timing of asset sales could be used as 
a way to manage reported earnings. Bartov (1993) examines a sample of 653 US 
firm-year observations with income from asset sales reported as ordinary over the 
period 1987-1989 and finds evidence that managers time the sales of long-lived 
assets and investments (hereafter assets) in order to manipulate reported earnings. 
Specifically, he finds that manager increase reported earnings by utilising asset 
sales to smooth reported earnings and to avoid incurring debt covenant violations. 
Herrmann et al. (2003) examine a sample of 3,068 Japanese firm-year observations 
with March fiscal year-end over the period 1993-1997 and find evidence that 
Japanese firms manage earnings upward (downward) by selling long-term assets 
and stock investments when the operating income is below (above) management 
earnings forecasts. Generally, asset sales manipulation occurs during the fourth 
quarter (Bartov, 1993) as managers at this time are likely to know whether earnings 
will meet or miss the desired threshold and, therefore, they determine the volume 
and the time of these sales. 
Furthermore, Black et al. (1998) examine 503 firm-year observations from 
Australia and New Zealand and 696 firm-year observations from the UK with 
income of sales of long-term assets and other necessary data items over the period 
1985-1997. They investigate the use of fixed assets sales as earnings management 
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tools to increase earnings in three countries (Australia, New Zealand, and the UK) 
with different accounting rules. They find that financial reporting standards can 
influence specific earnings management behaviour. Firms in countries that allow 
revaluation of book value of long-term assets do not engage in earnings smoothing 
through assets sales. In other words, firms in Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom do not need to sell assets to increase equity. However, Whittred and Chan 
(1992) and Easton et al. (1993) find that Australian firms revalue assets in response 
to a need to mitigate reported debt-to-equity ratios.  
3.6.5 Earnings Management via Financial Instruments, including Hedges and 
Debt-Equity Swap 
Fluctuations in interest rates, foreign exchange rate, and commodity prices increase 
the volatility of firms’ operating cash flow and earnings. Financial derivatives 
(future, option, and interest-rate swap) are popular tools to hedge away the 
uncertainty related to these factors. Barton (2001) finds that managers of Fortune 
500 firms use financial derivatives to smooth earnings. Specifically, in his study, 
Barton analyses the trade-off between derivatives and discretionary accruals and 
finds a negative association between the magnitudes of derivatives positions and 
the amounts of discretionary accruals, after controlling for various incentives to 
smooth earnings through hedging and accruals management. Pincus and Rajgopal 
(2002) investigate whether oil and gas firms reduce the volatility of their cash flows 
and smooth earnings by hedging their exposure to oil and gas price risks. 
Specifically, they trade-off between abnormal accruals and hedging to smooth 
earnings, where the firm makes hedging decisions and accruals manipulation 
decisions in a sequential order. They first determine the extent of hedging and then, 
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particularly in the fourth quarter, manage residuals earnings volatility with 
abnormal accruals.  
In addition to hedging with derivatives, prior literature documents evidence on 
earnings management through debt-equity swap. There are, however, examples that 
suggest that the market does not understand earnings management even when 
disclosures are made. Hand (1989) reports the use of debt-equity swaps to smooth 
earnings and to relax potentially binding sinking-fund constraints. Hand (1990) 
examines how the market responds to the announcement of earnings in the quarter 
in which the swap took place. If the market sees through earnings management, no 
reaction to the gains on the swap should take place because of the prior 
announcement of the swap. Hand (1990) shows that the market does not absorb all 
the implications of swaps since there is a favourable reaction to increases in 
earnings that result from swaps. 
3.6.6 Earnings Management via Overproduction 
To manage earnings upward, managers can manipulate cost of goods sold expenses 
in any period by overproducing to spread fixed overhead costs over a larger number 
of units as long as the reduction in per-unit cost is not offset by inventory holding 
costs, or any increase in managerial cost in the current period. Thomas and Zhang 
(2002), Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010) and Zang (2012) find evidence that 
managers’ overproduction decreases cost of goods sold in an effort to avoid 




3.6.7 Earnings Management via Structuring of Business Transaction 
Other types of real earnings management activities that have been explored include 
structuring of business transaction to take advantage of alternative accounting 
choice. Moreover, Dye (2002) describes such structuring of transactions as 
“classification manipulation”. Several studies use various instances of structuring 
transactions and find that managers manipulate reported earnings (Comiskey and 
Mulford, 1986; Imhoff and Thomas, 1988; Matsunaga, 1995; Mittelstaedt et al., 
1995; Ayers et al., 2002; Marquardt and Wiedman, 2005; Carter et al., 2007).   
3.6.8 Other Real Earnings Management Activities Manipulation 
It was only recently that an understanding of real earnings management’s 
popularity as tools of earning management has been achieved and the bulk of 
earnings management results from manipulating real operating activities. In a 
survey of over 400 US corporate executives, Graham et al. (2005) focus on the 
common use of real earnings management and reveal that managers displayed a 
preference for dealing with reported earnings through real earnings management 
rather than through accruals manipulation. The real earnings management activities 
differ considerably from their accruals-centred counterparts, since they have a 
direct impact on cash flows. Graham et al. (2005) demonstrate that managers take 
real economic actions to maintain accounting appearances. In particular, 80% of 
survey participants reported that they would decrease discretionary spending on 
R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target. More than half 
(55.3%) stated that they would delay starting a new project to meet an earnings 
target, even if such a delay was detrimental to the firm’s value. However, prior 
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investigation of real earnings management activities has focused primarily on 
opportunistic reductions in research and development expenditures – most likely 
because research and development expenses is usually disclosed separately in the 
financial statement of publicly traded companies, whereas expenditures on 
advertising and travel are aggregated in selling, general, and administrative 
expenses.  
The real earnings management activities, along with their capital consequences for 
important earnings targets, including zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and 
consensus analysts’ forecast, are investigated by several recent studies 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012). 
Real earnings management is management actions that deviate from business 
practice, undertaken with the primary objective to mislead certain stakeholders into 
believing that earnings benchmarks have been met in the normal course of 
operations (Roychowdhury, 2006). Roychowdhury (2006) focuses on the zero 
earnings threshold and scrutinised yearly data, finding evidence that suggested 
firms were avoiding disclosure of losses. Following this discovery, he provides a 
comprehensive overview of real earnings management of operating activities. 
Specifically, he develops empirical methods to measure real earnings management 
from a large sample, centred around the zero earning thresholds and honing three 
real earnings management activities: 
(1) Manipulating sales (sales-based manipulation) by accelerating timing of sales, 
carried out via price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Such an approach 
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would result in higher reported earnings, but would reduce cash income in the 
short term; 
(2) Cutting; reduction in the amount of discretionary expense in advertising, 
research and development (R&D) or selling, general and administrative 
expenses (SG&A), with the ultimate goal of increasing margins. Such a 
reduction is more common when the discretionary expenses focused upon fail 
to produce instant income and revenues. Despite this, a reduced level of 
discretionary expenses would lead to a higher contemporaneous cash flow; and 
(3) Reduction in the costs of goods sold and greater operating margins as a result 
of overproduction determining more allocation to overhead inventory and less 
to the cost of goods sold. 
In line with Roychowdhury’s definition, the survey findings of Graham et al. (2005) 
reveal three outcomes. (a) Financial executives prioritised fulfilling earnings 
targets, like zero earnings and last year’s earnings; (b) Despite the potential 
negative effect on the firm’s value in the long term; executives acknowledged their 
willingness to manipulate their real earnings management activities in order to meet 
these targets. (c) They confirm that managers attend to quarterly performance 
indicators and benchmarks.  
Gunny (2010) builds on the models in Roychowdhury (2006) and modifies them 
slightly to develop other real earnings management measures. She identifies four 
types of real earnings management subject to manipulation mentioned in previous 
studies. These are (1) reducing the amount of discretionary R&D expenditure; (2) 
reducing the amount of discretionary SG&A expenditures; (3) timing of the sale of 
fixed assets for the reporting of gained assets; and (4) overproduction to report a 
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less significant cost of goods sold. Gunny (2010) examines a sample of 23,308 
firm-year observations during 1988-2000, and finds evidence that US firms manage 
earnings upward by using four types of real earnings management activities to just 
meet earnings benchmarks by focusing on two earnings benchmarks (last year’s 
earnings and zero earnings benchmarks).19  
Prior large-sample studies generally aggregate annual advertising expenses 
together with other discretionary expenses such as research and development and 
maintenance or include them as part of selling and general expenses 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012).20 Cohen et al. (2010) study real 
earnings management using a different measure by focusing on monthly advertising 
expenditures by media outlets, using a sample of 1,156 US firms covering 41,960 
monthly observations over the period 2001 through 2006. They focus on three 
earnings benchmarks: (1) zero earnings, (2) change in earnings relative to the same 
quarter in the previous year, and (3) analysts’ forecast errors. They find that 
managers, on average, reduce advertising spending to achieve financial reporting 
objectives, such as avoiding reporting a loss and avoiding earnings decreases. They 
further report that firms in the late stages of the life cycle increase advertising to 
meet earnings benchmarks. They also find some evidence that firms increase 
                                                          
19 Gunny (2010, p. 863) does not address the third earnings benchmark analysts’ forecast for two 
reasons as mentioned.  Firstly, “real earnings management must take place before the end of the 
year and managers are unlikely to know what the analysts’ forecast of earnings will be prior to the 
earnings announcement.” Secondly, Matsumoto (2002) “examines the mechanism managers use to 
avoid missing analysts’ forecasts and find evidence consistent with forecast guidance dominating 
accruals manipulation as a mechanism for avoiding negative surprise. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether using firms that just meet the analysts’ forecast would increase the power of correctly 
identifying real earnings management.” 
20 Cohen et al. (2010) provide new and direct evidence that advertising expenses is used as a tool of 
real earnings management. Moreover, Cohen et al. (2010, p. 809) assert that, “Compared with R&D, 
advertising might have a more immediate impact on sales, leading to the possibility that managers 
may increase advertising to generate a positive short-term response in revenues and earnings.” 
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advertising in the third month of the fiscal quarter and in the fourth quarter to beat 
prior year’s earnings.  
Managers of both for-profit and non-profit organisations have incentives to increase 
income when it is below zero to avoid negative net income because of contractual 
and reputation pressures, and also to decrease income when it is high to avoid 
scrutiny regulatory and from third-party payers. Prior studies find that non-profit 
hospitals manage earnings to report income-increasing earnings (Leone and Van 
Horn, 2005; Eldenburg et al., 2011). Eldenburg et al. (2011) examine real operating 
decisions in a sample of all California non-profit hospitals consisting of 95 hospitals 
over the period 1998-2003. They use benchmarks of zero operating income to 
provide evidence consistent with management of expenditures associated with non-
operating and non-revenue-generating activities that non-profit hospital managers 
manipulate real activity to achieve positive income.21 In contrast, Leone and Van 
Horn (2005) use benchmarks of zero operating income to provide evidence that 
non-profit hospital managers manipulate accruals to achieve positive income 
(manage earnings). However, non-profit hospital managers also have compensation 
and reputational incentives that agency theory predicts would lead them to report 
higher earnings. Therefore, managers face competing objectives between satisfying 
the expectations of external stakeholders and maximising their personal utility in 
the short run (Vansant, 2015).  
Badertscher (2011) investigates the earnings management choices of managers 
seeking to maintain overvalued stock prices. The motivation to manage earnings in 
                                                          
21 Eldenburg et al. (2011) define the types of expenditures as core versus noncore and operating 
versus non-operating activities. 
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the case of an overvalued stock is based on the work of Jensen (2005). 22 
Badertscher (2011) examines overvaluation as an incentive of earnings 
management using a sample of large US firms (5,844 firms) over the period 1994- 
2008. He finds that, during the sustained period of overvaluation, managers must 
employ accrual-based earnings management in the early years, real earnings 
management in the later years, and non-GAAP earnings management only when 
no other option is available. He argues that managers selected earnings approaches 
based on the length of time of the overvaluation, and claimed that the length of time 
that things have been overvalued is vital in the managers’ selection of earnings 
management activities, but he avoids using relative costliness to model the trade-
off between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management.23 
In addition, examining the relation between equity overvaluation and earnings 
management in a sample of US firm-year observations over the period 1964-2003, 
Chi and Gupta (2009) find that equity overvaluation leads to more income-
increasing earnings management and intensifies accrual-based earnings 
management. 
Recent studies examine the impacts of the costs of accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management on the choice of earnings management 
strategies. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) argue that accounting standards only 
restrict accrual-based earnings management but not real earnings management. 
                                                          
22 According to the agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005), when a firm’s shares become 
overvalued, managers act to prolong the overvaluation using various tools, including income-
increasing earnings management and at the same time, sell their shares to benefit from overvaluation. 
He predicts that overvaluation leads managers to engage in earnings management in an effort to 
sustain the firm’s overvalued stock price.  
23 Badertscher (2011) classifies earnings management choices as (1) Real Transaction Management 




Consistent with this view, Cohen et al. (2008) study the real earnings management 
from another perspective by using a sample of US firm-year observations (8,157 
firms) over the period 1987-2005. They investigate the prevalence of both accrual-
based earnings management and real earnings management activities in the period 
leading to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) and in the period following the 
passage of SOX. They focus on three important benchmarks of earnings 
management – zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and consensus analysts’ forecast 
– and show that, on average, accrual-based earnings management declines, but that 
the managers tend to manage real earnings management, after the passage of the 
SOX. They focus on one cost of accrual-based earnings management – namely the 
heightened post-SOX scrutiny of accounting practice – and its impact on the levels 
of real and accrual earnings management. Graham et al. (2005), Cohen and Zarowin 
(2008) and Zang (2012) validate the argument that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
made accrual-based earnings management more costly and, therefore, that firms 
have switched from accruals to real earnings management after the passage of SOX. 
The most crucial finding pertained to the consequences of accruals earnings 
management by comparison to those of real earnings management activities. In 
their paper, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) extend extant research investigating how 
firms use accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs). They examine the effect of each of the three types of real 
earnings management method applied in Roychowdhury (2006) around the firms 
with strong incentives to manage earnings upward; i.e. firms that issue seasoned 
equities, using a US SEO sample consisting of 1,511 offers over the period 1987-
2006. They find that, after examining a variety of accrual-based earnings 
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management costs, SEO firms engage in greater levels of real earnings management 
activities in the year of the SEO to avoid SEO under-pricing. Specifically, and in 
addition to accruals manipulation, they find that SEO firms exhibit higher levels of 
abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production costs. In addition, Chi et al. (2011) examine the trade-off 
between real earnings management activities and accrual-based earnings 
management for firms with strong incentives to manage earnings upward in order 
to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks or to support seasoned equity offerings, 
focusing on a sample of 925 US firm-year observations over the period 2001- 2008. 
They find that firms (e.g., firms that meet or just beat earnings benchmarks and 
firms that issue seasoned equity offerings) are associated with greater levels of real 
earnings management.  
McInnis and Collins (2011) examine whether managers in US firms shift from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management when analysts 
provide operating cash flow forecasts for their firm and find that, following the 
provision of cash flow forecasts which make accrual-based manipulation more 
detectable, there is an increase in real activities manipulation. Their reasoning is 
straightforward: Since cash flow and earnings forecasts implicitly provide accrual 
forecasts, accrual-based manipulations become more visible. Hence, managers 
replace accrual-based earnings management with more costly, but less transparent 
real earnings management. Their analysis confirms that the presence of cash flow 
estimates improves the quality of accruals and decreases the probability of 
achieving analyst expectations. 
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Building on prior research on the trade-off between real earnings management and 
accrual-based earnings management, and introducing new variables, Zang (2012) 
uses a large sample of US firms over the period 1987-2008 to explain the costs 
associated with real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. 
She investigates a sample of suspect firms just beating/meeting important earnings 
benchmarks – around zero earnings; last year’s earnings; the consensus analysts’ 
forecast; and management forecasts – and therefore most likely to engage in 
earnings management.24 She finds proof that manager relied on resultant costs to 
trade-off real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management and 
that they used the level of accomplished real earnings management to adjust the 
level of accrual-based earnings management. She also finds evidence that managers 
engage in real activities-based manipulation throughout the fiscal year and then 
accrual-based earnings management is adjusted at the end of the fiscal year by the 
unrealised amount of real activities to meet the desired threshold. Her results show 
that real earnings management positively correlates with the costs of accrual 
manipulation, and that accrual and real manipulations are negatively correlated. 
These results led her to surmise that managers generally used real earnings 
management and accrual-based earnings management interchangeably, with a 
tendency to prioritise real earnings management decisions over accrual-based 
earnings management. 
                                                          
24 Zang (2012) points out that research by several scholars (Beatty et al., 1995; Hunt et al., 1996; 
Gaver and Paterson, 1999; Barton, 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010) does not consider the timing of the two types of earnings management (does not 
consider the sequential decision process as an alternative process). Zang (2012) addresses this issue 
using a Hausman test and finds the earnings management actions are sequential: real activities 
precede accruals management; and accruals are partially determined by real activities management. 
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3.6.9 Critical Evaluation of Relevant Literature of First Essay 
In conclusion, Pioneering studies examining the REM are fronted by 
Roychowdhury (2006), and followed mainly by Cohen et al. (2008), Gunny (2010), 
Badertscher (2011), Chi et al. (2011), Zang (2012) and Kothari et al. (2016) in the 
US context. In the UK, only a few studies examine REM; these are Oswald and 
Zarowin (2007), Osma (2008), Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Athanasakou et al. 
(2011).   
Roychowdhury (2006) is the first to examine and develop the three types of REM 
applying one benchmark only; that is, firms that are most likely to meet or beat zero 
earnings. Moreover, in his model, Roychowdhury uses production costs instead of 
costs of goods sold to detect abnormal production costs; and he controls for 
significant variations in earnings management by adding three control variables 
(firm size, firm performance, and firm growth). However, his study does not 
address the other benchmarks – last year’s earnings and management analysts’ 
forecast. As a result, his work does not deliver a complete understanding of the 
importance of meeting earnings targets, the extent of earnings management through 
real activities, and the long-term effects of real activities manipulation; instead, his 
study is limited to only documenting the existence of REM with no consideration 
given to the timing of real activities manipulation over the year. Further, 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) findings are limited to the US context and are not 
compared to other contexts such as the UK. Such a comparison may evidence that 
the legal framework of a specific country has an impact on earnings management.  
Enomoto et al. (2015) suggest the need to explore and compare the study context 
with other developed markets, which would lead to a more complete understanding 
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of the importance of meeting earnings targets, the extent of earnings management 
through real activities, and the long-term effects of real activities manipulation. 
Gunny (2010) builds slightly on Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to develop other 
real earnings management measures. She mainly investigates four real earnings 
management types that can be subject to manipulation. These are reducing 
discretionary R&D expenditure levels; reducing discretionary SG&A expenditure 
levels; timing the sale of fixed assets for the reporting of gained assets; and 
overproduction costs. She also focuses on two important earnings benchmarks – 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings. Gunny (2010) does not consider the other 
types of real earnings management such as sales-based manipulation. Similar to 
Roychowdhury’s (2006) study, her study is limited to the US context. More 
significantly, she does not address the impact of the SOX act on REM although her 
study covers the period when SOX was implemented.    
Applying the US data, Zang (2012) contributes to the REM literature significantly 
by introducing a new variable related to the costs associated with real and accrual 
earnings management. She only examines two types of real earnings management 
activities; these are discretionary expenditures and overproduction costs.  
Considering the timing of the two types of earnings management, she finding out 
that overproduction decreases costs of goods sold in an effort to avoid reporting 
losses. Even though she contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the 
trade-off decisions between REM and AEM, she also ignores the SOX 
implementation in her sample, similar to Gunny. Again, neither Gunny nor Zang 
provide answers to the importance of the legal environment in affecting the REM.  
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In a different environment, in the UK context, Oswald and Zarowin (2007) shed 
light on the extent to which the attitude of UK firms to R&D expenditure 
(capitalisation of R&D expenditures) impacts on their ability to meet earnings 
targets. An important feature of their study is the tests they use. They apply a two-
equation system to control for the endogeneity of the R&D accounting choice (e.g., 
self-selection). Nevertheless, their study only addresses one type of earnings 
management (R&D accounting choice) to meet earnings targets, which in return 
does not provide suggestions for policy makers and regulators. The following 
reasons limit the results and make them irrelevant. The first reason is that the 
applied tests are limited to three industries over the period 1990-1999. The second 
reason refers to the fact that the model of capitalisation prediction is imperfect in 
that it may not have captured all existing predictability. The third reason is that the 
length and extracting of the sample is restricted to a three-year period, which does 
not capture all benefits of R&D that require a longer period, and finally in their 
sample, they only include active and dead files in the tests without any 
consideration for the timing, and the missing data. 
Within the same context, Osma (2008) only examines one type of real earnings 
management activities (e.g., reducing/cutting discretionary expenses, such as R&D) 
to meet earnings benchmarks (last year’s earnings) in order to avoid reporting 
losses. In spite of this limitation, Osma (2008) is among the first to focus on the 
UK environment rather than the US with a reasonable sample size. Nevertheless, 
his study lacks the following contributions: (1) it could explore more aspects such 
as the impact of differences in industries’ (2) it could compare additional developed 
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economies with different settings; and (3) it could extend the sample period which 
offers a good opportunity to examine the effects of the adoption of IFRSs.  
In line with Oswald and Zarowin (2007) and Osma (2008), Athanasakou et al. 
(2009) focus mainly on the UK firms’ earnings management, as to whether they 
engage in EM (abnormal accruals and classification shifting), to ensure that their 
reported earnings meet analysts’ earnings expectation. Although their study does 
not address the importance of REM as a type of EM tools, it does nevertheless offer 
valuable documentation about the UK context: that is, large UK firms shift 
classification of core expenses to non-recurring items in order to meet analysts’ 
forecast expectations to avoid negative earnings surprise. Unluckily, their study 
does not assess investors’ abilities to detect classification-shifting attempts, or 
address the effect of large audit firms over the UK context.  
In a later study, Athanasakou et al. (2011) build on Athanasakou et al.’s (2009) 
results and limitations. They focus on how UK firms utilise real earnings 
management, accruals earnings management and classification shifting to meet 
expectations of analysts focusing only on firms that just meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts. Moreover, they build upon Roychowdhury’s and Gunny’s models by 
exploring four types of real earnings management; these are cutting R&D, cutting 
SG&A expenses, overproducing, and sales-based manipulation. They find evidence 
that UK firms are more likely to use earnings forecast guidance and classification 
shifting to non-recurring items to meet analysts’ expectations than to manage 
accruals or real transactions to meet analysts’ forecast expectations. Athanasakou 
et al.’s (2011) findings are not consistent with prior literature that firms manage up 
earnings to meet analysts’ forecasts by utilising more real earnings management.  
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Moreover, it would worth extending the sample period to know the effects of IFRSs 
on market responses. They also do not consider the other incentives of REM such 
as zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and managing earnings upward in order to 
evaluate the firm’s performance and its financial position. 
Moreover, recent literature presents different incentives for managers to engage in 
real and accrual-based earnings management such as SEOs and IPOs, but 
researchers do not consider the other capital market motivations as incentives for 
managers to manage earnings upward in order to evaluate the firm’s performance 
and its financial position (avoid negative earnings surprises). For instance, Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari et al. (2016) examine the trade-off between real 
and accrual-based earnings management for US firms around SEOs. Wongsunwai 
(2013) examines the effect of external monitoring (venture capitalist) for US firms 
around IPOs through real and accrual-based earnings management. In the UK 
context, Alhadab et al. (2015) examine the relationship between real and accrual-
based earnings management for UK firms around IPOs, focusing only on two real 
earnings management activities. These are sales manipulation and reducing 
discretionary expenses. 
From the above discussion, despite examination of the UK context in the recent 
literature, there is still a variation in the evidence documented regarding the REM. 
A gap remains about the incomplete assessment of whether UK firms engage in 
real earnings management activities to meet or just beat important earnings 
benchmarks, such as zero earnings and prior year’s earnings. These issues need to 
be explored together instead of addressing each component individually to capture 
 
93 
the total effect on the REM. This would lead to a comprehensive and complete 
understanding for the effect of the REM incentives.  
3.7 Consequences of Real Earnings Management Activities to Meet 
or Just Beat Earnings Benchmarks on Subsequent Operating 
Performance  
Firms can manage upward earnings by utilising real and accrual-based earnings 
management (Schipper, 1989; Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Graham et al., 2005). 
However, the direct effect on future performance from income-increasing accrual-
based earnings management is straightforward: one additional Great Britain Pound 
(GBP) of net income recognised in the current period results in one GBP of net 
income sacrificed in the future. The direct impact on future performance from 
income-increasing real earnings management is less observable because firms may 
incur additional costs (e.g., holding costs when excess inventory is produced) and 
forgo benefits (e.g., forfeited future revenues when advertising is reduced). 
Empirical evidence tends to suggest that performance levels in the future will be 
lower in high levels of real earnings management. In this regard, in their study of 
real earnings management and accrual based-earnings management on future 
performance at the time of seasoned equity offering (SEO), Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) provide the most pertinent example. They prove that a negative correlation 
exists between the future changes in return on assets (ROA). Other evidence from 
prior papers, however, contends that real earnings management affects the future 
performance of firms differently (Gunny, 2010).  
Since all real earnings management activities lead to higher net income in the 
current period, these activities will inevitably have some consequence. However, 
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empirical results are mixed. Conflicting empirical results regarding the positive or 
negative influence of real earnings management on performance have led to 
opposing explanations regarding the reasons the managers adopt real earnings 
management. 
3.7.1 Future Performance through the Opportunistic Earnings Management 
Argument 
An important question is whether such deviations from the normal business strategy 
due to real earnings management are on average so severe as to have a significant 
negative impact on firms’ future performances. The extant literature evidences that 
when firms’ real earnings management manage-up earnings to meet/beat important 
earnings benchmarks, this reduces the firm’s value, which will harm the firm’s 
future performance (value destroying).  
Bens et al. (2002, 2003) find firms that manipulate earnings shift capital away from 
real investment to stock repurchases by reducing R&D experience a marginally 
negative impact on future operating performance. Gunny (2005) finds a negative 
relation between subsequent future operating performance and all four types of real 
earnings management activities. Further, she identifies firms engaged in real 
earnings management activities as those with both abnormal operating activities 
and high net operating assets, and finds that firms engaged in real earnings 
management activities face an economically significant decline in subsequent 
earnings and cash flow. Other studies also find that firms – whether they engage in 
real earnings management activities or not – with high net operating assets 
experience a significant negative impact on subsequent operating performance 




Graham et al. (2005) document that chief financial officers (CFOs) are willing to 
manipulate real earnings management activities in order to meet analyst earnings 
expectations, even if such manipulations would decrease long-term firm value.25 
The survey CEOs and CFOs acknowledge that they face a trade-off between 
meeting short-term earnings targets and making long-term optimal business 
decisions.26 Further, they argue that 80% of the participants would like to adopt real 
earnings management to achieve short-term earnings targets. On the extent to which 
managers sacrifice real resources to manage earnings, Graham et al. (2005) show 
that, more than 55% of the managers forfeit positive net present value (NPV) 
investment projects to meet analyst earnings forecasts. Other research on myopic 
behaviour and real earnings management confirms Graham and colleagues’ survey 
evidence suggesting that managers engage in myopic behaviour to meet/beat 
earnings benchmarks, which is costly and directly harmful to a firm’s future 
operation (Baber et al., 1991; Bhojraj and Libby, 2005; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 
2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Bhojraj et al., 2009). However, Jensen (2005, p. 8) 
refers this behaviour in part to the agency theory of overvalued equity, noting that 
“when numbers are manipulated to tell the market what they want to hear 
(or what managers want them to hear) rather than the true status of the 
firm…and when real operating decisions that would maximize value are 
compromised to meet market expectations, real long-term value is being 
destroyed.” 
                                                          
25 Graham et al. (2005) find that CFOs prefer to manage earnings via economic actions such as 
postpone or eliminate hiring, R&D, advertising, or even investment rather than within-GAAP 
accounting choices.  
26 The primary incentives for managers to meet short-term objectives are stock prices and career and 
reputation concerns (Graham et al., 2005). 
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Moreover, Zhang (2008) examines a sample of 59,011 observations during the 
period 1993 to 2005 and finds evidence that US firms which meet analysts’ cash 
flow forecast engage in higher real earnings management activities through 
discretionary expenditures, production, and sales to inflate earnings. In other words, 
firms have incentives to manipulate real earnings management opportunistically to 
meet analysts’ cash flow forecast. Further, they find evidence that REM firms 
experience deterioration in subsequent operating performance. Furthermore, 
Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that beat analyst forecasts have negative 
operating future performance and stock market performance in the subsequent three 
years in terms of return on assets, Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs), and 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). This is compared to firms that miss analyst 
forecasts without earnings management, through either real earnings management 
activities (e.g., R&D and advertising expenditures) or accrual-based earnings 
management. In addition, firms that beat analyst forecasts are willing to achieve 
short-term earnings targets that may lead to positive short-term stock returns. 
In a similar study to that of Zhang (2008), Using a sample of all US firms containing 
13,291 observations (1,597 firms) over the period 1988-2007, Leggett et al. (2009) 
examine whether firm-years that manipulated earnings upward engage in real 
earnings management and whether it is associated with subsequent performance. 
The authors find evidence that firm-years manage earnings upward through real 
earnings management to meet/beat earnings benchmark. In addition, they find 
strong evidence that firms that engage in real earnings management through 
discretionary expenditures are negatively associated with lower subsequent future 
performance in terms of both return on assets and cash flows from operations than 
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non-REM firms meeting/beating earnings benchmarks. Mizik (2010) finds that 
firms which, manage earnings upward by engaging in myopic real earnings 
management activities through reducing marketing and R&D spending experience 
a greater negative impact on future stock returns and future financial performance.  
The notion that real earnings management is value-destroying is consistent with 
investor perceptions in a recent survey, De Jong et al. (2014) find that analysts 
perceive that meeting earnings benchmarks and smoothing earnings enhances 
investor perception of firm future performance and that all earnings management 
actions to meet earnings benchmarks, excluding share repurchases, are have the 
potential to be value-destroying.  
Vorst (2016) examines the impact of real earnings management through 
discretionary investment cuts on long-term operating performance. He shows that, 
on average, firm-years with real activities manipulation (e.g., a reversal of an 
abnormal cut in discretionary investment) are associated with lower long-term 
operating performance (reduced long-term operating performance). However, he 
finds that such results vary significantly depending on the various incentives 
offered to engage in real earnings management, as well as other factors that affect 
its associated costs and benefits. 
Based on a large sample of US firms over the period 1994-2009, Francis et al. (2016) 
examine whether firms that utilised real earnings management to manage earnings 
upward to meet earnings benchmarks (zero benchmarks and last year’s benchmarks) 
are associated with subsequent stock price risk, which is due to stock being 
mispriced under REM. They find that prior real earnings management has a positive 
association with stock price crash in the subsequent period. This result suggests that 
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managers utilised real earnings management activities to hide negative information 
but not positive information. In addition, they find that the impact of real earnings 
management on stock return-crash risk increases after SOX 2002. 
Given that previous research on the consequences of real earnings management 
pays little attention in the bond market, using 1,934 US bonds issues from 1993 to 
2009, Ge and Kim (2014) examine the relation between the cost of new corporate 
bond issues and the level of real earnings management. They investigate three types 
of real earnings management – sales-based manipulation, overproduction-based 
manipulation, and discretionary expenditures-based manipulation. They find that 
real earnings management activities through overproduction causes credit rating to 
decline, and their results also show that overproduction and sales-based 
manipulation increase the cost of borrowing money from the bond market 
(overproduction and sales-based manipulation are associated with higher bond 
yield spreads). 
Similarly, Kim and Sohn (2013) examine the impacts of real earnings management 
on cost of equity. They find a positive association between US firms that utilised 
real earnings management to just meet or beat an earnings target and the implied 
cost of equity even after controlling for the effects of accrual-based earnings 
management. They also find that this association is stronger for the subset of firms 
(e.g., firms that just meet/beat an earnings target) with higher incentives to manage 
earnings opportunistically. They argue that real earnings management increases a 
firm’s risk and, therefore, capital providers require a higher rate of return because 
of this increased risk so for the firms that utilised real earnings management, the 
higher cost of equity capital they have to bear. 
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Apart from future performance, several studies examine other effects of real 
activities manipulation. IPO firms have very strong incentives to manipulate 
reported earnings upward at the end of the IPO year to maintain high stock prices. 
However, prior literature has found that IPO firms manage up earnings using real 
and accrual earnings management during the IPO year. Wongsunwai (2013) 
examines the effect of venture capitalist (VC) quality on earnings management in 
firms’ initial public offerings (IPOs) through real and accrual earnings management. 
He finds that IPO firms manage earnings around the IPO year and that IPO firms 
backed by higher-quality VCs generally exhibit higher performance; thus, they 
have lower real and accrual-based manipulation on average. Similarly, because in 
general firms with higher levels of real earnings management have smaller profits, 
they are less likely to survive in subsequent periods compared to the more profitable 
ones, which could explain the results in Alhadab et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, Alhadab et al. (2015) analyse the relationship between real and 
accrual earnings management and IPO failure risk based on a sample of 570 UK 
IPO firms (public) over the period 1998–2008. They additionally find that UK IPO 
firms that manage up earnings during the IPO year, either through real earnings 
management activities or accrual-based earnings management, have a higher 
probability of IPO failure and lower survival rates in subsequent periods.  
Mizik and Jacobson (2008), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), and Kothari et al. (2016) 
examine managers’ accounting choice of real earnings management versus accrual-
based earnings management at the time of seasoned equity offering (SEO) and find 
that financial markets overvalue firms engaging in income-increasing earnings at 
the time of issuing seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). They find that this mis-
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valuation (e.g., overvaluation) has a closer link to real earnings management 
activities rather than to accrual-based manipulation. Their findings indicate that 
firms engaging in income-increasing real earnings management at the time of 
issuing SEOs have a negative future operating performance in the post-offering 
period than other firms that engage accrual-based earnings management.  
3.7.2 Future Performance through Signalling Earnings Management 
Argument 
Manipulation of operating activities to affect reported earnings deviates from 
normal operational practices and thus potentially leads to a decline in subsequent 
operating performance (Roychowdhury, 2006). However, real earnings 
management may not necessarily have a significant negative on firms’ future 
operations, signalling an argument that claims that managers have better 
information about firms’ future market and growth potential. They engage in real 
earnings management because it is a way to signal firms’ future value.  
The findings in existing research present different views of the relation between 
real earnings management activities and future operating performance. Focusing 
on two common earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s earnings), 
Gunny (2010) examines the association between income-increasing real earnings 
management and future performance (measured by industry adjusted return on 
assets and cash flow from operations) on a sample of 23,308 firm-year observations 
during the period 1988-2002.27 She finds evidence that US firms that managing 
earnings upward in order to meet/beat earnings benchmarks achieve a more positive 
                                                          
27 Gunny (2010) uses indicator variables and classifies real earnings management firms in the most 
extreme quintile of abnormal real earnings management activities.  
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impact on the client’s cash flow and subsequent operating performance than other 
firms do in the absence of just meeting/beating earnings benchmarks or managing 
earnings upward through real earnings management. This supports the signalling 
argument that firms use real earnings management to signal good future 
performance.  
Zhao et al. (2012) support Gunny’s (2010) findings; they examine whether takeover 
protection mitigates real earnings management and whether it is associated with 
subsequent future performance, focusing on two common earnings benchmarks 
(e.g., zero earnings and previous year’s earnings) by using a sample of 7,966 US 
firm-year observations over the period 1995-2008. Zhao et al. (2012) find evidence 
that managers are generally willing to manage earnings upward through real 
earnings management (e.g., discretionary expenditures, production, and sales) to 
meet/beat earnings benchmarks.28 In addition, they find a negative relation between 
the abnormal real earnings management and future performance in the absence of 
just meeting/beating earnings benchmarks, but firm-years with abnormal real 
earnings management that intend to just meet/beat earnings benchmarks are 
associated with higher future performance. Further, by taking the two conflict 
effects of abnormal real earnings management on subsequent future operating 
performance for firms who just meet/beat earnings benchmarks and firms that miss 
                                                          
28 To capture the overall level of real earnings management, Zhao et al. (2012) aggregate these 
individual measures of real earnings management into two comprehensive metrics. The first 
measure aggregates abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenditures, and for the 
second one aggregate all individual measures into one measure (e.g., abnormal cash flows from 
operations, abnormal discretionary expenditures, and abnormal production costs). The higher value 




the earnings benchmarks, Zhao et al. (2012) suggest that real earnings management 
is consistent with signalling better performance.  
Using a sample of 10,553 US firm-fourth-quarter observations over the period 
1988-2008, Chen et al. (2010) find that firms meeting/beating analyst forecasts 
using income-increasing real earnings management. They find also firms that doing 
so without earnings management (e.g., real earnings management and accrual-
based earnings management) achieve significantly better future operating 
performance than firms missing analysts’ expectations by taking return on assets 
(ROA) or change in return on assets as measurers of future firm performance. 
Further, their findings are consistent with those of Gunny (2010) and Zhao et al. 
(2012), which suggest that used-only real earnings management offers positive 
signalling effects about future firm performance than firms that used only accrual-
based earnings management. 
Taylor and Xu (2010) use a matched sample analysis of consequences of real 
earnings management based on 18,267 firm-year observations over the period 
1988-2003 examine whether firm-year is involved in real earnings management 
activities to meet/beat zero earnings (e.g., avoid reporting losses) and whether 
analysts forecast is associated with subsequent operating performance. They find 
that US firms with high abnormal production costs or/and low abnormal 
discretionary expenditures do not experience, on average, a more significant 
decline in firms’ subsequent operating performance in terms of ROA, CFOA (cash 
flows from operations on assets) and size adjusted returns (SAR) than control firms 
do when matched by industry, year and abnormal accrual-based earnings 
management. Moreover, previous papers have observed good future performance 
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among firms, which manipulated earnings to meet/beat the analysts’ forecasts 
(Bartov et al., 2002; Koh et al., 2007; Roychowdhury, 2006).29 
3.7.3 Critical Evaluation of Relevant Literature of Second Essay 
In conclusion, Gunny (2010), Chen et al. (2010) and Zhao et al. (2012) examine the 
impacts of REM activities on firms’ future performance and their findings are 
mixed (positive or/and negative impacts on firms’ future performance). In her 2010 
study on a US sample, Gunny employs real earnings management activities as the 
indicator variable equal to one if the residuals from R&D, SG&A and production 
models fall within the lowest (highest) quintile; otherwise zero is recorded. 
Furthermore, Chen et al. (2010) and Zhao et al. (2012) use indicator variables for 
real earnings management firms rather than examining the magnitude of real 
earnings management. Chen et al.’s (2010) sample depends on firm-quarter 
observations rather than firm-year observations.  
In addition to the above studies, Leggett et al. (2009) assess the effect of real 
earnings management through one type of discretionary expenditure on subsequent 
operating performance in US firms to meet earnings benchmarks. In a similar study 
to that of Leggett et al. (2009), Vorst (2016) also examines the consequence of real 
earnings management through discretionary investment cuts on long-term 
operating performance. However, the authors do not address the other types of real 
earnings management that managers could engage to manage earnings upward, 
                                                          
29 Tan and Jamal (2006) suggest that managers manipulate operating activities by reducing the level 
of accounting discretion (e.g., reduce their investments in R&D, and increase those in advertising) 
to communicate their firm’s superior earnings prospects to investors and they attain costs and 
benefits of real earnings management that allow the firm to do better in future performance 




such as production costs and sales based-manipulation. Moreover, Taylor and Xu 
(2010) examine the consequences of real earnings management on operating 
performance by focusing on two types of real earnings management – 
overproduction and discretionary expenditures – among firms that are more likely 
to manage earnings upward to meet or just beat zero earnings and management 
forecast. In addition, Taylor and Xu (2010), Leggett et al. (2009) and Vorst (2016) 
do not address the other types of real earnings management around the firm meeting 
last year’s earnings, such as sales manipulation. This would have provided a 
comprehensive overview of real earnings management of operational activities; 
that managers might not only engage in one type of real earnings management.  
Although the studies described above attempt to identify earnings management, 
they have not measured the impact of real earnings management on firms’ 
subsequent operating performance in terms of its magnitude in order to capture the 
general level of real earnings management activities on firms’ future operating 
performance. Further, although the above studies also focus on cross-sectional 
dependence, they do not examine the issues created by the presence of both cross-
sectional and time-series dependencies. Therefore, this study uses the Newey-West 
standard errors corrected Fama-Macbeth statistic to respond to this requirement to 
ensure robust results by correcting for potential bias and inconsistency issues in the 
estimates, and overcoming problems of heteroscedasticity.  
Several studies examine the other effects of real earnings management on future 
performance, but not in their main analysis. For example, around firms that beat 
analysts’ earnings forecasts (Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zhang, 
2008; Bhojraj et al., 2009); at the time of seasoned equity offering (Mizik and 
 
105 
Jacobson, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2016); during the IPO 
year (Wongsunwai, 2013; Alhadab et al., 2015). The above studies do not address 
the other incentives of earnings management such as zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings on firm’s future operating performance. Earnings benchmarks are viewed 
as important reference points that many users of financial information have 
employed to evaluate the firm’s performance and its financial position. In addition, 
firm-years with earnings on or just above benchmarks may still have incentives to 
manage earnings upwards. Therefore, concentrating on these firm-years not only 
increases the power of the tests, but also allows to better examining real earnings 
management – that is, earnings-target-oriented manipulation of real activities 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012).  
3.8 Summary  
This chapter has clarified the concept of earnings management. Earnings 
management has attracted a range of definitions; these were discussed, and I 
explored the factors that motivate managers to apply earnings management. This 
chapter also summarised the developing body of research on earnings management. 
A particular focus of the literature review was real earnings management around 
firms that are more likely to manipulate earnings to meet/beat important earnings 
benchmarks. As stated earlier, important earnings benchmarks include the 
benchmarks of earnings levels (report earnings just above zero) and make the 
previous year’s earnings.  
As this chapter has shown, real earnings management studies are largely US-based 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010 
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and Zang, 2012 among others), while only a few have provided empirical evidence 
for UK cases (Zarowin and Oswald, 2007; Osma, 2008; Athanasakou et al., 2011). 
By incorporating the discussion on REM measurements in the UK and taking into 
account the lack of research on the real earnings management activities outside the 
US, this research is the first to examine the real earnings management activities 
through three types of real earnings manipulation to meet or just beat earnings 
benchmarks, in the UK context. This chapter has also reviewed the literature on the 
association between real earnings management and firm future performance. 
Further, among those REM studies, there are two directions of thought. The first is 
the opportunistic earnings management argument and the second is the signalling 
earnings management argument.  
The results of the majority of studies referred to in this thesis reveal conflicting 
evidence of the consequences of real earnings management. Graham et al. (2005); 
Roychowdhury (2006), Bhojraj et al. (2009), Leggett et al. (2009), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), Kothari et al. (2016) and Vorst (2016) report evidence to support 
the opportunistic earnings management argument; that REM firms experience 
decline in subsequent operating performance. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2010), 
Gunny (2010), Taylor and Xu (2010) and Zhao (2012) provide evidence to support 
the signalling earnings management argument; that is a positive association 
between REM and subsequent operating performance. These conflicting findings 
confirm the importance of investigating the effect of REM on firms’ future 
operating performance in the UK where institutional environments and accounting 
greatly differ from the contexts investigated in previous studies. A review of the 
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previous literature shows that attention regarding the impacts of real earnings 
management on firm’s future performance is lacking in the UK environment. 
Overall, one of the objectives of this thesis is to investigate whether UK firms that 
manipulate operating activities to meet earnings benchmarks realise an impact on 
future financial performance or not. Thus, this study’s findings develop our 
understanding of the process through which management evaluates the costs and 
benefits of real earnings management in different environments.  
More specifically, previous studies use real earnings management activities on 
firms’ subsequent operating performance as indicator variables; this study is the 
first to use the absolute value of each measure of REM to capture the general level 
of real earnings management activities on future operating performance. In addition, 
previous methodological work on the consequences of earnings management 
focuses on cross-sectional dependence (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Zhao 
et al., 2012); however, no studies have critically assessed the problems created by 
the existence of both cross-sectional and time-series dependencies. The Newey-
West standard errors corrected Fama-Macbeth statistic is designed to address 
concerns about cross-sectional correlation in the data. Thus, robustness of the 
results is ensured by correcting for potential bias and inconsistency issues in the 










Chapter Four Research Hypotheses and Methodology 





4.1 Introduction  
The primary objective of this study is to examine whether managers in the UK 
utilise earnings management through three types of real earnings management to 
meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks – namely, zero earnings and last 
year’s earnings using a sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for 
the period 2009-2013. The data analysis and statistical methods employed to 
achieve the study objectives are also explicated. Accordingly, the chapter is 
structured as follows: formulation of the research hypotheses based on theoretical 
and empirical literature is discussed in section two. Section three describes the 
sample selection and data collection sources. Sections four, five and six explain the 
research methodology employed to empirically test the hypothesis. Finally, section 
seven summarises the chapter. 
4.2 Hypotheses Development 
Babbie (2005, p. 42) defines a hypothesis as  
“…A specified testable expectation about empirical reality that follows 
from a more general proposition; more generally an expectation about the 
nature of things derived from a theory. It is a statement of something that 
ought to be observed in the real world if the theory is correct.” 
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A hypothesis is formulated to fill the gap between the more abstractly stated 
research problem and purpose and the detailed design for analysis and data 
collection. Moreover, a hypothesis is a formal statement of the estimated 
relationship between two or more variables in a specified population and it 
interprets the research problem and purpose into a clear justification for or 
prediction of the estimated results of the study.  
4.2.1 Hypotheses Development of the First Empirical 
Financial statements are a major source of information, the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour increases, particularly when managers use reporting 
discretion opportunistically to achieve certain objectives (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986, 1990; Subramanyam, 1996), thus serving their own interests at the expense 
of others. In addition, under the assumptions of transaction cost theory, firms that 
are reporting a loss (or an earning decrease) carry significantly higher costs in 
transactions with stakeholders than if the firm had reported a profit (earnings 
increase). As a result, these assumptions infer incentives to avoid reporting earnings 
decreases and losses to decrease the cost imposed on the firm in transaction with 
stakeholders (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 30  Empirical research provides 
evidence that these incentives (e.g., maximize their own utility) increase when 
earnings are close to benchmarks which are considered as crucial points by 
stakeholders and investors. Thus, managers are suspected of managing earnings 
upward to avoid falling short of important earnings benchmarks. For example, 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find evidence that firms manage earnings 
                                                          
30 For a details description of transaction cost explanation, see chapter two, section 2.3.3. 
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opportunistically to meet certain benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings).  
The literature provide evidence that firms managing earnings to meet or beat 
important earnings benchmarks: to meet or beat zero earnings (avoiding a loss), to 
meet or beat the last year’s earnings (avoiding an earnings decline), and to meet or 
beat the analysts’ forecasts (avoiding a negative earnings surprise).31 Researchers 
(Hayn, 1995; Degeorge et al., 1999; Peasnell et al., 2001; Bartov et al., 2002; Jacob 
and Jorgensen, 2007) suggest that firm years with earnings right at or just above 
benchmarks are likely to manage earnings to meet these important benchmarks 
through upward earnings management. In addition, several studies also show that 
firms have a range of methods to manage earnings to meet these benchmarks. For 
example, Bartov (1993) finds that firms with negative earnings changes report 
higher profits from assets sales, suggesting that the profits are used to blunt the bad 
earnings news. Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that executives near the end of their 
tenure reduce R&D expenditures to increase short-term earnings. In related studies, 
Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998) report evidence consistent with firms 
reducing R&D expenditure to meet earnings benchmarks such as positive earnings 
or previous year’s earnings. Graham et al. (2005) report that 80% of the CFOs are 
willing to cut their discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance 
to meet short-term earnings targets. 
Recent related studies –  theoretical and empirical –  have found evidence that 
managers engage extensively in real earnings management activities to meet 
various targets and provide confidence in the construct validity of these types of 
                                                          
31 Due to data access limitations, this study does not explore the third threshold: “analysts’ forecast”. 
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real earnings management around important earnings benchmarks (e.g., Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 
2012). First, firms can adopt real earnings management through the acceleration of 
sales. The acceleration of sales can be achieved utilising price discounts and lenient 
credit terms, with the intention to persuade more customers. By introducing price 
discounts firms can accelerate their sales from the next year to the current year. 
However, the increase in sales is only a temporary situation. When the old prices 
are re-enacted, the situation will reverse. The price discounts will boost total 
earnings in the current period but will also lead to lower margins. This would 
subsequently lead to a situation where production costs relative to sales will be 
abnormally high (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Moreover, firms can decide to alter the levels of discretionary expenditures such as 
advertising, R&D, and selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). By reducing/cutting these expenses, firms can increase 
their current period earnings; which subsequently leads to an increase in the current 
period cash flows when these expenses are paid in cash. However, there is a risk 
that this may negatively affect the cash flows in the future (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Finally, firms can lower their costs of goods sold through an increase of their 
productions. By increasing their production more than normal, firms can spread the 
fixed overhead costs over more units. This would subsequently decrease the fixed 
cost per unit. However, due to overproduction, firms might contract additional 
holding costs, and therefore cash flows from operations are lower than the normal 
sales levels (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
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Most previous studies in this field examine US firms, while a few have provided 
empirical evidence for UK cases. Zarowin and Oswald (2005) and Osma (2008) 
find that UK listed firms manipulate reported earnings by cutting R&D expenses to 
meet earnings benchmarks. Further, Athanasakou et al. (2009) and Athanasakou et 
al. (2011) find that UK firms engage in earnings management to meet only one of 
the important earnings benchmarks; namely, analyst earnings expectations. 
However, the current study examines whether UK firms reflect that managers who 
have incentives manage reported earnings around zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings by using three types of real earnings management.32 Therefore, firms that 
manage earnings upwards are likely to have at least one of these characteristics – 
unusually low cash flows from operations, and/or unusually low discretionary 
expenses, and/or unusually high production costs. The three hypotheses, stated in 
alternate form, follow:33 
    HYPOTHESIS 1a. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero 
earnings are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
    HYPOTHESIS 1b. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around last 
year’s zero are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
    HYPOTHESIS 2a. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero 
earnings are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
                                                          
32 Roychowdhury (2006) defines firms that just meet/beat earning benchmarks around zero earnings 
threshold as firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 
0.005 as “suspect firm-years” (Suspect_zero). Gunny (2010) defines firm-years observation suspect 
just beating/meeting the last year’s earning as firm-years with change in net income before 
extraordinary items from last year between 0 and 0.01 as “suspect firm-years” (Suspect_last). 
33 It is worth noting that Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b are not new to the literature and 
have already been addressed by prior research based on US firms, e.g., Roychowdhury (2006), 
Gunny (2010) and Zang (2012). However, it is necessary to examine such hypotheses in the thesis 
to prove consistency with prior literature and check the applicability of the data in the UK. 
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    HYPOTHESIS 2b. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around last 
year’s earnings are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
    HYPOTHESIS 3a. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero 
earnings are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
    HYPOTHESIS 3b. UK firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around last 
year’s earnings are more likely to engage in real earnings management. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses Development of the Second Empirical 
Under the agency theory perspectives, the net effect of earnings management on a 
firm’s value depends on whether managers manipulate earnings mainly to serve 
their own interest (opportunistic earnings management) and thus mislead investors 
on their assessments of firms’ performance (Healy and Palepu, 1993; 
Subramanyam, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997). On the other hand, due to 
information asymmetry, investors usually do not have as much information as the 
managers. Therefore, managers may use earnings to communicate their private 
information on firms’ future performances and thus improve earnings’ 
informativeness by providing more timely measures of a firms’ future performance 
(Demski, 1998; Kothari, 2001; Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001). In addition, if 
managers sacrifice short-term value to manipulate earnings to signal their firms’ 
future performance (signalling earnings management), and the market recognizes 
the information in the signal, the benefits may offset the costs and eventually 
increase a firm’s value and thus protect its long-term value.  
Conflicting empirical results regarding the positive or negative influence of real 
earnings management on performance have generated opposing explanations 
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regarding the reasons the managers adopt real earnings management. A negative 
correlation between real earnings management activities and the subsequent 
operating performance of firms, which suggests the opportunistic mechanism, may 
affect the assumption of real earnings management. Empirical evidence generally 
indicates that income-increasing real earnings management leads to a decline in 
subsequent earnings and cash flow. In the US firms, Bens et al. (2002, 2003) find 
that earnings manipulation using stock repurchases has a marginally negative 
impact on future operating performance. Gunny (2005) investigates the 
consequences of real earnings management (cutting/reducing R&D and SG&A 
expenditures, offering price discount to boost sales, and recognising gains from 
sales of long-term assets) on subsequent operating performance, and finds that US 
firms that engaged in real earnings management experience a negative decline on 
subsequent operating performance. 
Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that beat analyst forecasts experience a 
significant negative decline in operating future performance and stock market 
performance in the subsequent three years. Moreover, Zhang (2008) and Leggett et 
al. (2009) find that US firms that meet analysts’ cash flow consequence and engage 
in real earnings management experience a negative impact on subsequent operating 
performance. Vorst (2016) finds that US firms that engage in real earnings 
management have a negative impact on long-term future performance.   
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Kothari (2016) provide the most straightforward 
evidence; they examine the future consequences of real and accrual-based earnings 
management around the time of seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and show that 
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future change in return on assets (ROA) is negatively associated with firms 
engaging in high levels of real earnings management. 
While positive correlation between real earnings management and the subsequent 
operating performance of firms suggests that, the signalling mechanism may affect 
the adoption of real earnings management. Roychowdhury (2006) and Taylor and 
Xu (2010) find no decline in subsequent operating performance for real earnings 
management firms using manipulation of discretionary expenditures, production, 
and sales to meet analysts’ forecasts of the US firms. Prior studies document that 
firms that manage earnings to meet analyst earnings forecast tend to demonstrate 
good future operating performance (Bartov et al., 2002; Koh et al., 2007). Gunny 
(2010) shows that conducting real earnings management simply to meet earnings 
thresholds is positively related with subsequent operating performance, and that 
firms reducing/cutting R&D expenditures or selling, general and administrative 
expenses just to meet/beat earnings thresholds have higher subsequent industry 
adjust return on assets and cash flow from operations (CFO). Chen et al. (2010) 
examine how the effect of accrual-based earnings management is negative on 
performance, whereas the effect of real earnings management is positive on 
performance.  
To the best of my knowledge, no study has depicted the relationship between the 
three types of real earnings management to meet or just beat important earnings 
benchmarks (zero earnings and last year’s earnings) and future operating 
performance in UK firms. Most prior studies in this field are US-based, and there 
is no empirical evidence for UK context. In addition, most academic studies attempt 
to identify earnings management, but they have not measured real earnings 
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management on firms’ subsequent operating performance in terms of its magnitude. 
Gunny (2010) uses indicator variables, and classifies real earnings management 
firms as those firms in the extreme quintile of abnormal real earnings management. 
This study is timely in that it addresses this gap by examining the relation between 
the magnitudes of real earnings management activities measurements and UK firms’ 
future operating performance in order to capture the general level of real earnings 
management activities on future operating performance. 
From the above empirical literature, since all earnings manipulation activities lead 
to higher income in the current period, there would be some consequences of these 
activities and it can be either opportunistic or signalling choices of managers and 
thus the results are mixed. However, if firms tend to manage earnings for 
opportunistic reasons and manipulate their operating activities on a regular basis, 
their operating performances are likely to deteriorate in the future. On the other 
hand, manipulations of operating activities are less likely to significantly affect the 
operations of firms that are in strong financial and market positions and intend to 
use earnings to communicate favourable private information about future 
performance. Compared to other firms, firms’ just meeting/beating important 
earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings have higher 
incentives to engage in real earnings management manipulation are expected to 
experience a negative (positive) effects on firms’ future performance. By taking 
three measures of real earnings management around firms to meet or just to beat 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings and industry adjusted return on assets as 




    HYPOTHESIS 4. There is an association between UK firms that manipulate their 
sales, discretionary expenses and production to meet or just beat earnings 
benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s earnings) and future operating 
performance.  
    HYPOTHESIS 5. There is an association between UK firms that manipulate their 
sales, discretionary expenses and production in absence of meeting/beating 
earnings benchmarks and future operating performance.  
4.3 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The dataset of this study can be classified into two categories of data: Firstly, 
financial and market data were extracted from Datastream and Worldscope 
databases34 for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from the fiscal 
years 2009 and 2013.35 The sample period starts with 2009 because managers could 
have been incentivised to manipulate earnings to avoid the negative effects of the 
financial crisis. The sample period ends in 2013, is the most recent fiscal year-end 
with available subsequent year data. The sample is extended to 2014 because of the 
requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating performance for one subsequent 
year. Secondly, classifications of industry; data on the industry classification were 
initially based on international standard industrial classification (ISIC).36 Since the 
distributions of the firms across the industry classifications was highly unbalanced 
                                                          
34  This database is provided by Thomson Reuters and the version is used here is Thomson 
Datastream Advance for Office (AFO) which covers time-series, statistics, and company accounts 
data. The Datastream database is used to collect the stock price (return) and basic information of 
the firms, while the Worldscope database is used to obtain all required financial data for the sample. 
35 To increase the sample size, this study does not restrict the sample to the firms with December 
fiscal year-end. 
36 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes are four-digit numerical codes assigned by the US 
government to business establishments to identify the primary business of the establishment. The 
SIC system arrays the economy into 11 divisions, that are divided into 83 2-digit major groups, that 




between the large numbers of economics activities, the industries were then 
summarised based on international standard industrial classification. Figure 4.1 
presents the distribution of the sample firms according to this classification.  
Table 4.1 sets out all sample selection criteria to estimate real earnings management. 
The initial sample has 6,831 firm-year observations with sufficient Datastream and 
Worldscope data for calculating real earnings management proxies over the sample 
period of 2009 to 2013. Matsumoto (2002) argues that firms in the financial, 
banking, and utilities industries have regulations and incentives in terms of earnings 
management that differ from those of firms in other industries. Consistent with 
prior research (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), firms in the financial institutions, banks, 
communication (SIC 6000-7000), transportation and utility industries (SIC 4400-
5000) were eliminated from the sample. This is because they operate in highly 
regulated industries with accounting rules that differ to those in other industries. In 
addition, to improve the comparability of results among sample firms, which gives 
me 5,230 firm-year observations. 
Following prior research (e.g., Kothari et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012), for real earnings management proxies I require firm-year data 
with at least 15 observations for each 2-digit SIC industry in a particular year in 
order to estimate real earnings management 37 . Since I base the earnings 
management measure on cross-sectional regression using industry-year 
information, I exclude firm-year in industries with less than 15 observations from 
                                                          
37 Industry is defined as division by its 2-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code. 
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the sample. After this step, the sample is reduced to 5,029 firm-year observations.38 
I exclude firms without sufficient data to calculate the proxies of real earnings 
management, and firm-year observations with missing data. This requirement 
further reduces the sample to 4,498 firm-year observations. I further eliminate firms 
with negative sales number or where the total assets value is zero or not reported.39 
All variables and continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of 
their distributions to avoid the influence of outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007; 
Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012).40 Finally, I have 4,487 firm-years and 930 firms over 
the period of 2009 to 2013; this is the full sample that I use to test the hypotheses 
as reported in Table 4.2, which includes six divisions, and 49 industries (major 
group).  
My tests proceed based on the firms that just meet or beat earnings benchmarks 
under the assumption that those firms are more likely to have incentives to 
manipulate earnings by utilising real earnings management activities. Specifically, 
I focus on the two common groups of firms that are well identified by the previous 
studies as the firms with strong incentives to manage earnings. These are (1) firms 
that meet or just beat zero earnings – that is, report positive net income and (2) 
                                                          
38 McNichols (2000, p. 324) notes that a time series approach of earnings management poses two 
problems. “First, one must exclude firms that do not have a sufficient data series in COMPUSTAT 
or other data sources. This leads to potentially smaller samples, and their representativeness remains 
open to question. Second, it is not clear that sample firms have no incentive to manage earnings in 
the estimation period, or that data are stationary over such a long period”. However, the cross-
sectional estimation approach of earnings management is used, which does not require a time-series 
for each firm. 
39 Datastream technicians note that “the negative sales may results from a data entry error or may 
actually denote a missing value.” 
40 All continuous explanatory variables in the models are primarily based on annual changes and 
this introduces a potential issue when they denominator is very small. To minimise distortions from 
extreme values, the data are winsorized at 1% and 99% percentiles for each variables. 
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firms that meet or just beat last year’s earnings – that is, maintain last year’s 




Table 4.1: Sample Selection Criteria for Real Earnings Management 






Firm-year observations have sufficient accounting 
data from Datastream and Worldscope over the period 
of 2009 to 2013 for real earnings management 
calculation 
1,510 6,831 
Less:   
Firms in the financial and utility industries (SIC 6000-
7000 and SIC 4400-5000) 
351 1,601 
Industries with less than 15 firm-years observations in 
the same industry-year 
56 201 
Firms without sufficient data to calculate the proxies of 
REM  
73 230 
Missing data (e.g., data not available) and firms 
greater than 12 months, therefore it may seem as there 
is a “missing year”  
97 301 
Firms with negative sales numbers or where the total 
assets value is zero or missing 
3 11 





















































Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining 12 Tobacco Products 21 
Oil and Gas Extraction 13 Textile Mill Products 22 
Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, except 
Fuels 
14 Apparel and other Finished Products 23 




 Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture 24 
Heavy Construction  16 Furniture and Fixtures 25 
Construction Special Trade Contractors 17 Paper and Allied Products 26 





Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 
Wholesale Trade-nondurable Goods 51 Chemicals and Allied Products 28 













Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 29 
General Merchandise Store 53 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30 
Food Stores 54 Leather and Leather Products 31 
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 55 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 32 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 Primary Metal Industries 33 
Home Furniture and Furnishings 57 Fabricated Metal Products 34 
Eating and Drinking Places 58 Industries and Commercial Machinery 35 
Miscellaneous Retail  59 Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and Components 36 













Transportation Equipment 37 
Personal Services 72 Measuring, Analysing, and Controlling Instruments 38 
Business Services 73 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39 
Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking  75 
Miscellaneous Repair services 76 
Motion Pictures 78 
Amusement and Recreation Services 79 
Health Services 80 
Educational Services 82 
Social Services 83 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management 87 
Miscellaneous Services 89 
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4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Final Sample by Industry and Year  
Table 4.2 presents the sample distribution of firm-year observations by SIC division 
grouping and by time, and Panel A presents the sample structure by industry. I show 
the industry distribution of the final sample by presenting the number of 
observations and percentage for each industry (division), which consists of 930 
firms from 49 industries. In addition, the sample firms come from a variety of 
industries, and I focus on several divisions. The most heavily represented industries 
are in the divisions of manufacturing with 1,452 firms (32.36%, 2-digit SIC code 
20-39), and 32.74% are in the division of services with 1,469 firms (2-digit SIC 
code 70-89). This is followed by the mining division (21.68%, SIC code 10-14), the 
retail trade division (7.24%, 2-digit SIC code 52-59), the division of construction 
(3.48%, 2-digit SIC code 14-17), and the division of wholesale trade (2.5%, 2-digit 
SIC code 50-51). Table 4.2, Panel B shows the time series distribution of the firms’ 
sample over the period of 2009 to 2013. However, there is no significant variation 
in the year-to-year numbers of the sample. All years – 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 



















Table 4.2: Sample Description of Industry and Time Distribution for All Firms’ Sample over 
the Period of 2009 to 2013 














Mining SIC 10 – SIC 14 4 973 21.68 21.68 
Construction SIC 15 – SIC 17 3 156 3.48 25.16 
Manufacturing SIC 20 – SIC 39 20 1,452 32.36 57.52 
Wholesale trade SIC 50 – SIC 51 2 112 2.50 60.02 
Retail trade SIC 52 – SIC 59 8 325 7.24 67.26 
Services SIC 70 – SIC 89 12 1,469 32.74 100.00 
Total  49 4,487 100.00%  
 
 
Panel B:  Time Distribution  
Year Frequency Percent Cum. (%) 
2009 842 18.77 18.77 
2010 878 19.57 38.33 
2011 907 20.21 58.55 
2012 930 20.73 79.27 
2013 930 20.73 100.00 







4.4 Research Methods 
4.4.1 Real Earnings Management Metrics  
Firms can utilise three types of real earnings management activities to manage 
earnings upward: boosting the time of sales through increasing price discounts or 
more lenient credit facilities; cutting or reduction of discretionary expenses 
including research and development; advertising expenses; selling, general and 
administrative spending; and finally reducing the reported cost of goods sold 
through overproduction. These actions can affect a firm’s cash flow from 
operations, discretionary expenses, and production costs, causing it to deviate from 
their normal business level. Specifically, both sales manipulation and 
overproduction generate abnormally high production costs relative to dollar sales, 
and reduction of discretionary expenses generates abnormally low discretionary 
expenses relative to sales (Roychowdhury, 2006). However, as reported in 
Roychowdhury (2006) the effect of these manipulation methods on cash flows from 
operations (CFO) is ambiguous. For example, given the sales level, both sales-
based manipulation and overproduction have a negative impact on abnormal 
current-period CFO, whereas reduction of discretionary expenses has positive 
impact on abnormal current-period CFO. Therefore, the results based on the cash 
flows from operations measure should be interpreted with caution. 
This study focuses on contexts in which the literature has shown that firms have 
strong incentives to manage earnings upward – i.e. firms that meet or just beat 
earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings. Also, this study 
follows prior research by using five measures to detect real earnings management 
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activities (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Gunny, 2010; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2016; Kothari et 
al., 2016) as these studies provide evidence of the validity of these measures.  
Specifically, this study uses the following five measures to detect real earnings 
management activities: (1) the abnormal levels of cash flows from operations 
(Ab_CFO), (2) abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX), (3) abnormal 
production costs (Ab_PROD), (4) a combined measure of real earnings 
management (REM_1), and (5) a combined measure of real earnings management 
(REM_2). Therefore, the residuals from these estimation models represent 
measures of real earnings management activities.  
4.4.1.1 The Normal Level of Cash Flows from Operations 
The first measure for real earnings management activities is the abnormal cash 
flows from operations. To manage earnings upward, firms can utilise the real 
earnings management method through sales manipulations by accelerating the time 
of sales or generating unsustainable sales. Roychowdhury (2006) defines sales-
based manipulation as managers’ attempts at temporarily boosting sales during the 
year through offering price discounts and/or more lenient credit facilities. Hence, 
sales-based manipulation is expected to lead to lower current-period operating cash 
flows. Such price discounting and/or more lenient credit facilities will temporarily 
accelerate the firm’s sales volume from the next year to the current year, assuming 
the margins are positive. However, the increase in sales is a temporary situation and 




In the first stage, I express (generate) the normal cash flows from operations as a 
linear function of sales revenue and change in sales revenue in the current period 
using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998) as implemented in 
Roychowdhury (2006). Recent researchers such as Cohen et al. (2008), Badertscher 
(2011), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also apply the cash flows from operations 
model to estimate real earnings management. To estimate this model, I run the 
following cross-sectional regression for each industry and year for all firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 41 ; where each industry is defined as a 
division by its 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                       (4.1) 
where 
 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = is cash flows from operations for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, defined as 
cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets; 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = the sales revenue during period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1; 
𝑖 = the firm; and 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = is the error term. 
All variables are deflated by lagged total assets consistent with prior studies on 
earnings management (Christie, 1987; Easton and Sommers, 2003).42 
                                                          
41 To take account of extreme values all variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
42 Easton and Sommers (2003) document that there are several potential advantages of deflating by 
lagged assets. First, scale differences largely disappear. Second, risk differences tend to become 
smaller through time for a given company than across companies and third, biases in coefficients 
on leverage and size would be inconsequential without deflating. Moreover, Barth and Clinch (2009) 
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Second, the estimated coefficients 𝛼0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 from equation (4.1) are used 
to estimate normal cash flows from operations (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) for all firms listed 
on the London Stock Exchange for each year and industry as follows: 
𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = â0 + ?̂?1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + ?̂?3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
)               (4.2) 
Third, for every firm on the LSE, the abnormal level of cash flows from operations 
(𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) is computed as actual cash flows from operations (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) 
minus the normal level of cash flows from operations (𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡) predicted 




) − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡                                                                           (4.3) 
4.4.1.2 The Normal Level of Discretionary Expenses  
The second measure for real earnings management activities is the abnormal 
discretionary expenses. Prior research suggests that managers cut discretionary 
expenses in order to manage earnings. Graham et al. (2005) find that CFOs indicate 
a willingness to engage in real earnings management by delaying discretionary 
spending in areas of R&D, advertising, and maintenance in order to achieve an 
earnings target. Moreover, firms can decide to alter the level of discretionary 
                                                          
point out that using the data simulated to have scale effects and find that market capitalisation 
mitigates more effectively the scale effects than do the other potential deflators such as equity book 
value, lagged price, returns, lagged market capitalisation, lagged assets and lagged sales. This 
follows the approach of prior research (see. e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012) which points out that adding a scaled intercept, 1/𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 to control for size is 
recommended, therefore avoiding artificial correlation between cash flow from operations and sales 
revenue that results from the differences in the total assets. Adding an unscaled intercept, 𝛼0 for the 
normal levels of cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, and production costs to ensure 
that the mean Ab_CFO, Ab_DISEX, and Ab_PROD for every industry-year are zero.  
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expenses such as advertising, R&D and selling, general and administrative 
expenses by reducing these expenses, firms can increase their current-period 
earnings. However, there is a risk that this may negatively affect the cash flow in 
the future (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
I draw from Roychowdhury’s (2006) work to measure managerial manipulation of 
discretionary expenses.43 Later researchers such as Cohen et al. (2008), Cohen and 
Zarowin (2010), Badertscher (2011) and Zang (2012) also apply the discretionary 
expenses model to estimate real earnings management. The normal level of 
discretionary expenses can be expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous 
sales where:  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                             (4.4) 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) mention, however, that 
estimating a normal level of discretionary expenses as a function of current sales in 
equation (4.4) can lead to problems if firms manage sales upwards to increase 
reported earnings during any year, and lower residuals from running a regression 
as specified in the equation (4.4).44 To address this issue, following a number of 
researchers (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Badertscher, 2011; Zang, 
2012), I model discretionary expenses as a linear function of lagged sales. I then 
estimate the following model to derive the normal levels of discretionary expenses 
                                                          
43Roychowdhury (2006) includes advertising expenses as a separate component of discretionary 
expenses. This study does not include advertising expenses separately since they are already 
included in the annual Worldscope data items for selling, general and administrative (WC101101). 
44 Roychowdhury (2006, p. 345) models discretionary expenses as a linear function of lagged sales 
because “if firms manage sales upward to increase reported earnings in any year, they can exhibit 
unusually low residuals from the regression using current sales in that year, even when they do not 
reduce discretionary expenses.” 
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(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ) for all firms listed on the London Stock Exchange cross-
sectionally for each industry and year as follows,  
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                            (4.5) 
where 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = is the discretionary expenses that are defined as the sum of 
research and development (R&D), advertising, and selling, 
general and administrative expenses (SG&A) in year 𝑡 for firm 
𝑖45; 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets at the beginning of period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; and 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. Given 
that firms with higher sales generally have higher expenses, the 
coefficients on lagged sales should be positive. 
For every firm on the LSE the abnormal level of discretionary expenses 
(𝐴𝑏_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡)  is computed as the difference between the actual discretionary 
expenses ( 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) and the normal level of discretionary expenses 




) − 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡                                               (4.6) 
4.4.1.3 The Normal Level of Production Costs  
The third measure of real earnings management activities is abnormally high 
inventory production, producing an excessive volume of units, the less fixed 
manufacturing overhead costs for each unit, and vice versa (Cohen et al., 2008). 
Thus, to manage earnings upward, managers can overproduce inventory during an 
                                                          
45 As long as SG&A expenses are available, advertising expenses and R&D are set to zero if they 
are not available in the Datastream database. 
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accounting period in order to lower costs of goods sold by increasing their normal 
production and therefore report higher profit margin, if greater inventory holding 
costs or increases in marginal cost per unit in the current period are not offsetting 
realised cost savings (Gunny, 2010). However, high inventory holding costs in 
subsequent periods caused by surplus of inventories have negative impact on cash 
flows. 
I draw from Roychowdhury’s (2006) model to capture the amount of abnormal 
production costs (Ab_PROD). Subsequent studies, such as Cohen et al. (2008), 
Gunny (2010), Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Badertscher (2011), and Zang (2012), 
using the production costs model to estimate real earnings management, define the 
production costs as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory during 
the year46. In addition, they provide further evidence that this measure captures real 
earnings management activities. Variables sales revenue (𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), change in 
sales revenue ( ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ), and lagged change in sales revenue 
(∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) have been utilised to estimate the normal levels of production 
costs. The normal level of production costs can be expressed as a linear function of 
contemporaneous sales as: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  (4.7) 
where 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 and the 
change in inventory from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; 
                                                          
46 Roychowdhury (2006) points out that, in order to detect abnormal production costs, production 
costs instead of cost of goods sold are used for two reasons: using cost of goods sold may also 
measure at the same time accrual based-earnings management via inventory account, and secondly, 
it could be distorted by the company’s inventory cost flow assumption (FIFO/LIFO). 
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𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the total assets in firm-year 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1; 
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = is the sales revenue in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = is the change in sales revenue from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; and 
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 = is the change in sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. 
The abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD) is computed as the difference between 
the actual values of production costs and the normal levels predicted from equation 
(4.7). Equation (4.7) is estimated as cross-sectional for each industry and year.  
4.4.1.4 Aggregate Real Earnings Management Measures 
In order to capture the total effects of real earnings management (REM), aggregate 
real activities manipulation is developed. Batrov and Cohen (2007), Cohen et al. 
(2008) and Badertscher (2011) use a variable of REM proxies as a single measure 
of real earnings management by summing the three standardised individual 
components; i.e. abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production costs. Furthermore, Gunny (2010) computes a 
variable aggregate REM as the sum of the residuals from the R&D model, SG&A 
model, and production costs model multiplied by negative one. 
In recent studies, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) develop and combine 
the three individual measures of real earnings management (abnormal cash flows 
from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs) 
to compute an aggregate measure of real earnings management activities. By using 
the same metrics, they provide further evidence that these measures capture real 
earnings management. For the first measure, REM_1 – and consistent with Cohen 
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and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) – abnormal discretionary expenses and 
abnormal production cost are multiplied by negative one, and then aggregated as 
one measure.47 A higher amount of this aggregate measure implies that suspect 
firm-years are more likely to be cutting discretionary expenses and overproduction 
to increase reported earnings. Thus, 
REM_1 = Ab_DISEX * (-1) + Ab_PROD                                                         (4.8) 
For the second measure, REM_2 – again, consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) 
and Zang (2012) – abnormal cash flows from operations and the abnormal 
discretionary expenses are multiplied by negative one and then aggregated into one 
measure. As for REM_1, I multiply it by negative one so that, the higher these 
amounts, the more likely it is that the firm is engaging in sales-based manipulation 
and cutting discretionary expenses to manage reported earnings upwards.48 Thus, 
REM_2 = Ab_CFO * (-1) + Ab_DISEX * (-1)                                                 (4.9) 
Even though single REM proxies have different implications for earnings, 
aggregating these measures may dilute the empirical results.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012), I do not multiply abnormal production 
costs by negative one because higher production costs are indicative of overproduction to reduce 
cost of goods sold. I do not combine abnormal production costs and abnormal cash flows from 
operations because the same activities that lead to abnormally high production costs also lead to 
abnormally low cash flow; thus, adding these two amounts lead to double counting REM. 
48 Following the approach of Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Zang (2012) I multiply abnormal 
discretionary expense and abnormal cash flows from operations by (-1) so that positive values 
represent income increasing REM to allow all measures of real earnings management to have the 
same interpretation and consistency with other REM measures as the measure of production costs.  
 
133 
4.4.2 How to Achieve Measures of Real Earnings Management  
Consistent with prior research, residuals from these estimation models represent 
measures of real earnings management activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et 
al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). In the above 
equations, the abnormal cash flows from operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal 
production costs (Ab_PROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX) 
are computed as the difference between the actual values and the normal levels 
predicted from Equations (4.1), (4.5) and (4.7). Apparently, the higher values of 
these residuals indicate that firms engage in real earnings management activities to 
increase reported earnings by accelerating sales or generating unsustainable sales 
with price discounts and more lenient credit terms, and cutting discretionary 
expenses and overproduction of inventory.  
4.4.3 Suspect Firms Just Meeting/Beating Important Earnings Benchmarks 
Prior research suggests that firm-years with earnings right at or just above 
benchmarks are likely to manage earnings to meet these important benchmarks 
(Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Peasnell et al., 
2001; Bartov et al., 2002; Jacob and Jorgensen, 2007). Graham et al. (2005) also 
provide survey evidence that CFOs find the following earnings benchmarks are the 
most important: same quarter last year, analyst consensus forecast, zero earnings, 
and previous quarter earnings per share (EPS). Moreover, both theoretical and 
empirical studies find evidence that managers engage extensively in real earnings 
management activities and manage earnings based on three earnings benchmarks 
to meet various targets; these are zero earnings, last year’s earnings, and 
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management forecasts (e.g., Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Zang, 2012).   
Two common earnings targets, however, adopted by management are zero earnings 
and last year’s earnings. Thus, I use the same assumption to identify firm-years 
suspected of managing earnings upward to meet/beat benchmarks targets that are 
consistent with the prior research. First, following Roychowdhury (2006), I identify 
suspect firms just beating/meeting the zero benchmarks as firm-years with net 
income before extraordinary items over lagged assets that lie in the interval 0 and 
0.005 as real earnings management “suspect firm-years” (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜). Second, 
following Gunny (2010), I identify firm-year observations suspects just 
beating/meeting the last year’s earning as firm-years with change in net income 
before extraordinary items from last year between 0 and 0.01 as “suspect firm-years” 
( 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 ). I then create a dummy variable, “suspect firm-years” 
(𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 and 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡), with a value of one for these suspect firm-
years, and zero otherwise. 
4.5 Empirical Model of Suspect Firm-Years  
The following regressions suggested by Roychowdhury (2006), similar to Gunny 
(2010) and Zang (2012) are run to examine whether suspect firm-years have 
incentives to manage reported earnings (e.g., firms are more likely to manipulate 
earnings) compared with non-suspect firm-years (e.g., firms are less likely to 
manipulate earnings). This study utilises unbalanced panel data including different 
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numbers of firms in every year. Therefore, I run Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach 
cross-sectionally for each of the five years from 2009-2013 to test the hypotheses.49 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 −
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 ,                                                                                       (4.10) 
where  (𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 ) refers to one of the five measures for abnormal real earnings 
management activities: the dependent variables abnormal cash flows from 
operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX), and aggregate measures of real earnings 
management; REM_1 and REM_2. Each dependent variable in equation (4.10) will 
be run separately with a similar set of independent and control variables. 
Based on prior research (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; 
Zang, 2012), three control variables – firm size, firm performance, and firm growth 
– are added to the model that are to be associated with real earnings management 
to control for significant variations in earnings management that might include 
measurement errors that are correlated with these firm characteristics. The possible 
impact of a size effect is controlled for by adding the natural logarithm of market 
value (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸) to the model. To control for firm performance, the return-on-assets 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴)  is added as a control variable calculated as the net income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. In addition, in order to control 
for firm-specific growth opportunities, the model includes market-to-book ratio 
(𝑀𝑇𝐵) is computed as the market value of equity (𝑀𝑉𝐸) divided by the book value 
                                                          
49 In his study, Roychowdhury (2006, p. 350) reports the means of the coefficients from 15 separate 
annual cross-sectional regressions across industry-years over the period from 1987 to 2001. Fama 
and MacBeth’s approach is used to calculate t-statistics. In the estimation process, this study uses 
Fama and MacBeth’s approach to increase the comparability of the results to prior research. 
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of common equity.50  Furthermore, these three control variables are considered 
individually, along with the method of measurement for each variable. However, 
no prediction is made for the coefficient sign because the empirical evidence on 
these relations is mixed. 
Suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 and 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) are an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if firm-year just beats/meets one of the earnings benchmarks and 0 if 
it clearly misses or beats all the benchmarks.51 In line with Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
discussions, if suspect firm-years manage earnings upwards, their abnormal cash 
flows from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses should be lower; and 
abnormal production costs should be higher compared with the rest of the sample. 
Finally, consistent with Gunny (2010) and Zang (2012), equation (4.10) is run with 
a year ( 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 ) as indicator to control for any general economic 
condition in each given year.  
4.6 Empirical Model of Future Operating Performance 
Real earnings management activities are achieved by influence output of 
accounting systems through operating activities with direct cash flow consequences 
(sales-based manipulation, discretionary expenses based-manipulation, and 
                                                          
50 Furthermore, Roychowdhury (2006) provides evidence that managers of the suspect firm-years 
with high growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio, MTB) manipulated earnings by engaging in 
real earnings management. He shows that these firm-years have abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses that are lower, and abnormal production costs that 
are higher, on average, compared to the rest of the suspect firm-years. 
51 Durtschi and Easton (2005, 2009) provide evidence that the discontinuity around zero earnings as 
an artefact of the data also can be caused by the deflator because it is significantly smaller for firms 
just below zero than at zero. They point out that small profitable firms are, on average, more highly 
valued than small loss firms are. For my sample of UK suspect firm-years around zero earnings, 
total assets are not significant between suspect firm-years around zero earnings (1,861.28 £m) and 
non-suspect firm-years (1,396.56 £m) - see Table 5.1. 
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production costs-based manipulation). The consequences of real earnings 
management activities on subsequent future performance are two conflict effects. 
 The first conflict effect is that these activities destroy value for shareholders 
because such manipulation generally impairs the firm’s longer-term cash flows. 
This means REM is negatively associated with subsequent future performance (e.g., 
Barton and Simko, 2002; Hirshleifer et al., 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; 
Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Mizik and Jacobson, 
2008; Bhojraj et al., 2009; Leggett et al., 2009; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Mizik, 
2010; Wongsunwai, 2013; De Jong et al., 2014; Ge and Kim, 2014; Alhadab et al., 
2015; Francis et al., 2016; Kothari et al., 2016; Vorst, 2016). 
The second conflict effect conveys a signal of superior future performance to the 
market because real earnings management activities allow management to just 
beat/meet important benchmarks (i.e. zero benchmarks, last year’s benchmarks) 
(e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Koh et al., 2007; Roychowdhury, 2006; Chen et al., 2010; 
Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012). 
To analyse the consequences of real earnings management on future operating 
performance, the current study tests whether the two conflict effects of real earnings 
management activities of firms that just meet or beat important earnings 
benchmarks have an impact on subsequent future performance. Operating 
performance was measured with industry-adjusted return-on-assets (ROA) that is 
augmented with each real earnings management activities measures. The following 
regression model controls for determinants of subsequent operating performance 
and is similar to that used by Bens et al. (2002) and Gunny (2010). However, this 
model is estimated with pooled ordinary least squares (time series cross sectional) 
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regression relating future performance in 𝑡 + 1  to real earnings management 
activities as the dependent variables. Abnormal real earnings management 
measures ( 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 ) as independent variables, along with control variables, 
computed t-statistics using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach, and run cross-
sectionally for each of the five years from 2009 to 2013 (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010).52 
𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎4 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎6 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎8 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎10 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                            (4.11) 
Most academic studies attempt to identify earnings management, but do not provide 
evidence on its magnitude; this current study addresses this by examining the 
relation between the magnitude of real earnings management proxies and future 
performance. In this model, the dependent variable is one-year-ahead industry-
adjusted financial performance return-on-assets (ROA), calculated as the 
differences between firm-specific ROA and median ROA for the same year and 
industry (2-digit SIC code), as a direct measure of the firm’s longer-term cash 
flow. 53  𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀  refers to one of the five measures for abnormal real earnings 
                                                          
52 The procedures of Fama-Macbeth are used as follow: in the first step, a time series standard error 
regression for each cross-sectional distribution of coefficients (e.g., firm- or portfolio-specific) is 
estimated. Then, in the second step, the final coefficients estimates are obtained by basing inferences 
on the mean and standard deviation of the resulting coefficients. In other words, Fama-MacBeth t-
statistic based on mean and standard error of time-series of coefficients from cross-sectional 
regressions. 
53 Extensive literature depicts the different measures and proxies for financial performance of the 
firms. Broadly, these measures are divided into two categories: accounting-based measures and 
market-based measures (Margolis et al., 2007). Previous studies on future performance use return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), earnings per shares (EPS), price-earnings (P/E), earnings 
before income and tax (EBIT) and net profit margin as measure of firm performance. To investigate 
the impact of real earnings management, previous studies (e.g., Rangan, 1998; Gunny, 2005; Mizik 
and Jacobson, 2008; Leggett et al., 2009, Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010) use return on assets 
(ROA), industry-adjusted return on assets, and industry-adjusted cash flows from operations (CFO) 
as measures for performance. Further, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) use change in return on assets as 
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management activities. The coefficients on 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, captures the main effects of 
abnormal real earnings management activities on future performance. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 as 
defined above is an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting 
important earnings benchmarks (zero benchmarks and last year’s benchmarks). 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 is an interaction term which captures the incremental effects of 
abnormal real earnings management activities in the presence of just beating or 
meeting important earnings benchmarks. Finally, to capture the total “value-
destroying” and “signalling” impacts of real earnings management activities, I test 
the sum of coefficient on abnormal real earnings management ( 𝑎7 ) and the 
coefficient on the interaction terms of firms in the presence of just meeting or 
beating earnings benchmarks (𝑎9).  
4.6.1 Control Variables 
This study examines the consequences of real earnings management activities on 
future performance with regression models that control for a more comprehensive 
list of factors that may affect operating performance. Prior research suggests several 
factors that affect future operating performance: 
 Size (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸): is included in the regression model as the control variable and is 
defined as the natural logarithm of market capitalisation. Fama and French (1992) 
demonstrate that the market capitalisation provides an important representation of 
the future expectations of the firm. To further assess the association between real 
earnings management and future operating performance, earlier studies employ 
                                                          




firm size as the control variable (Gunny, 2005, 2010; Leggett et al., 2009; Chen et 
al., 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2013).  
Financial health (𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒): the essential goal for firms with poor financial health 
is to carry on their operations instead of manipulating their earnings. Graham et al. 
(2005) find that CEOs in firms with poor financial health first attempt to survive 
instead of manipulating their earnings. To capture the cost of real activities 
manipulation, Zang (2012) argues that the marginal cost of real earnings 
management is high if firms are in poor financial health. Further, Zang (2012) also 
finds that firms with higher values of 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  indicate a healthier financial 
condition (superior financial health) and lower cost associated with real activities 
manipulation. However, financial health of the firm has a positive relationship with 
financial performance; thus the coefficient on 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  should be positive. 
Following Zang (2012), the current study uses the bankruptcy prediction model 
developed by Altman (1968, 2000), which is represented here by the 
Altman 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 , to control for financial health of the firm. A higher 
𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 implies a firm’s healthier financial condition and a lower 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 implies 
poorer financial condition of firms.54  
The Altman 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 model is: 
z_scorei,t−1= 0.3 * (X1) + 1.0 * (X2) + 1.4 * (X3) + 1.2 * (X4) + 0.6 * (X5)               (4.12) 
where  
                                                          
54 Mackie-Mason (1990), Leggett et al. (2009), Gunny (2010) and, Taylor and Xu (2010) use 
different measures for the firm’s financial health and calculate 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 of year (𝑡) as: 3.3 * (Net 
incomet / Total Assetst-1) + 1.0 * (Salest / Total Assetst-1) + 1.4 * (Retained Earningst / Total Assetst-
1) + 1.2 * (Working Capitalt / Total Assetst-1). However, Altman found that firms scoring below 1.8 
in the “Distress Zones” will probably go into bankruptcy, while firms with scores above 3.0 in the 
“Safe Zones” are not likely to go bankrupt. 
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𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 represents the Altman (1986, 2000) distress score with which relative 
financial condition of the firm can be explained based on magnitude and sign, 
measured at the beginning of year 𝑡 . X1 represents the net income before 
extraordinary items are added to the total assets ratio. X2 represents the total sales 
to the total assets ratio. X3 represents the retained earnings to the total assets ratio. 
X4 represents the working capital to the total assets ratio.55  X5 represents the 
market value of equity to the total liabilities ratio.   
Growth Opportunities (Market-To-Book ratio, 𝑀𝑇𝐵 ): Matsumoto (2002) and 
McNichols (2000) document that firms that are growing rapidly are more likely to 
be associated with earnings management. In addition, Skinner and Sloan (2002) 
point out that firm with growth prospects are more likely to be penalised in the 
market by the investors; therefore, managers of high-growth firms are more likely 
to have incentives to engage in more aggressive earnings management to avoid 
negative earnings. Consistent with previous research, growth opportunities are 
included in the regression models as a control variable to control for the life cycle 
of the firm. This is because Fama and French (1992) detect that growth 
opportunities are a direct signal of the relative future prospects of firms, and 
calculated as the ratio of market value of common equity divided by the book value 
of equity, or market-to-book. Prior studies measure growth opportunities of the firm 
as market value of common equity divided by book value of equity (e.g., Gunny, 
2005, 2010; Leggett et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2012).56  
                                                          
55 Working capital represents the difference between a firm’s current assets and current liabilities. 
56 Other studies use different ways to measure firm performance; return-on-assets, market-to-book 
value of equity, and sales growth. Kim et al. (2011) use market value of common equity plus the 
book value of debt divided by the total assets, and Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) also use different 
proxies to measure the growth as total sales in the current year minus total sales in the previous year 
 
142 
Prior research, however, suggests that large firms and firms with larger market 
value of common equity-to-book value of equity ratios, and firms with financial 
health and returns have better future performance, so the coefficients on these 
control variables are expected to be positive. 
Current-period industry-adjusted financial profitability (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴) – calculated as 
net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets minus median 
ROA for the same year and industry – is also included in the model as a control 
variable to control for the time-series properties (i.e. persistence) of performance. 
However, previous research demonstrates that there is a significant positive 
association between one-year-ahead earnings and past-period earnings (Sloan, 
1996; Dechow et al., 2003; Kraft et al., 2007, Gunny, 2010; Taylor and Xu, 2010). 
Return: Following Kothari and Sloan (1992) and Gunny (2010), to control for the 
association between stock performance and future net income, market-adjusted 
abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance. This is included in 
the regression models as a control variable, calculated as the difference between 
monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold return, 
compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year 𝑡.57 In addition, Kothari and Sloan 
(1992) argue that a change in market price during a period reflects a revision in the 
market’s expectations of future net incomes and achieved earnings during the year; 
thus, price changes are likely to be relevant in predicting earnings changes, and a 
                                                          
divided by lagged total sales and overall multiplied by 100%. Further, another possible proxy to 
measure growth, PE ratio calculated as market value per share divided by earnings per share, is not 
used, because the price-earnings ratio for firms with negative or close to zero net income are difficult 
to interpret (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
57 Consistent with Bens et al. (2002) this examination use the 12 months buy-and-hold stock return 
on the firm’s ordinary shares. Gunny (2010, p. 877) computes size-adjusted abnormal returns as 
“the monthly buy and hold raw return minus the monthly buy and hold return on a size matched 
decile portfolio of firms compounded over 12 month of fiscal year (𝑡)”. 
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measure for market’s earnings anticipation should be used.58 Gunny (2010) finds a 
significant positive association between the one-year-ahead industry-adjusted 
financial performance (ROA) and the past-period market return. 
Loss firm (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠): Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that firms with higher net 
incomes are less likely to manage earnings and engage in real earnings management. 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 is measured as indicator variable equal to one when net income before 
extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise, and included in the model 
because earnings are less persistent for firms with negative income. Finally, to 
control for fixed-year effects, this study includes year dummies in the regression 
model.  
4.7 Summary  
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed, most prior studies on 
real and accrual-based earnings management are US-based, and there is still a 
scarcity of empirical research on earnings management for UK cases. The two 
major hypothesis categories have been formulated in the following manner (1) UK 
firms that meet/beat important earnings benchmarks are more likely to engage real 
earnings management activities to achieve an earnings target, and (2) the 
consequences of the real earnings management activities on UK firms’ future 
operating performance that meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This chapter also 
discusses the research methodology by highlighting the aim and objectives of the 
study. It describes the methods used in the study to detect real earnings management 
                                                          
58 Furthermore, Kothari and Sloan (1992) use lagged market return in an attempt to mitigate timing 
and matching problems in earnings. 
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by using Roychowdhury’s (2006) model, following which the regression model 
used to examine the consequences of real activities manipulation on firm future 
operating performance is examined. The sample selection criteria are explicated 
and the definitions of variables used in the study together with their Datastream 
code and Worldscope code are provided. The next chapters (chapters five and six) 























Chapter Five Data Analysis and Empirical Test Results of First Essay 






This chapter presents the first set of empirical results. I test the research hypotheses 
1, 2 and 3 using the abnormal real earnings management as a measure of 
manipulation and report the empirical results using both univariate and multivariate 
analyses. The main question to be answered is whether UK firms that meet or just 
beat important earnings benchmarks utilise real earnings management activities. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, section two gives descriptive statistics 
of real earnings management activities of the whole sample. In section three, I 
discuss estimation of the normal level of cash flows from operations, discretionary 
expenditures, production costs, and accrual-based earnings management, while 
section four presents the summary statistics of abnormal real earnings management 
activities levels. Correlation coefficients of abnormal real and accrual earnings 
management are provided in section five. In sections six and seven I present the 
tests of regression assumptions and the empirical results of the multivariate 
analyses of firms that just meet/beat important earnings benchmarks (zero 





5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Real Earnings Management Activities 
Table 5.1 (Panel A) presents descriptive statistics of the full sample, which includes 
4,487 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2013 comparing suspect firm-years just 
beating/meeting zero earnings with the non-suspect firm-years. While Panel B 
provides summary statistics of the full sample, comparing suspect firm-years just 
beating/meeting last year’s earnings with the non-suspect firm-years.   
In Table 5.1 (Panel A), the mean market capitalisation of suspect firm-years, at 
around £606 million, is 43% of the mean for the rest of the sample, £1,391 million. 
Interestingly, mean total assets (£1.86 billion) of the suspect firm-years are not 
lower than the rest of the sample mean (£1.39 billion). This difference in total assets 
and market capitalisation values suggests that, on average, suspect firm-years have 
fewer growth opportunities than the rest of the sample, meaning that suspect firm-
years have significantly lower mean ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity than the overall sample (1.37 and 2.77, respectively). However, the 
sample in Panel B is significantly larger at the 1% level in terms of total assets and 
market capitalisation (£2,286 million and £2,326 million, respectively) than the 
overall sample. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 firm-years have lower market capitalisation to the 
book value of common equity ratio, averaging around 0.532, than the rest of the 
sample, at 3.013. This suggests that suspect firm-years around last year’s earnings 
that have fewer growth opportunities than the rest of sample tend to engage in real 
activities manipulation. Furthermore, the mean net income of 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 firm-
years at around £4.8 million is 17% – significantly lower than the mean for the rest 
of the sample, which is £82 million at the 5% level. This indicates that suspect firm-
years with lower profitability compared to the non-suspect firm-years are more 
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likely to engage in real earnings management. However, the mean net income of 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡  firm-years at around £141 million is 51% significantly higher 
compared to the mean of non-suspect firm-years, at £73 million. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). The mean-scaled discretionary expenses of total assets 
on both suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 and  𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) (28% and 26%, 
respectively) are significantly lower than the means for the non-suspect firm-years 
(47% and 49%, respectively) at the 1% level. This confirms the second hypothesis 
(H2a and H2b) that suspect firm-years around zero earnings and last year’s earnings 
with low discretionary expenses engage more in real activities manipulation, and 
that suspect firm-years have lower mean discretionary expenses as a percentage of 
assets. In contrast, mean production costs scaled by total assets of suspect firm-
years around zero earnings have a higher mean although this is not significant 
compared with the rest of the sample (28% and 48%, respectively). 
 In addition, in Table 5.1 (Panel B) mean production costs scaled by total assets of 
suspect firm-years around last year’s earnings have a significantly higher mean than 
the means for the non-suspect firm-years (82% and 59%, respectively) at the 1% 
level. This is consistent with the third hypothesis (H3b) that suspect firm-years that 
just beat/meet benchmarks around last year’s earnings with high production costs 
engage in real activities manipulation. Moreover, suspect firm-years in Table 5.1 
(Panels A and B) have significantly higher mean cash flow from operations as 
percentage of assets (2.6% and 6.5%, respectively) than the means for the non-
suspect firm-years (-10.3% and -12.1%, respectively) at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Suspect firm-years versus Non-Suspect firm-years 



















 (The table is continued the next page)  
Variable 
Full Sample Suspect _zero firm-years Non-Suspect _zero firm-years Difference in 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Means (t-test) 
MVE (£million) 4,487 1,325.136 39.302 73 606.457 33.765 3,484 1,391.233 42.049 
-784.766* 
(-1.82) 
MVE/BVE 4,487 2.654 1.574 73 1.377 0.969 3,484 2.768 1.609 
-1.390** 
(2.37) 
Total Assets (TA) (£million) 4,487 1,359.179 50.600 73 1,861.286 74.485 3,484 1,396.566 53.027 
464.720 
(0.524) 
NI (£million) 4,487 77.742 0.582 73 4.863 0.177 3,484 82.696 0.842 
-77.833*** 
(-6.820) 
CFO/TA 4,487 -0.096 0.046 73 0.026 0.022 3,484 -0.103 0.047 
0.129*** 
(4.454) 
Production Costs/TA 4,487 0.624 0.379 73 0.706 0.414 3,484 0.622 0.379 
0.083 
(0.775) 











*Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
Note to Table 5.1: This full sample consists of 4,487 firm-years over the period of 2009–2013. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 firm-years are the 71 firm-years with reported income before 
extraordinary items between 0% and 0.5% of lagged total assets in Panel A. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 firm-years are the 393 firm-years with reported change in net income before 
extraordinary items from the last year between 0% and 1% in Panel B. Differences in means (unequal variances) are tested using t-tests (in parentheses). The variables are 
defined in Appendix A. 
Variable 
Full Sample Suspect _last firm-years Non-Suspect _last firm-years Difference in 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Means (t-test) 
MVE (£million) 4,487 1,325.136 39.302 393 2,326.074 151.570 3,164 1,257.010 37.515 
-1,069.064*** 
(2.513) 
MVE/BVE 4,487 2.654 1.574 393 0.532 1.730 3,164 3.013 1.578 
-2.480 
(-1.545) 
Total Assets (TA) (£million) 4,487 1,359.179 50.600 393 2,286.091 191.474 3,164 1,296.800 44.825 
989.291*** 
(2.616) 
NI (£million) 4,487 77.742 0.582 393 141.584 7.616 3,164 73.586 0.478 
67.997** 
(2.322) 
CFO/TA 4,487 -0.096 0.046 393 0.065 0.072 3,164 -0.121 0.040 
0.186*** 
(5.885) 
Production Costs/TA 4,487 0.624 0.379 393 0.826 0.543 3,164 0.598 0.362 
0.227*** 
(4.176) 





5.3 Estimation of the Normal level of Cash Flows from Operations, 
Discretionary Expenditures, Production Costs, and Accrual-
based Earnings Management 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the current study uses three types of real 
earnings management as a measure of earnings management where abnormal real 
earnings management are estimated using Roychowdhury’s (2006) model.59  In 
addition, the study also estimates the normal level of accrual-based earnings 
management as a measure of earnings management, where discretionary accruals 
are estimated using Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. The signs and the absolute value 
of the error terms can be used to evaluate the accrual-based earnings management. 
A positive sign of the error term indicates that accruals have been manipulated to 
increase the reported earnings, and a negative sign, otherwise, indicates that 
accruals have been manipulated to decrease the reported earnings. Since accruals 
reverse, the degree of the manipulation is manifested by the absolute value of the 
error terms. 
Table 5.2 reports the estimation results of the regressions to estimate normal levels 
through models (4.1), (4.5) and (4.7), and Kothari et al.’s (2005) model to 
determine the abnormal level of cash flows from operations, discretionary expenses, 
production costs, and accrual-based earnings management. For every industry-
based industry-year, the equations are estimated cross-sectionally over the period 
of 2009 to 2013. There are 930 firm-years available during the sample period for 
each estimation model. On average, each industry-year regression contains more 
                                                          
59 Accrual-based earnings management is also examined to assess the accruals management 
behaviour of suspect observations.  
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than 125 observations. All variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of 
their distributions to avoid the influence of outliers. The reported coefficients are 
the mean value of the coefficients across industry-years. The parametric test (t-
statistic) is calculated using the standard error of the mean coefficients across 
industry-years (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). 
Given that firms with higher sales generally have higher expenses, the coefficient 
in the real earnings management model on sales at the beginning of year 𝑡 (𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ) 
should be positive. The mean coefficient on (𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 ) is statistically significant and 
positive, similar to those reported in Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012). 
However, all the mean coefficients of the three regressions (Ab_CFO; Ab_DISEX; 
Ab_PROD) are significantly different from zero and comparable to those reported 
in Roychowdhury (2006) and Zang (2012) with several exceptions. The mean 
coefficient on the model of abnormal production costs on sales change scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡  (∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 /𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1)  is insignificant with 
positive sign (0.0214) while the mean coefficients in Roychowdhury (2006) and 
Zang (2012) are significantly positive. 
 In addition, the mean coefficients of cash flows from operations on sales change 
scaled by the total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡  ( ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 /𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1)  are 
insignificant with positive sign (0.0165). The estimated coefficients in the 
regressions of abnormal accruals are also similar to those reported in Kothari et al. 
(2005), with one exception. The mean coefficient (1 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) is insignificant with 
positive sign (1.303). However, the difference in the model estimation table of real 
earnings management and accrual-based earnings management may come from the 
differences in the market.  
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Finally, the mean adjusted R2 across industry-year is 39% for CFO model, 75% for 
the production costs model, 34% for the discretionary expenses model, and 44.5% 
for the accrual-based earnings management model. Therefore, it appears that these 
models (Roychowdhury, 2006 and Kothari et al., 2005) have reasonable to 




Table 5.2: Measurement of Real Activities Manipulation 
Estimation of the Normal Level of Cash Flow from Operation, Discretionary Expenditures, Production Costs, and Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 
(The table is continued the next page)
Model 4.1: CFO 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
Model 4.5: Discretionary 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑬𝑿𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
Model 4.7: Production 
𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
Kothari et al.’s (2005) Model: Accruals 













1 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.4191*** 
(-7.408) 
1 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.4285*** 
(4.344) 
1 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.1527* 
(1.867) 
1 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.1185 
(1.303) 
𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.0679*** 
(3.934) 
𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.0997*** 
(7.222) 
𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕  ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.7709*** 
(31.731) 
(∆𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕 − ∆𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ) ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.0560* 
(-1.895) 
∆𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.0165 
(0.612) 
  ∆𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕 ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.0214 
(0.321) 
 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕  ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.0612*** 
(-4.307) 
    ∆𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 ⁄𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
-0.1057** 
(-2.032) 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  ⁄ 𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 
0.3773*** 
(6.378) 
No. of Industry-years  
(Industry-divisions) 24  24  18  24 
Avg. No. of Obs. 147.80  126.46  142.20  138.85 
No. of Obs. 3,547  3,035  2,559  3,332 
Mean Adj. R2 0.390  0.340  0.750  0.445 
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Table 5.2 (Continued)  
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Note to Table 5.2: The following (ordinary least squares) regressions are estimated cross-sectionally for 
each industry and year from 2009 to 2013. The reported coefficients are the mean value of the coefficients 
across the industry-years. T-statistics (in parentheses) calculated using the standard errors of the 
coefficients across industry-years (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). The adjusted R2 and the number of 
observations is the mean across the industry-years. All variables in model (4.1), model (4.5), model (4.7), 
and Kothari et al.’s (2005) model are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to avoid the 
influence of outliers. 
The dependent variables are cash flow from operations (CFO) divided by total assets at year  𝑡 − 1 , 
discretionary expenditure (DISEX) divided by total assets at year 𝑡 − 1, production costs (PROD) divided 
by total assets at year 𝑡 − 1 and total accruals (TACC) divided by total assets at year 𝑡 − 1.  
The Roychowdhury (2006) Model 
Abnormal cash flows from operations are the difference between actual cash flows from operations 
and normal cash flows from operation, estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the 
following industry-year regression from a sample of UK firms: 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,   
where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is cash flow from operations for firm i in the year 𝑡, defined as cash flow from operations divided 
by lagged total assets, 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the total assets at the beginning of period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡  is the sales revenue 
during period 𝑡  for firm 𝑖 , ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 , 𝑖  the firm, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. Abnormal 
discretionary expenses are estimated as the deviations from the predicted values from the following industry-
year regressions from a sample of UK firms: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,   
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the discretionary expenses which are defined as the sum of research and development (R&D), 
advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses (SG&A) in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 . Abnormal 
production costs are the difference between actual production cost and the normal level of production costs, 
estimated as the deviation from the predicted values from the following industry-year regression from a sample 
of UK firms: 
      
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 and the change in inventory from 𝑡 − 1 
to t,  ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the change in sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖.  
The Kothari et al. (2005) Model 
 
Total accruals are the difference between total accruals and normal accruals, estimated according to the cash 
flow approach   
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,  
where  𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  is total accruals defined as the differences between net income before extraordinary items 
and cash flows from operations for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡  denotes the gross value of property, plant and 
equipment for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is return on assets measured as net income before extraordinary 
items divided by total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡. The variables are defined in Appendix A.
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5.4 Summary Statistics Abnormal Real Earnings Management 
Activities Levels 
Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics related to the residuals from the proxies of 
real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management containing 
mean, median, mean (25th Percentile), mean (75th Percentile), skewness and 
kurtosis for each model separately. Means of earnings management proxies are 
equal to zero indicating a good fit for a linear model because “The best fitting 
regression line is the one that makes the mean residual equal to zero” (Hayes, 2005, 
p. 282). Descriptive statistics of abnormal production costs, abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal accruals are in general similar to the findings of prior 
research. For instance, Kothari et al. (2005) report mean abnormal accruals close 
to zero and Gunny (2010) reports zero mean of abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses. In contrast, I find that the means of both REM_1 
and REM_2 are different from the zero (-0.012 and -0.001, respectively). 
The impact of abnormal operating cash flows in the UK is similar to the case in the 
US. That is, median abnormal operating cash flows (Ab_CFO) in the UK is 0.026% 
of total assets, which is similar to that found in previous research in the US by 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008). The median of abnormal 
discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX) is negative -0.03% of total assets in all firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange, indicating the cutting of discretionary 
expenses to inflate reported earnings, which is comparable to the findings of prior 
studies (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012). In contrast, I find the median of abnormal 
production costs (Ab_PROD) to be weakly negative (-0.0074) of total assets. This 
may be because overproduction to reduce cost of goods sold is only available to 
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firms in manufacturing industries (Roychowdhury, 2006)60, which is consistent 
with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 
2012) (i.e. -0.035, -0.006 and -0.017, respectively). Furthermore, the medians of 
REM_1 and REM_2 proxies are both positive (0.018 and 0.022, respectively), 
meaning that the REM_1 measure is consistent with the finding of prior studies 
(e.g., Zang, 2012). 
Finally, Gujarati (2003) and Kennedy (2008) suggest that data can be normally 
distributed if standard skewness is within ±1.96 and standard kurtosis is ± 2 or ± 3. 
The skewness data for all the distributions are relatively close to zero, suggesting 
the distributions of the abnormal values are symmetrically distributed. The kurtosis 
data for all distributions suggest that the tail of the distribution is heavier than for a 
normal distribution, which is consistent with firms engaging in real activities 
manipulation through sales manipulation, discretionary expenses, and 
overproduction (Gunny, 2010), and also engaging in income-increasing accrual-
based earnings. 
                                                          
60 Note that both Ab_CFO and Ab_DISEX are the residuals from corresponding models multiplied 
by negative one. Thus, some descriptive statistics of these two measures are the opposite of those 
from prior studies.  
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics for Abnormal Real Earnings Management Activities 
Levels 
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Note to Table 5.3: This table reports properties of the abnormal level of various variables for 4,487 firm-years 
over the period 2009 to 2013. Reported are the mean, median, standard deviation, the 25th and 75th quintiles, 
skewness and kurtosis. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% of their distribution. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
5.5 Correlation Coefficients among Real and Accrual Earnings 
Management  
This section presents the correlation coefficients of the regressions. Table 5.4 
reports the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients (Upper Triangle) and 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficients (Lower Triangle) among the measures 
of both real earnings management and accrual earnings management for all firms 
listed in the London Stock Exchange in each industry and year over the period 2009 
to 2013. The Pearson coefficient correlation is only appropriate when the sampling 
distribution is normal or when the sample is large (Field, 2009). This research 
qualifies as having a large sample and normal distribution (4,487 firm-year 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25% 75% Skewness Kurtosis 
No. of 
Obs. 
Ab_CFO 0.0000 0.0262 0.2437 -0.0505 0.0973 -1.8877 20.2242 3,547 
Ab _DISEX 0.0000 -0.0383 0.3627 -0.1917 0.0934 1.2667 15.5911 3,035 
Ab _PROD 0.0000 -0.0074 0.3333 -0.1175 0.1302 0.7690 25.664 2,559 
Ab _TACC 0.0000 -0.0006 0.1347 -0.0486 0.0466 0.4714 14.5453 3,332 
Ab _CFO *-1 0.0000 -0.0262 0.2437 -0.0973 0.0505 1.8877 20.2242 3,547 
Ab _DISEX *-1 0.0000 0.0383 0.3627 -0.0934 0.1917 -1.2667 15.5911 3,035 
REM_1 -0.0125 0.0183 0.5530 -0.1897 0.2763 -1.1176 10.8922 2,173 
REM_2 -0.0016 0.02292 0.3406 -0.1203 0.1669 -0.7840 11.3397 3,027 
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observations) so the Pearson correlation is justified. Nevertheless, to be certain, I 
perform an additional Spearman correlation test.   
Similar to prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010) I find a significant positive correlation between abnormal 
discretionary accruals and abnormal cash flows from operations (Pearson 49% and 
Spearman 55%). This positive correlation can be explained by firms in the UK 
engaging in accrual-based earnings management and sales manipulation at the same 
time. The correlation coefficient between abnormal discretionary accruals and 
REM_1, REM_2 is significantly positive (Pearson 15% and 32%, respectively). 
These significantly positive correlation coefficients between abnormal accruals and 
the aggregate proxies of real earnings management mean that firms engage in real 
activities manipulation as well accrual-based manipulation. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that firms engage in both kinds of earnings management (Cohen et 
al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Also consistent with the above 
interpretation, the correlation coefficient between abnormal discretionary accruals 
and abnormal production costs is significantly positive (21%, Pearson and 26%, 
Spearman) so firms in the UK engage in both abnormal discretionary accruals and 
increase the production to report earnings upward. In addition, the correlation 
between abnormal accruals and abnormal discretionary expenses is insignificant 
for the Pearson correlation coefficient (-0.01%, Pearson), and the Spearman 
correlation coefficient is insignificant (0.007%, Spearman). 
Abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and 
abnormal production costs are positively associated with each other. Specifically, 
an analysis of the correlation among the real earnings management activities 
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proxies reveals that the correlation between abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses is significantly positive (Pearson 35% and 
Spearman 52%). This suggests that managers are using real activities manipulation 
that leads to abnormally high production costs that occur at the same time that they 
are reducing discretionary expenditures (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012).  
There is a significant negative relationship between abnormal discretionary 
expenses and abnormal cash flows from operations (Pearson -43%, Spearman -
17%); this shows that reduction of discretionary expenses frees up more cash flow 
for the firm. This result is consistent with prior research (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; 
Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). In addition, the positive and significant correlation 
coefficient (34%, Pearson and 42%, Spearman) between abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal production costs shows that (a) UK firms could engage in 
different real earnings management methods at the same time to trigger higher 
reported earnings, and (b) it has a negative effect on cash flow from operations. 
The correlation coefficients between REM_1 and abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and between REM_1 and abnormal production costs are positive and statistically 
significant (Pearson 84%, 81%, respectively) and (Spearman 86%, 83%, 
respectively). This is because this aggregate measure of real earnings management 
(REM_1) is the sum of two proxies, suggesting that firms are engaging in real 
activities manipulation. They achieve this through producing more goods to 
decrease reported cost of goods sold that will lead to higher operating margins, and 
cutting of discretionary expenses, which is consistent with the findings in prior 
research (Zang, 2012). 
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 In addition, a significant positive correlation exists between REM_2 and abnormal 
cash flows from operations and between REM_2 and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (Pearson 28%, 75%, respectively) and (Spearman 37%, 77%, 
respectively). This because the aggregate measure of real earnings management 
(REM_2) is also the sum of two proxies (denoted as abnormal cash flows from 
operations and abnormal discretionary expenses). This suggests that firms are using 
real activities manipulation to manage earnings upward by offering price discounts 
and reducing discretionary expenses. 
Table 5.5 (Panel A and Panel B) shows the variance inflation factors (VIF) and 
tolerance coefficients of each independent variable. Multicollinearity defines 
whether a strong correlation exists between two or more predictors in the regression 
model (Hair et al., 1998; Gujarati, 2003; Kennedy, 2008; Field, 2009). The problem 
of multicollinearity appears when there is a perfect collinearity between two 
predictor variables, which makes it impossible to retrieve unique estimates, as the 
values of the variables are interchangeable. To identify whether there is 
multicollinearity in the variables of interest this research measures multicollinearity 
through the VIF of STATA Software. However, for all three types of real activities 
manipulation and discretionary accruals proxies, the outputs of the VIF are all less 
than 1.20, suggesting that there is no multicollinearity between the various 
variables.61  
Related to the VIF – as suggested by Field (2009) – is the tolerance statistic, which 
is calculated by 1/VIF. The guideline regarding the tolerance statistic is that serious 
                                                          
61 Higher VIFs are indicative of collinearity problems. Greene (2000, p. 255-256) states, “As a rule 
of thumb, for standardized data a VIF > 10 indicates harmful collinearity.”  
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problems of multicollinearity emerge when the tolerance statistic is below 0.1, and 
concerns are also justified when it is below 0.2. Similar to the VIF, the tolerance 
statistic does not present results that would justify any concerns, as the tolerance 
levels all appear to be over 0.2. To conclude based on the collinearity statistics, the 
variables of this research do not appear to demonstrate multicollinearity that 
justifies their use herein.  
 
Table 5.4: Pearson and Spearman Correlations Coefficients among Abnormal Real and 






























0.2189*** 0.3383*** 0.3558*** 1.0000 0.8296*** 0.7360*** 
REM_1 0.1483*** -0.0554*** 0.8365*** 0.8097*** 1.0000 0.8776*** 
REM_2 0.3195*** 0.2752*** 0.7502*** 0.6391*** 0.8508*** 1.0000 
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5.4 shows the Pearson correlations (Upper Triangle) and Spearman correlations (Lower Triangle) table 
for the sample of 4,487 firm-years over the period 2009 to 2013 between all residual variables as follows: 
abnormal accrual-based earnings management is estimated residuals using Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. 
Abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs are 
estimated residuals using models developed by Dechow et al. (1998) and as implemented by Roychowdhury 
(2006). The first aggregate measure of real earnings management (REM_1) is the sum of abnormal production 
costs and abnormal discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. The second aggregate measure of real 
earnings management (REM_2) is the sum of abnormal cash flows from operations multiplied by negative one 
and discretionary expenses multiplied by negative one. Both abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary 









Table 5.5: Variance Inflation Factors Test Results for Abnormal Earnings Management 
Panel A: VIF Test Results for Abnormal Earnings Management around Firms that Meet/Beat 
Zero Earnings 
VIF Test Results 
Zero Earnings  
Variable 
Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD Ab_TACC 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.15 0.869 1.16 0.862 1.16 0.862 1.14 0.877 
MTB 1.15 0.869 1.16 0.862 1.15 0.869 1.14 0.877 
ROA 1.04 0.961 1.05 0.952 1.04 0.961 1.05 0.952 
Suspect_zero 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mean VIF 1.09  1.09  1.09  1.08  
 
Panel B: VIF Test Results for Abnormal Earnings Management around Firms that Meet/Beat 
Last Year’s Earnings  
VIF Test Results 
Last Year’s Earnings 
Variable 
Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD Ab_TACC 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
Size 1.17 0.854 1.18 0.847 1.17 0.854 1.16 0.862 
MTB 1.15 0.869 1.16 0.862 1.16 0.862 1.14 0.877 
ROA 1.04 0.961 1.05 0.952 1.04 0.961 1.05 0.952 
Suspect_last 1.03 0.970 1.03 0.970 1.03 0.970 1.03 0.970 
Mean VIF 1.10  1.10  1.10  1.10  
Table 5.5 reports VIF test results around firms that meet/beat earnings benchmarks. The variables are defined 




5.6 Empirical Results on Hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a  
Table 5.6 reports the results for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings from the estimation of model (4.10) by using five 
measures of abnormal real earnings management as dependent variables. The 
reported coefficients are the mean values of the coefficients from the five annual 
cross-sectional regressions over the period of 2009-2013 from the Fama and 
Macbeth approach. Because the error terms are likely to exhibit cross-sectional 
correlation and auto correlation, the t-statistics are used to calculate standard errors 
corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure (Newey, 1987).  
The mean coefficients on control variables in Table 5.6 are statistically significant, 
similar to those reported in previous studies, but with several exceptions. Table 5.6 
(Panel A) reports the estimation results of model (4.10) and focuses on firms just 
beating or meeting zero earnings. I identify 73 suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) 
for the abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation), abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs samples. Specifically, to 
test H1a, the abnormal cash flows from operating activities measure is employed 
as the dependent variable as per Roychowdhury’s (2006) model. The coefficient on 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 is positive (0.0260) and statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 
5.50). The coefficient indicates that the mean abnormal cash flows from operations 
of suspect firm-years is larger by 2.60% of assets than the mean across the rest of 
the sample. This in turn indicates that UK firm-years just beating or meeting zero 
earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) have unusually high levels of boosting sales that will lead 
to lower cash flow from operations, such that the higher the residuals, the greater 
amount of boosting sales, and the greater increase in reporting earnings. In addition, 
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this result is consistent with findings in Roychowdhury’s (2006) prediction that 
firm-years just beating or meeting zero earnings engage more in earnings 
management through sales-based manipulation (abnormal cash flows from 
operations). That is, boosting sales by offering more price discounts and more 
lenient credit facilities will report upward earnings in the current period, as well as 
lower cash flow in the current period.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on suspect firm-years just 
beating or meeting zero earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) confirms H2a which predicts that 
UK firms that just meet/beat earning benchmarks around zero earnings are more 
likely to engage in real earnings management. Specifically, the coefficient on 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 is positive (0.0677) and significant at the 1% level (t = 2.54) in the 
abnormal discretionary expenses regression. The coefficient indicates that the mean 
abnormal discretionary expenses of suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) is larger by 
6.77% of assets than the mean across the rest of the sample, such that the higher 
the residuals, the larger amount of cutting discretionary expenses, and the greater 
the increase in reported earnings.  In addition, this result is consistent with findings 
in literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012) predicting that firm-
years just beating or meeting zero earnings engage more in earnings management 
through discretionary expenses-based manipulation. That is, cutting discretionary 
expenses will increase reported earnings in the current period, as well as generate 
higher cash flow in the current period.  
To test H3a, the third column in Table 5.6 (Panel A) shows the results from the 
estimation of model (4.10) using the abnormal production costs measure as the 
dependent variable. The results indicate that UK firm-years just beating or meeting 
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zero earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) have unusually higher levels of production costs-
based manipulation than the rest of the sample. Specifically, the coefficient on 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 is positive (0.0547) and significant at the 1% level (t = 3.90) in the 
abnormal production costs regression. The coefficient indicates that the mean 
abnormal production costs of suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) are larger by 5.47% 
of assets than the mean across the rest of the sample, such that the higher the 
residuals, the larger the amount of inventory overproduction, and the greater the 
increase in reported earnings through reducing cost of goods sold. This result is 
consistent with findings in literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 
2012) predicting that firm-years just beating or meeting zero earnings engage more 
in earnings management through overproduction. 
 In order to capture the total effects of real earnings management, the results in the 
last two columns in Table 5.6 (Panel A) show that the higher amount of these 
aggregate measures implies that suspect firm are more likely to be engaged in real 
earnings management activities to increase reported earnings. Further, the signs of 
the coefficients on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  are positive for the REM_1 and REM_2 and 
significant at the 5% and 1% levels (t = 2.00 and 4.10, respectively). The coefficient 
indicates that the means of REM_1 and REM_2 of suspect firm-years 
(𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) are larger by (11.5% and 9.8%, respectively) of assets than the 
mean across the rest of the sample. This result is consistent with the finding in 
previous studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012) and evidences that 
managers in suspect firm-years just beating or meeting an earnings benchmark 
around zero earnings exhibit higher levels of both aggregate real earnings 
management measures by engaging in sales manipulation and reducing/cutting 
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discretionary expenses simultaneously than other suspect firms. The results further 
show that such managers also engage in overproducing products and reducing, 
cutting discretionary expenses at the same time.  
In summary, the reported results in Table 5.6 (Panel A) are consistent with the 
hypothesis that UK suspect firm-years just beating/meeting zero earnings engage 
in sales-based manipulation, discretionary expenses-based manipulation, and a 
production cost-based manipulation to manage earnings upward. Further, they 
engage in sales manipulation and reducing, cutting discretionary expenses 
simultaneously; and also engage in overproducing products and reducing, cutting 
discretionary expenses at the same time. However, according to the opportunistic 
perspective and under the assumptions of transaction cost theory, the study findings 
reveal that UK firms engage in higher levels of abnormal real earnings management 
to meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks opportunistically. 
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Table 5.6: Comparison of Suspect Firm-Years Just Beating/Meeting Earnings Benchmarks 
with the Rest of the Sample 
Panel A: Comparison of Suspect Firm-Years Just Beating/Meeting Zero Earnings with the 
Rest of the Sample 
     (The table is continued the next page)



































































Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 3,547 3,035 2,559 3,332 2,173 3,027 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** *** 
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Panel B: Comparison of Suspect Firm-Years Just Beating/Meeting Last Year’s Earnings with the 
Rest of the Sample 


































































Year Indicator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. Of Obs. 3,547 3,035 2,559 3,332 2,173 3,027 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** *** 
* Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level.  *** Significant at the 1% level. 
Note to Table 5.6: This table reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions, over the period of five years from 2009 to 
2013. The total sample includes 4,487 observations. The regressions being estimated are of the form: 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 + 𝜀𝑡 ,  
T-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. They 
reported in parentheses. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 refers to one of the five measures 
for abnormal real earnings management activities: the dependent variables abnormal cash flows from operations (Ab_CFO), 
and abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX). REM_1 is the sum of 
Ab_DISEX multiplied by (-1) and Ab_PROD, and REM_2 is the sum of Ab_CFO multiply by (-1) and Ab_DISEX multiplied 
by (-1). 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 − 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 is an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting important earnings 
benchmarks. Each panel reports the estimation results using a different definition of suspect firm-years as discussed below. 
Panel A reports results for suspects just beating/meeting the zero earnings, which are firm-years with earnings before 
extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results for suspects just beating/meeting last 
year’s earnings, which are firm-years with the change in net income from the last year between 0 and 0.01. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the net 
income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 is the natural logarithm of market value of 
equity.  𝑀𝑇𝐵  is the market-to-book ratio. All regressions include  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 . Both abnormal cash flows and 
abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by (-1) to allow real and accrual earnings management measures to have 
the same interpretation. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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5.7 Empirical Results on Hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b  
Table 5.6 (Panel B) presents the regression results in the next five columns using 
each of the five measures of real earnings management as dependent variables for 
suspect firm-years just beating/meeting last year’s earnings from the estimation of 
model (4.10). I identify 393 suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) for the abnormal 
cash flows from operations (sales-based manipulation), abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production costs samples. The results show a significantly 
positive coefficient of 0.0774 (t = 7.73) on suspect firm-years (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) in 
the abnormal discretionary expenses regression. This confirms H2b that UK firms 
that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around last year’s earnings are more likely 
to engage in real earnings management to increase reported earnings. The higher 
level of abnormal discretionary expenses means a higher level of reduction/cutting 
discretionary expenses, and thus increased reported earnings. In addition, the 
results are consistent with the literature (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012) suggesting that 
firm-years around last year’s earnings are more likely to be cutting discretionary 
expenses to report earnings upward.  
Further, a positive coefficient of 0.0122 (t = 5.64) is found on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 in the 
abnormal production costs regression, suggesting that firm-years are more likely to 
engage in real earnings management activities through overproduction costs. This 
means that the higher the residuals are, the larger the amount of inventory 
overproduction is, and the greater increase there is in reported earnings through 
reducing the costs of goods sold. This result is consistent with the literature (Gunny, 
2010; Zang, 2012) suggesting that firm-years around last year’s earnings are more 
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likely to be increasing production to report earnings upward. However, this study 
does not find a significant and positive coefficient of 0.0037 (t = 0.80) on 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡  when the abnormal cash flows from operations (sales-based 
manipulation) is the dependent variable, suggesting that firm-years around last 
year’s earnings are not associated with more actual real earnings management 
activities through sales-based manipulation. 
Consistent with literature (Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012), the results reported in the 
last two columns in Table 5.6 (Panel B) show a significant positive coefficient of 
0.0164 (t = 8.51) and 0.0826 (t = 6.20) on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡  in both aggregate 
measures of real earnings management REM_1 and REM_2, respectively. This 
indicates that managers engage in sales manipulation and reducing, cutting 
discretionary expenses simultaneously than other suspect firms, and also engage in 
overproducing products and reducing, cutting discretionary expenses at the same 
time. 
In summary, under opportunistic perspective of earnings management and 
transaction cost theory the results reveal that managers with firms that manage 
earnings upward utilise more real earnings management activities to achieve 
earnings benchmarks opportunistically. Further, they are also under pressure to 
opportunistically inflate cash flow; therefore, aggressive real earnings management 
reveals the management’s opportunism in financial reporting (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 
2016; Vorst, 2016). In some other cases, managers may occasionally use real 
earnings management to cross the benchmark to signal the capital market firms’ 
foresight about better future performance. However, the evidence that UK suspect 
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firm-years around last year’s earnings that exhibit unusually lower discretionary 
expense and unusually high production costs are more likely to engage in real 
earnings management to manage earnings upwards confirms hypotheses H2b and 
H3b. This chapter presents new evidence that suspect firm-years around last year’s 
earnings are not involved in managing earnings upwards via sales-based 
manipulation.  
This chapter also provides new evidence that suspect firm-years manage earnings 
upwards via sales-based manipulation and discretionary-based manipulation 
simultaneously. Finally, managers in the firms that manage earnings upward to 
meet or just beat important benchmarks engage in income-increasing earnings 
management through accrual-based earnings management. Specifically, the 
coefficients on 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  and 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡  are positive (0.0185, 0.0079, 
respectively) and significant at the 1% level (𝑡 = 2.78, 3.01, respectively) in the 
abnormal accrual-based earnings management using Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. 
5.8 Summary  
This chapter presents the results of descriptive and multivariate analysis employed 
to investigate the research hypotheses. This chapter examines whether UK firms 
manage earnings upward by utilising real earnings management around zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings. The findings contribute to the literature by 
providing the following evidence. First, this chapter presents evidence that UK 
suspect firm-years just beating/meeting zero earnings have lower abnormal cash 
flows from operations, lower discretionary expenses, higher production costs and 
higher levels of both aggregate measures of real earnings management, suggesting 
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that they take income-increasing actions. Second, I also present evidence that UK 
suspect firm-years around last year’s earnings have unusually low discretionary 
expenditures and unusually high production costs, and unusually higher levels of 
both aggregate real earnings management measures, suggesting they take income-
increasing actions. Moreover, I find new evidence that UK suspect firm-years 
around last year’s earnings are not involved in managing earnings upwards via 
sales-based manipulation. Finally, managers in UK suspect firm-years 
beating/meeting important earnings benchmarks engage in income-increasing 
earnings management through accrual-based earnings management. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter contributes to the earnings 
management literature by showing that real and accrual earnings management are 
a key strategy/tool that managers utilise to reported income-increasing earnings. 
Further, the evidence confirms the recent accounting literature which reports that 
managers in the UK suspect firm-years manage earnings upward by utilising real 
and accrual earnings management to achieve their targets (Roychowdhury, 2006; 














Chapter Six Data Analysis and Empirical Test Results of Second Essay 






This chapter presents the second set of empirical results. I test the research 
hypotheses H4 and H5 using the industry-adjusted return on assets as a measure of 
firms’ operating performance and report the empirical results using both univariate 
and multivariate analyses. In this chapter, I examine the effect of real earnings 
management activities to meet or just beat important earnings benchmarks (e.g., 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings) on UK firms’ subsequent operating 
performance. This chapter is organised as follows. First, section two gives the 
descriptive statistic of future operating performance of the whole sample. 
Correlation coefficients among all variables in the operating performance 
regression are discussed in section three. Sections four and five present the tests of 
regression assumptions and the empirical test results of the consequence of real 
earnings management activities to meet or just beat zero earnings and last year’s 
earnings on firms’ subsequent operating performance. In section six, I undertake 
supplemental analysis to determine and verify whether, and to what extent, the 
primary results are sensitive to changes in the dependent variable measurement 
defined as two-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets is undertaken in 
section six. Finally, section seven provides an overview of the results. 
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6.2 Descriptive Statistic of Future Operating Performance 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the second empirical test for the 
impact of real earnings management activities on future operating performance for 
the dependent and independent variables for the full sample of firm-year 
observations covering the period of 2009 through 2013, which includes 4,487 firm-
year observations. I extend the sample to 2014 because of the requirement for data 
to measure a firm’s operating performance defined as one-year-ahead industry-
adjusted return on assets. The mean of total assets is £1.05 billion, with a median 
of about £51 million and a standard deviation of £4.24 billion. The first and third 
quartiles of total assets range from £11 million to £308 million. The mean of the 
total sales is about £775 million with a median of about £31 million and standard 
deviation is £2.65 billion. The lower and upper quartiles of total sales range from 
£3 million to £270 million. The mean industry-adjusted return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) are 
-10.32% and -10.34% for the subsequent dependent variable (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1) and 
independent variable current year (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴). The median for both are, on average, 
zero, which is estimated because the variables are calculated by deducting the 
industry-year median from the firms’ perceived return on assets. 
The means of all three individual real earnings management measures are all zeroes. 
The median of Ab_CFO is 2.6% with a standard deviation of 24.37%; the median 
of Ab_DISEX is -3.8% with a standard deviation of 36.27%; and the median of 
Ab_PROD is -0.7% with a standard deviation of 33.33%. The two aggregate 
measures of real earnings management are still close to zeroes, but the medians are 
about 1% to 2% of the total assets higher than expected industry-year average, 
suggesting the usage of income-increasing real earnings management. Total 
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abnormal accrual-based earnings management has an average of zero and a median 
of -0.06% with standard deviation of 13.47%, meaning the average total abnormal 
accrual-based earnings management is about -0.06% of total assets, lower than the 
industry year average. The summary statistic shows low standard deviations 
regarding the Ab_CFO, Ab_DISEX, Ab_PROD, and Ab_TACC variables. These 
low standard deviations suggest that the means of these abnormal real and accrual 
earnings management are an accurate representation of the data.  
The size is measured as the natural log of market value of common equity (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸). 
The mean is 17.839 (about £55,819 millions of market value of equity), with a 
median of 17.486 (about £39,270 millions of market value of equity). The growth 
opportunities are measured as market value of common equity divided by book 
value of equity (𝑀𝑇𝐵). The mean is 2.552, with a median of 1.574. This value is 
comparable to those in Leggett et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2010) and Zhao et al. 
(2012). The mean of  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is 7.109, with a median of 2.753, above the cut-off 
point (1.80: Altman, 1986, 2000) of being a healthy firm. These values are 
comparable to those in Zang (2012). The average (median) 12 months buy-and 
hold-return is 8.7% (-1.4%). The independent variable (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 ) is measured as 
indicator variable equal to one when net income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise. The mean is 41.69%, with a median of zero and a 






Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistic of Future Operating Performance 
 
Note to Table 6.1: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control 
variables for the full sample of firm-year observations covering the period of 2009 through 2013, which 
includes 4,487 firm-year observations, from 930 firms. The sample is extended to 2014 because of the 
requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating performance for one subsequent year. Reported are the 
mean, median, standard deviation, the lower quartile and higher quartile. To limit the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distribution. The variables are defined 
in Appendix A. 
 
6.3 Correlation Coefficients among Future Operating 
Performance 
Table 6.2 provides information about the Pearson correlation coefficients of all 
variables in the future operating performance regressions for the entire sample of 
4,487 firm-year observations from 930 firms. In Table 6.2, the main correlations of 
interest for H4 and H5 are the correlations between the magnitudes of current real 







Total Assets (£million) 4,487 1,054.736 50.600 4,242.953 11.095 308.261 
Total Sales (£million) 4,485 774.418 30.660 2,647.411 2.900 269.323 
𝐀𝐝𝐣_𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭+𝟏 4,410 -0.1032 0.0000 0.4125 -0.0987 0.0574 
𝐀𝐝𝐣_𝐑𝐎𝐀 3,557 -0.1034 0.0000 0.4227 -0.0944 0.0556 
𝐀𝐛_𝐂𝐅𝐎 3,547 0.0000 0.0262 0.2437 -0.0505 0.0973 
𝐀𝐛_𝐃𝐈𝐒𝐄𝐗 3,035 0.0000 -0.0383 0.3627 -0.1917 0.0934 
𝐀𝐛_𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐃 2,559 0.0000 -0.0074 0.3333 -0.1175 0.1302 
𝐀𝐛_𝐓𝐀𝐂𝐂 3,332 0.0000 -0.0006 0.1347 -0.0486 0.0466 
𝐑𝐄𝐌_𝟏 2,173 -0.0125 0.0183 0.5530 -0.1897 0.2763 
𝐑𝐄𝐌_𝟐 3,027 -0.0016 0.0229 0.3406 -0.1203 0.1669 
𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐳𝐞𝐫𝐨 4,487 0.0205 0.0000 0.1418 0.0000 0.0000 
𝐒𝐮𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭_𝐥𝐚𝐬𝐭 4,487 0.1104 0.0000 0.3135 0.0000 0.0000 
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 4,487 17.839 17.486 2.349 16.133 19.402 
𝐌𝐓𝐁 4,487 2.552 1.574 4.936 0.827 3.044 
𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 4,336 0.087 -0.014 0.640 -0.244 0.246 
𝐙_𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞 3,483 7.109 2.753 20.349 1.546 4.937 
𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 4,487 0.4169 0.0000 0.4931 0.0000 1.0000 
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earnings management (measured by Ab_CFO, Ab_DISEX, Ab_PROD, REM_1 and 
REM_2) and subsequent operating performance (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1). The subsequent 
operating performance (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴) is significantly negatively associated with three 
of the five real earnings management measures except REM_1, Ab_DISEX, 
indicating that the main effects of abnormal real earnings management activities on 
the firm in the absence of just beating or meeting important earnings benchmarks 
that they perform worse in the future or in signalling future performance. However, 
this reduces the firm’s value which will harm the firm’s future performance (value 
destroying), which is comparable to the findings of prior studies. Notable is the 
relation between one-year-ahead industry-adjusted operating performance and 
abnormal accrual-based earnings management. It appears that abnormal accrual-
based earnings management is significantly negatively associated with subsequent 
operating performance, indicating that a firm’s future performance will be harmed 
if earnings upward are managed through accrual-based earnings management. 
Addressing the correlation coefficients above 0.60 specifically, the subsequent 
operating performance (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1) is significantly positive with current year 
adjusted return on assets (Pearson 66%, Spearman 70%), which is expected because 
of earnings persistence. The current and one-year-ahead industry-adjusted return 
on assets are significantly positively correlated with firm size (Pearson 33%, 30%, 
respectively and Spearman 43%, 46%, respectively). This is supports the 
assumption that firms have better current and future performance. The subsequent 
year’s industry-adjusted returns on assets have a strong negative correlation with 
the firms that experience negative net income (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠) although this is significant 
(Pearson -38% and Spearman -50%). Other control variables (𝑀𝑇𝐵, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛, and 
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𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ) also not, or only negligibly correlated with subsequent operating 
performance (Pearson -10%, 2%, 0.03%, respectively and Spearman 13%, 19%, 
12%, respectively), which suggests that there is no major problem of 
multicollinearity in the future operating performance model.  
Finally, the correlation coefficients of real and accrual-based earnings management 
have been explained in the previous chapter and in more detail in chapter five 
section 5.5. All significant and insignificant coefficient correlations between the 
independent variable using future operating performance are relatively less than 
55%, indicating that the multicollinearity should not be problematic in future 
operating performance regression. The mean variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
the independent variables used in regression analysis of subsequent operating 
performance of firms just meeting or beating zero earnings and last year’s earnings. 
By using Roychowdhury’s (2006) and Gunny’s (2010) criteria to identify suspect 
firm-years, for all five measures of real earnings management, are all less than 2 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
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Table 6.2: Pearson and Spearman Correlations Coefficients among all Variables in the Operating Performance Regression 
Significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively, based on two-tailed test. 
Note to Table 6.2: The table shows Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of all variables in the future operating performance regression for the full sample of firm-year observations covering the period of 2009 through 2013, which includes 
4,487 firm-years observations, from 930 firms. The sample is extended to 2014 because of the requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating performance for one subsequent year. The five measures of real earnings management are as follow: 
Abnormal cash flows from operations; abnormal discretionary expenses; abnormal production costs; REM_1; REM_2. Both abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses are multiplied by (-1) to allow real and accrual earnings 
management measures to have the same interpretation. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distribution. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 





Ab_CFO Ab_DISEX Ab_PROD REM_1 REM_2 Ab_TACC 𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 𝐌𝐓𝐁 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 𝐳_𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 
𝐀𝐝𝐣_𝐑𝐎𝐀𝐭+𝟏 1.0000 0.7020*** 0.0339*** 0.0898*** -0.4206*** 0.1075*** -0.1603*** -0.0280 -0.1495*** -0.1374*** 0.4349*** 0.1325*** 0.1898*** 0.1209*** -0.4985*** 
𝐀𝐝𝐣_𝐑𝐎𝐀 0.6596*** 1.0000 -0.391*** 0.1069*** -0.4806*** 0.1315*** -0.1719*** -0.0196 -0.1538*** 0.0076 0.4623*** 0.1433*** 0.2483*** 0.1355*** -0.7033*** 
Suspect_zero 0.0212 0.0295 1.0000 0.0059 0.0281 0.0459*** 0.0194 0.0313 0.0513*** 0.0435*** -0.0249 -0.0719*** -0.013 -0.0461*** -0.1188*** 
Suspect_last 0.0933*** 0.0941*** 0.0059 1.0000 -0.4029*** 0.1318*** 0.0570*** 0.0985*** 0.0872*** 0.0194 0.1585*** 0.0247 0.0812*** 0.0311 -0.1776*** 
Ab_CFO -0.3547*** -0.5290*** -0.0043 -0.0468*** 1.0000 -0.1713*** 0.4203*** 0.1392*** 0.3705*** 0.5511*** -0.2043*** -0.1385*** -0.1662*** -0.-510*** 0.3514*** 
Ab_DISEX 0.1487*** 0.3395*** 0.0403*** 0.0934*** -0.4293*** 1.0000 0.5208*** 0.8607*** 0.7706*** 0.0007 0.0719*** -0.1336*** 0.0102 -0.1121*** -0.1878*** 
Ab_PROD -0.2091*** -0.2146* 0.0156 0.0432*** 0.3383*** 0.3558*** 1.0000 0.8296*** 0.7360*** 0.2595*** -0.0084 0.1192*** -0.0141 -0.0434*** 0.0339 
REM_1 -0.0023 0.0865* 0.0323 0.0842*** -0.0554*** 0.8365*** 0.8097*** 1.0000 0.8776*** 0.1498*** 0.0234 -0.1517*** -0.0204 -0.0922*** -0.0698*** 
REM_2 -0.0758*** -0.0073 0.0428*** 0.0716*** 0.2752*** 0.7502*** 0.6391*** 0.8508*** 1.0000 0.3021*** -0.0440*** -0.1673*** -0.0831*** -0.1126*** 0.0305 
Ab_TACC -0.1173*** 0.0043 0.0212 0.0073 0.4922*** -0.0197 0.2189*** 0.1483*** 0.3195*** 1.0000 -0.0828*** -0.0442*** -0.0407*** -0.0057 -0.0068 
𝐋𝐧𝐌𝐕𝐄 0.3278*** 0.3002*** -0.0271 0.1568*** -0.1230*** 0.0395*** -0.0099 0.0203 -0.0274 -0.0510*** 1.0000 0.3521*** 0.2540*** 0.1547*** -0.4275*** 
𝐌𝐓𝐁 -0.1011*** -0.0781* -0.0358*** -0.0092 0.0546*** -0.1047*** -0.0758*** -0.1177*** -0.0716*** 0.0243 0.1363*** 1.0000 0.2436*** 0.3069*** -0.1013*** 
𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐧 0.0254 0.0500* -0.0154 0.0423*** -0.0614*** -0.0546*** -0.0236 -0.0699*** -0.0995*** -0.0038 0.1205*** 0.1068*** 1.0000 0.0087 -0.2657*** 
𝐳_𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞 -0.0034 0.0043 0.0264 -0.0195 0.0870*** -0.0717*** 0.0574*** 0.0036 -0.0146 0.0464*** 0.0161 0.1500*** -0.0498*** 1.0000 -0.0246 
𝐋𝐨𝐬𝐬 -0.3850*** -0.4784*** -0.1188*** -0.1776*** 0.2972* -0.1482*** 0.0586*** -0.0369 0.0528*** -0.0223 -0.4228* 0.0130 -0.1028*** 0.1906*** 1.0000 
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6.4 Empirical Test Results of Consequences of Real Earnings 
Management Activities to Meet/Beat Zero Earnings on 
Subsequent Operating Performance 
This study examines the magnitude of real earning management with which firms 
manage earnings upward to meet or beat important earnings benchmarks around 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings in order to capture the general level of real 
earnings management activities on future operating performance. The results are 
presented in Table 6.3, which reports mean coefficients and Fama-MacBeth 𝑡-
statistic from the annual cross-sectional regressions over the period 2009 to 2013. 
The sample is extended to 2014 because of the requirement for data to measure a 
firm’s operating performance defined as one-year-ahead industry-adjusted return 
on assets. T-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for 
autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. Table 6.3 (Panel A) reports 
regression explaining the dependent variable (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1) the firm’s industry-
adjusted return on assets over the subsequent one year using the proxies of the real 
earnings management methods. 
The coefficients’ estimate on current-period industry-adjusted financial 
profitability (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴) is significantly different from zero and positive in each of 
the real earnings management methods. This is indicates that current-period 
industry-adjusted financial profitability is positively associated with future 
industry-adjusted ROA (p<0.01), which is consistent with the findings from prior 
empirical studies in the US (e.g., Leggett et al., 2009; Gunny, 2010).  
Prior research suggests that large firms with larger market-to-book ratio and return 
have better future performance; thus the coefficients on 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸, 𝑀𝑇𝐵 and 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
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are expected to be positive. The coefficients estimate on 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 is significantly 
different from zero and positive in each of the real earnings management methods, 
indicating that suspect firm-years to just beat or meet zero earnings have better 
future performance, which is consistent with the findings of Gunny (2010) and 
Leggett et al. (2009). The coefficients estimate on 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is significantly different 
from zero and negative in each of the real earnings management methods. This 
indicates that growth firms underperform in the future, which is consistent with the 
findings of Gunny (2010). The coefficient estimates on 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 in each of the earnings 
management methods of equation (4.11) are all significantly negatively associated 
with future performance (p<0.01). This is indicates that firms that engage in real 
earnings management activities in the absence of just beating/meeting important 
benchmarks (i.e. zero earnings) perform worse in the future or in signalling future 
performance than other firm-years. On the other hand, no coefficients on 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
significantly provide information about future performance, except the coefficient 
on REM_2 that is significantly positively associated with future performance 
0.00025 (𝑡 = 2.69) at 1% level.  
The coefficients for year dummies and industry dummies are not presented in Table 
6.3 (Panel A). All the years are significantly positively associated with the 
subsequent operating performance (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1). All the 49 industries division 
groups are also significantly positively associated with the subsequent operating 
performance. The mean adjusted R2 in future operating performance model is 51% 
for each of the abnormal cash flows from operations and the abnormal discretionary 
expenses, 53% for the abnormal production costs, and 50% for each of the 
aggregate measures of real earnings management REM_1, and REM_2. Therefore, 
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it appears that the models of future operating performance have reasonable to 
substantial explanatory power; and the mean adjusted R2s are consistent with prior 
literature (Gunny, 2010). 
Zang (2012) points out that firm with higher values of 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 indicate a healthier 
financial condition. In other words, future profitability will be more negatively 
affected by real earnings management activities when firms are in poor financial 
health, whereas coefficients on 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  are not significant in each of the real 
earnings management methods, except for the coefficient on aggregate measures of 
real earnings management REM_2 which is positive and statistically significant at 
0.00025 (𝑡 = 2.69). This finding is in line with prior empirical study (Gunny, 2010).  
The first column of Table 6.3 (Panel A) reports a positive coefficient of 0.9004 (𝑡 
= 2.55) at the 1% level on interaction term 𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂  * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  using 
industry-adjusted ROA in year 𝑡+1 as the performance measure. The coefficient 
indicates that one unit of an interaction term leads to 0.9004 units increase in 
industry-adjusted ROA in year 𝑡+1, which suggests that managers who engage in 
real earnings management to just meet/beat earnings benchmarks around zero 
earnings through sales-based manipulation have better subsequent performance 
than other firm-years. The results for the discretionary expenses sample are 
reported in the second column of Table 6.3 (Panel A) the coefficients on interaction 
term 𝐴𝑏_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 are positive and statistically significant 0.4022 
(𝑡 = 4.57) at the 1% level in the industry-adjusted ROA in year 𝑡+1 regression. This 
result is consistent with Gunny’s (2010) findings and suggests that managers of 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  firm-years who engage in discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation have better subsequent performance than other firm-years and convey 
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a signal of superior future performance to the market. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on interaction term 𝐴𝑏_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷  *  𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  using 
industry-adjusted ROA in year 𝑡+1 as the performance measure associated with 
future performance (p<0.01) (which is consistent with Gunny’s (2010) findings) 
suggests that managers of 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  firm-years who engage in production 
costs-based manipulation have better subsequent performance than other firm-
years. They also convey a signal of superior future performance to the market. 
Furthermore, in the last two columns of Table 6.3, Panel A reports the results from 
the estimation of (4.11) with aggregate REM measures. The average coefficients 
on the two aggregate real earnings measures, REM_1 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜, REM_2 
*𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜, are positive and statistically significant at 0.2110 (𝑡 = 2.86) and 
0.5407 (𝑡 = 4.30), respectively. Hence, these results indicating that managers of 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 firm-years who simultaneously engage in discretionary expenses-
based manipulation and production costs-based manipulation, and sales-based 
manipulation and discretionary expenses-based manipulation have better 
subsequent operating performance. The results are similar to the individual 
measures; abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal discretionary expenses, 
and abnormal production costs. 
Regarding the joint signalling effect documented by Gunny in her 2010 study, she 
reports that firms that utilise real earnings management to meet or just beat 
important earnings benchmarks exhibit significantly better future performance than 
other real earnings management firms that miss the targets, jointly signalling to the 
market that these firms perform better. As shown in Panel A of Table 7.4, the 
coefficient on the independent term 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 , 𝛼7  captures the main impacts on 
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abnormal real earnings management and the coefficient on the interaction term 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜  * 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 , 𝛼9  captures the incremental impact of abnormal real 
earnings management activities in the presence of meeting or just beating earnings 
benchmarks. However, the results of the sum of 𝛼7 and 𝛼9 , which  captures the 
combined “value-destroying” and “signalling” impacts of real earnings 
management activities show that the term (𝛼7 + 𝛼9) is significantly positive for 
three of five measures of real earnings management Ab_DISEX, Ab_PROD, and 
REM_2 (p<0.1 or p<0.01). This  indicates  that firm-years to just beat or meet zero 
earnings who engage in real earnings management activities have better subsequent 
operating performance (have significantly higher industry-adjusted ROA) than 
other firm-years with abnormal real earnings management activities. This result is 
consistent with joint signalling; that is, engaging in real earnings management 
activities in the presence of meeting or just beating the important earnings 
benchmarks to signal superior future performance (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 
2012).62 
Moreover, the results reported in Table 6.3 Panel A indicate that the main effects 
of abnormal real earnings management activities are all negative and significant 
(p<0.01). This is comparable to the findings of prior studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Roychowdhury, 2006). This suggests general value destroying of the 
                                                          
62 Gunny (2010 p. 861) gives an example of how managers may utilise the joint signal - engaging 
in real earnings management activities in the presence of meeting or just beating the earnings 
benchmarks to convey future growth prospects. For example, “manager could choose to meet a 
benchmark by engaging in RM or miss the benchmark by not engaging in RM. Consistent with the 
signalling explanation, only managers confident in superior future performance will use the joint 
signal because they expect future earnings growth to outweigh the adverse impact of using RM and 
meeting the benchmark. Firms with relatively worse future performance are not likely to use the 
joint signal because investors will be disappointed when the firm experiences an impact on earnings 
from the costs of RM (i.e., forfeited future cash flows) and the cost of setting earnings expectations 
higher by meeting the benchmark in the prior period.”  
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shareholders’ effect of abnormal real earnings management activities in the absence 
of just beating or meeting important benchmarks. In other words, firms that do not 
just beat or meet the zero earnings but engage in real earnings management 
activities perform worse in the future or in signalling future performance than other 
firm-years.  
In summary, the results of Table 6.3 (Panel A) show that, overall, managers engage 
in real earnings management activities to meet or just beat zero earnings by using 
sales-based manipulation, cutting discretionary expenses, and producing more 
product units and the aggregate real earnings measures REM_1 and REM_2. This 
suggests that using real earnings management activities to just beat or meet zero 
earnings is not opportunistic, but consistent with attaining benefits that allow the 
firm to perform better in the future or signal future performance (also convey a 
signal of superior future performance to the market). In addition, these results are 
consistent with the findings in previous empirical studies. Gunny (2010) and Zang 
(2012) examine the consequences of real earnings management activities, and find 
that suspect firm-years just beating or meeting important benchmarks that engage 
in real earnings management activities perform better in the future or signal future 
performance than firms that do not engage in real earnings management activities 







6.5 Empirical Test Results of Consequences of Real Earnings 
Management Activities to Meet/Beat Last Year’s Earnings 
on Subsequent Operating Performance 
Table 6.3 Panel B reports regression explaining the dependent variable subsequent 
operating performance (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1) of firms just meeting or beating last year’s 
earnings. It uses Gunny’s (2010) criteria to identify suspect firm-years using the 
proxies of the real earnings management methods. 
The signs and significance of the control variables are consistent with the results 
from prior studies (e.g., Leggett et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Gunny, 2010; Taylor 
and Xu, 2010; and Zhao et al., 2012) with just a few exceptions. For instance, 
current-year industry-adjusted ROA is statistically positively associated with future 
industry-adjusted ROA in each of the five real earnings management measures at 
the 0.01 significance level. 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 is a market measure of equity, all coefficients 
of 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸 are positive, and all the five coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 significance level with subsequent operating performance in each of real 
earnings management methods, representing that firms have better performance. 
Market-to-Book is also a market measure of growth, and all the five coefficients in 
each of the real earnings management methods are statistically negatively 
significant at the 0.01 significance level with future operating performance, 
representing that growth firms underperform in the future. The coefficient estimates 
on 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 in each of the real earnings management methods of equation (4.11) are 
all significantly negatively associated with future performance (p<0.01), whereas 
coefficients on 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  and 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  are, overall, not providing any significant 
information about possible future performance. 
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The three interaction term (𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 _𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡, 𝐴𝑏_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 _𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡, 
and 𝐴𝑏_𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷  *  𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 _𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) are all significantly positively associated with 
future operating performance at the 0.01 significance level, which is consistent with 
Gunny’s (2010) and Zhao et al.’s (2012) findings; this suggests that abnormal real 
earnings management intended to meet or just beat last year’s earnings and also 
transmit a signal of superior future performance to the market. Moreover, in the last 
two columns of Table 6.3, Panel B reports that the results from the estimation of 
(4.11) with aggregate REM measures, and the average coefficients on the two 
aggregate real earnings measures, 𝑅𝐸𝑀_1 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 _𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 ,  𝑅𝐸𝑀_2 
* 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡, are positive and statistically significant at 0.1487 (𝑡 = 3.10) and 
0.3434 (𝑡  = 4.99), respectively. Hence, these results confirm that managers of 
suspect firm-years to meet or just beat last year’s earnings who simultaneously 
engage in discretionary expenses-based manipulation and production costs-based 
manipulation, and sales-based manipulation and discretionary expenses-based 
manipulation have better subsequent operating performance. The results are similar 
to the individual measures; abnormal cash flows from operations, abnormal 
discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs. 
The first column of Table 6.3 Panel B reports a positive coefficient of 0.6224 (𝑡 = 
2.79) at the level 1 % on interaction term 𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 _𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡, which suggests 
that firms do not manipulate operating activities thorough sales-based manipulation 
to meet/beat last year’s earnings experience better subsequent operating 
performance. Furthermore, the results reported in Table 6.3 Panel B show that the 
main effects of abnormal real earnings management activities are all negative and 
significant at the 0.01 significance level, which is comparable to the findings of 
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prior studies (Gunny, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012). These results suggest a general value 
destroying of shareholders’ effect of abnormal real earnings management activities 
in the absence of just beating or meeting important benchmarks. In other words, 
firms that do not sustain recent performance – that is, just beat or meet the last 
year’s earnings – but engage in real earnings management activities perform worse 
in the future or in signalling future performance than other firm-years.  
The results of the sum of the coefficients 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 *𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, 𝛼9 and 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, 
𝛼7 is significantly positive for one of five measures of real earnings management 
Ab_PROD analyses at the 0.05 significance level. This indicates that firm-years to 
just beat or meet last year’s earnings that engage in real earnings management 
activities have better subsequent operating performance than other firm-years with 
abnormal real earnings management activities. In addition, in the case of 
Ab_DISEX, the sum of coefficients 𝛼7 (-0.3381) and 𝛼9 (0.1713) is -0.1668. The 
Wald test 𝑡-values of 𝛼7 and 𝛼9 are significantly negative at the 0.05 significance 
level ( 𝑡 = -2.18), indicating that firm-years that engage in real earnings 
management to just beat or meet last year’s earnings perform worse in the future or 
in signalling future performance than other firm-years with abnormal real earnings 
management activities.  
In summary, under the signalling theory the results of Table 6.3 (Panel B) also show 
that, overall, managers engage in real earnings management activities to meet or 
just beat last year’s earnings by cutting discretionary expenses, and to produce more 
product units and the aggregate real earnings measures REM_1 and REM_2. This 
suggests that using real earnings management activities to just beat or meet last 
year’s earnings is not opportunistic, but consistent with attaining benefits that allow 
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the firm to perform better in the future or in signalling future performance (also 
conveys a signal of superior future performance to the market). In addition, these 
results are consistent with the finding in previous studies. Gunny (2010) and Zhao 
et al. (2012) examine the consequences of real earnings management activities. 
They find that suspect firm-years just beating or meeting last year’s earnings that 
engage in real earnings management activities also perform better in the future or 
in signalling future performance than firms that do not engage in real earnings 




Table 6.3: Regression Analysis of Subsequent Operating Performance of Firms Just 
Meeting/Beating Earnings Benchmarks 
Panel A: Regression Analysis of Subsequent Operating Performance of Firms Just 
Meeting/Beating Zero Earnings using Roychowdhury’s (2006) Criteria to Identify 
Suspect Firm-Years of Real Earnings Management Activities 
 
Dependent Variable = One-Year-Ahead Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets  















































































































Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂𝟕 + 𝛂𝟗 0.8677 0.0662* 0.2230*** 0.1246 0.2795* 
Mean VIF 1.44 1.38 1.34 1.24 1.39 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5075 0.5086 0.5272 0.4994 0.5037 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** 
(The table is continued the next page)
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Panel B: Regression Analysis of Subsequent Operating Performance of Firms Just 
Meeting/ Beating Last Year’s Earnings using Gunny’s (2010) Criteria to Identify Suspect 
Firm-Years of Real Earnings Management Activities  
 







Dependent Variable = One-Year-Ahead Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets 















































































































Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂𝟕 + 𝛂𝟗 0.4100 -0.1668** 0.0826** 0.0615 0.0811 
Mean VIF 1.37 1.19 1.23 1.19 1.20 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5061 0.5088 0.5272 0.4995 0.5038 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** 
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Table 6.3 (continued) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Note to Table 6.3: This table reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions; the total sample consists of 930 
listed firms on the London Stock Exchange (4,487 firm-year observations) over the period 2009-2013. The 
sample is extended to 2014 because of the requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating performance for 
one subsequent year.  
The table contains the results of the following regressions:                                                                                                      
𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎4 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑎6 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎8 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑎10 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
In this model, the dependent variable (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1) Industry-adjusted ROA equals the difference between 
firm-specific ROA and the median ROA for the same year and industry during year 𝑡 + 1.  
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, refers to one of the five measures for abnormal real earnings management activities: the independent 
variables abnormal cash flow from operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs (Ab_PROD), abnormal 
discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX), and the aggregate real earnings measures REM_1 and REM_2 capture the 
main effects of abnormal real earnings management activities on future performance.  
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 is an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting important earnings benchmarks. 
Each panel reports the estimation results using a different definition of suspect firm-years as discussed below. 
Panel A reports results for suspects just beating/meeting the zero earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜), which are firm-
years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results 
for suspects just beating/meeting last year’s earnings (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡), which are firm-years with the change in 
net income from the last year between 0 and 0.01. 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 is an interaction term and captures the 
incremental effects of abnormal real earnings management activities relative to in the presence of just beating 
or meeting important benchmarks. Six control variables - firm size, firm’s current-period financial profitability, 
firm growth, firm loss, return and firm financial health - are added to the model. The possible impact of a size 
effect is controlled by adding the natural logarithm of market value (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸) to the model. To control for firm 
performance, the return on assets (ROA) is added as a control variable calculated as the net income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. In addition, in order to control for firm-specific growth 
opportunities the model includes market-to-book (MTB) computed as the market value of equity (MVE) 
divided by the book value of common equity.  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  measures the financial strength of the firm 𝑖 at the 
beginning of year 𝑡, computed as:  0.3 * (Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0 * (Sales 
revenue/Total assets) + 1.4 * (Retained earnings/Total assets) + 1.2 * (Working Capital/Total assets) + 0.6 * 
(Market value of equity/Total liabilities). 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  to control for the association between stock performance 
and future net income, market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, 
calculated as the difference between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-hold 
return, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year (𝑡). 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 is an indicator variable equal to one when net 
income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the net income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged total assets. To be consistent with the dependent variable, all continuous independent 
variables are industry-adjusted. Industry and year are included as indicator variables in the model. For brevity, 
the coefficients on industry and year dummy variables are not presented. Note that t-statistics are calculated 
using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. They are reported in 
parentheses. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% 









6.6 Sensitivity Analysis  
This section undertakes additional analysis to extend and verify the results on the 
subset of firms that meet earnings benchmarks through their use of real earnings 
management activities on subsequent operating performance. Section 6.6.1 
examines the results’ sensitivity to the period of industry-adjusted return on assets 
measured by utilising two-year-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
(𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2) to proxy the dependent variable.  
6.6.1 Two-Year-Ahead Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets 
To determine if the impacts of real earnings management on future operating 
performance extend beyond one year, and because the future harmful net income 
outcomes may last longer than one year, the analysis shown in Table 6.4 Panel A 
and Panel B is replaced with the dependent variable. This dependent variable is the 
two-years-ahead industry-adjusted return on assets (𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2) in the following 
adjustment of equation (4.11):  
𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎4 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎5 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎6 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎8 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝑎10 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                        (6.1) 
Table 6.4 reports the coefficient estimates for equation (6.1) in Appendix B. The 
results, in general, are robust when using  𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2 as the future performance 
measure and consistent with the results from 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 in Table 6.3 (Panel A 
and Panel B). For example, four of the five interaction terms of suspect firm-years 
of all measures of real earnings management remain the same and all are 
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significantly positively associated with future operating performance in year two at 
the 0.01 significance level. The abnormal cash flows from operations that interacted 
with suspect firm-years (𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜, 𝐴𝑏_𝐶𝐹𝑂 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡) are 
still significantly positive, where the significance levels drop from 1% to 5% and 
10%, respectively. The significance levels also drop from 1% to 5% on the 
coefficient of abnormal discretionary expenses that interacted with suspect firm-
years (𝐴𝑏_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋 * 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡).  
The main effects of all abnormal real earnings management activities remain the 
same and all are negative and significant with future operating performance in year 
two at the 0.01 significance level. In addition, the combined coefficients on the 
interaction terms of abnormal real earnings management (𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 * 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀,𝛼9 
and 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, 𝛼7), which represents the full impact of real earnings management on 
a firm’s subsequent two-years operating performance are also positive and 
significant at the 0.01 significance level on abnormal production cost analysis in 
Panel A and Panel B. However, it is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 
significance level on abnormal discretionary expenses analysis in Panel B. Further, 
the other combined coefficients of 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 *𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, 𝛼9 and 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀, 𝛼7  are still 
the same sign but are no longer statistically significant.  
Notable differences among the control variable are as follows. The coefficients of 
𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝛼3) in Panel A and Panel B are still positive and mildly significant for 
the aggregate measure of real earnings management 𝑅𝐸𝑀_2 (𝑡 = 1.61 and 1.56, 
respectively). The significance levels drop from 1% to 5% on the coefficients 
of 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 firm in Panel B for abnormal cash flows from operations and abnormal 
production costs (𝑡 = -2.35 and -2.37, respectively). Finally, Table 6.6, Panel A and 
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Panel B, reports that adjusted R2 dropped slightly to 48% in each of the real earnings 
management measures in the future operating performance model. Overall, the 
results of the regression analysis presented in Table 6.4 are consistent with the main 
finding in this study. They key finding is that suspect firm-years just beating or 
meeting important benchmarks that engage in real earnings management activities 
perform better in the future operating performance in year one as well as in year 
two than firms that miss or just meet earnings benchmarks.   
6.7 Summary  
This chapter examines the effect of real earnings management activities to meet or 
just beat zero earnings and last year’s earnings on firms’ subsequent operating 
performance. The findings contribute to the literature by providing the following 
evidence. First, this chapter presents evidence that UK suspect firm-years just 
beating/meeting zero earnings and last year’s earnings that manipulate their sales, 
discretionary expenditures, and production have better subsequent operating 
performance than other firms have. Second, I also find that UK firm-years that miss 
the earnings benchmarks but engage in real earnings management manipulation 
experience worse future performance. Moreover, additional analysis is performed 
to investigate the sensitivity of the results on a subset of firms that met earnings 
benchmarks through utilising real earnings management activities on subsequent 
operating performance. I find that firms that meet earnings targets by engaging in 
real earnings management activities perform better in the subsequent operating 













This chapter summarises the findings of this thesis by providing a brief synopsis of 
the thesis chapters. First, section two provides a summary of the research including 
a brief review of the relevant literature, research hypotheses, data and methodology, 
and findings. The main research contributions to accounting literature, regulators, 
standard setters, and investors are discussed in sections three and four. Finally, 
section five presents research limitations and makes recommendation for future 
research. 
7.2 Summary of Research Questions, Hypotheses and Major 
Findings 
7.2.1 Manipulation of Real Earnings Management Activities 
This section presents the key findings of the first essay, and answers the main 
research questions. These are derived from the formulated conclusions in the 
previous chapter. The main research question was: 
Do UK firms engage in real earnings management activities; specifically operating 
activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, and production to meet/beat 
important earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last year’s earnings)? 
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According to the opportunistic perspective of earnings management and transaction 
cost theory, the results of the first essay reveal that managers in UK suspect firm-
years that manage earnings upward utilise more real earnings management 
activities to achieve earnings benchmarks opportunistically. However, based on a 
sample of London Stock Exchange-listed firms over the period 2009 to 2013, the 
first hypothesis (H1a and H2a) tests whether UK firms that just meet/beat earnings 
benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings are more likely to engage 
in real earnings management. The Fama-Macbeth approach results for H1a and H1b 
show that UK firms that just beat or meet zero earnings engage more in real 
earnings management to achieve certain earnings targets. In addition, this result is 
consistent with findings in Roychowdhury’s (2006) prediction that firm-years just 
beating or meeting zero earnings engage more in earnings management through 
sales-based manipulation (abnormal cash flows from operations). However, the 
results in Table 5.6 Panel B do not support H1b that suggests that UK firms around 
last year’s earnings are not associated with more real earnings management 
activities through sales-based manipulation. 
The second hypothesis (H2a and H2b) tests whether UK firms that just meet/beat 
earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings are more likely 
to engage in real earnings management. The results show that UK firms that 
meeting/beating zero earnings and last year’s earnings engage more in real earnings 
management to achieve certain earnings targets. In addition, this result is consistent 
with findings in literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012) 
predicting that firm-years just beating or meeting earnings benchmarks engage 
more in earnings management through discretionary expenses-based manipulation. 
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That is, cutting/reducing discretionary expenses will increase reported earnings in 
the current period, as well as generate higher cash flow in the current period. 
Evidence from the third hypothesis (H3a and H3b) shows that UK firms engage 
more in real earnings management through overproduction-based manipulation to 
meet/beat zero earnings and last year’s earnings than other firms that miss earnings 
targets do. This result is consistent with findings in literature (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Gunny, 2010; Zang, 2012) predicting that firm-years just beating or meeting zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings engage more in earnings management through 
overproduction in order to achieve certain earnings targets. 
Furthermore, in order to capture the total effects of real earnings management and 
the likelihood that firms might engage in more than one type of real earnings 
management activities, the present study combines the three individual measures 
to compute two comprehensive metrics of real earnings management activities. 
This result is consistent with the findings in previous studies (Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010; Zang, 2012). It provides evidence that managers in UK firms just beating or 
meeting an earnings benchmark engage in sales manipulation and reducing/cutting 
discretionary expenses simultaneously and also engage in overproducing products 
and reducing/cutting discretionary expenses at the same time. 
Finally, the current study also examines whether UK firms around zero earnings 
and last year’s earnings engage in income-increasing earnings management by 
utilising accrual-based earnings management. The results are consistent with the 
findings in prior literature and provide evidence that managers in UK firms around 
zero earnings and last year’s earnings also engage in income-increasing accrual-
based earnings management and/or in real earnings management.  
 
199 
7.2.2 Consequences of Real Earnings Management on Firm’s Future 
Performance 
This section presents the key findings of the second essay, and answers the main 
research questions. These are derived from the formulated conclusions in the 
previous chapter. The main research question was: 
Do manipulations of operating activities such as sales, discretionary expenditures, 
and production in presence of meeting/beating important earnings benchmarks 
have, on average, significant negative or positive consequences for UK firms’ 
subsequent operating performances? 
Graham et al. (2005) demonstrate that managers elect to apply real earnings 
management over accrual-based earnings management to manage earnings upward, 
without considering whether this action will diminish the firm’s value in the long 
term.  Following their findings, attention has turned to an analysis of real earnings 
management. As real earnings management increases as a practice, this has 
attracted a growing number of real earnings management (REM) papers 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Xu et al., 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Gunny, 2010; 
Zang, 2012; Cohen et al., 2016; Kothari et al., 2016). These REM studies follow 
two directions of thought. The first is the opportunistic earnings management 
argument that managers who employ real earnings management as opposed to 
normal business strategy to manage reported earnings are misleading investors in 
how they assess firms’ performance (Healy and Palepu, 1993; DeFond and Park, 
1997). Conversely, the second direction of thought is the signalling earnings 
management arguments. This asserts that firms employ real earnings management 
to signal future successful performance while distancing themselves from negative 
performance (Roychowdhury, 2006). Investors, however, are not generally as 
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informed as the managers are because of the information asymmetry that exists 
between insider and outsider investors. Subsequently, managers may use earnings 
to communicate the private information that they have on firms’ future performance, 
thereby protect firms’ long-term value. (Demski, 1998; Kothari, 2001; Sankar and 
Subramanyam, 2001; Arya et al., 2003; Louis and Robinson, 2005). 
I extend the sample of London Stock Exchange-listed firms to 2014 because of the 
requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating performance for one subsequent 
year following the sample period. The fourth hypothesis (H4) tests whether there is 
an association between UK firms that manipulate their sales, discretionary expenses 
and production to just meet/beat earnings benchmarks (e.g., zero earnings and last 
year’s earnings) and future operating performance. Pooled ordinary least squares 
(time-series cross-sectional) regression results show that UK firms that manipulate 
their earnings to meet or beat zero earnings and last year’s earnings are all 
significantly positively associated with future operating performance. This is 
consistent with Gunny’s (2010) and Zhao et al.’s (2012) findings and suggests that 
abnormal real earnings management intended to meet or just beat zero earnings and 
last year’s earnings and to also transmit a signal of superior future performance to 
the market. Moreover, the two aggregate REM measures are positive and 
statistically significantly associated with future operating performance. Hence, 
these results confirm that managers of suspect firm-years to meet or just beat zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings who simultaneously engage in discretionary 
expenses-based manipulation and production costs-based manipulation, and sales-
based manipulation and discretionary expenses-based manipulation realise better 
subsequent operating performance.  
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Furthermore, the results also show that UK firms that manipulate their earnings but 
miss or/and meet earnings targets are all negatively associated with future operating 
performance, which is comparable to the findings of prior studies (Gunny, 2010; 
Zhao et al., 2012). These results suggest a general value-destroying outcome of 
shareholders’ effect of abnormal real earnings management activities in the absence 
of just beating or meeting important benchmarks. In other words, firms that do not 
sustain recent performance – that is, just beat or meet the last year’s earnings – but 
engage in real earnings management activities perform worse in the future or in 
signalling future performance than other firm-years.  
In summary, evidence from H4 suggests that in the presence of meeting/beating 
earnings benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings, real earnings 
management signals firms’ good future performance. Further, evidence from H5 
suggests that real earnings management in the absence of meeting/beating earnings 
benchmarks around zero earnings and last year’s earnings perform worse in the 
future; this reduces the firm’s value, which will harm the firm’s future performance 
(value destroying).  
Finally, to determine if the impacts of real earnings management on subsequent 
operating performance extend beyond one year, additional tests are also performed. 
The results show that UK firms that meet/beat earnings benchmarks by engaging 
in real earnings management activities perform better in subsequent operating 
performance in year two as well as in their performance in year one. However, 
firms that miss earnings benchmarks but engage in real earnings management 
activities experience deterioration in subsequent operating performance in year two 
as well as in their performance in year one.  
 
202 
7.3 Research Contributions 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in a number of ways. First, the 
study contributes on the extant empirical research on real earnings management 
(e.g.,  Graham et al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Gunny, 2010; 
Badertscher, 2011; Chi et al., 2011; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 2016) by providing 
empirical evidence on real earnings management in the UK context which has not 
been examined before. Specifically, I examine whether UK firms that manage 
earnings upward utilise three types of real earnings management activities to meet 
or just beat earnings benchmarks. Furthermore, this study indicates exactly which 
types of real earnings management have been manipulated to meet or just beat zero 
earnings and last year’s earnings. Thus, this study extends the existing knowledge 
to gain greater understanding in the UK market.  
Second, this study is the first to consider real earnings management activities 
through sales-based manipulation around firms that sustain recent performance, 
such as making at least last year’s earnings to provide a comprehensive overview 
of real earnings management around firms that are more likely to manage up 
earnings to meet or just beat earnings benchmarks. Prior research presents an 
incomplete picture of this association. For example, Gunny (2010) examines four 
types of real earnings management subject to manipulation; these are reducing the 
amount of discretionary R&D expenditure; reducing the amount of discretionary 
SG&A expenditure; timing of the sale of fixed assets for the reporting of gained 
assets; and overproduction costs. Further, Zang (2012) only examines two types of 
real earnings management activities, these being discretionary expenditures and 
overproduction costs. Thus, this study presents the first evidence on firms that 
 
203 
manipulate their earnings through sales-based manipulation to sustain recent 
performance, such as making at least last year’s earnings. 
Third, the current study contributes to the extant empirical research on the 
relationship between the real earnings management and future operating 
performance (e.g., Leggett et al., 2009; Gunny, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Taylor and 
Xu, 2010; Zhao et al., 2012; Kothari et al., 2016; Vorst, 2016) by providing 
empirical evidence on the consequences of real earnings management in the UK 
context. While the previous empirical results are mixed, the results of this study 
show that UK firms utilizing real earnings management to meet or just beat 
earnings benchmarks does not necessarily cause significant negative consequences 
for firms’ subsequent operations. The results of this study allow a more 
comprehensive understanding of the process through which management evaluates 
the costs and benefits of real earnings management. 
Fourth, although most academic studies attempt to identify earnings management, 
they have not measured real earnings management on firms’ subsequent operating 
performance in terms of its magnitude; this study is the first to use the absolute 
value of each measure to capture the general level of real earnings management 
activities on future operating performance. For example, Gunny (2010) examines a 
US sample and uses real earnings management activities as the indicator variable 
equal to one if the residual from R&D, SG&A, and production models is in the 
lowest (highest) quintile, zero otherwise. Chen et al. (2010) also use indicator 
variables for real earnings management firms rather than examining the magnitude 
of real earnings management. In contrast to the previous research (e.g., Gunny, 
2010; Chen et al., 2010), this research considers avoiding the drawbacks of binning 
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continuous variable. That is, the potential loss of power and loss of precise average 
effect, that could arise by estimating means effect of the measures in the upper 
quantile rather than estimating the means effect of the whole observations (Harrell, 
2015). The results of this study provide a better understanding of REM on future 
performance. 
Finally, previous methodological work on the consequences of earnings 
management focuses on cross-sectional dependence (e.g., Gunny, 2010; Chen et al. 
2010; Zhao et al., 2012) but does not examine the issues created by the presence of 
both cross-sectional and time-series dependences. The Fama-MacBeth procedure 
is designed to address concerns about cross-sectional correlation in the data (Fama 
and MacBeth, 1973). In this study, I use the Fama-MacBeth procedure as a method 
that corrects for dependence in one direction and typically assumes independence 
in the other (Gow et al., 2012). In addition, a potential problem with the pooled 
(time series-cross sectional) regression (Fama-Macbeth approach) is the possibility 
of within-firm autocorrelation (also called serial correlation) in addition to possible 
heteroscedasticity, which would bias the standard error in the model. To address 
this issue, the t-statistics are used to calculate standard errors corrected for 
autocorrelation in addition to possible heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West 
standard errors (Newey-West, 1987). Thus, the Newey-West standard errors 
corrected Fama-Macbeth statistic add values to the robustness of the results by 
correcting for potential bias and inconsistency issues in the estimates and 





7.4 Policy Implications 
7.4.1 Regulatory and Standard Setters Implications 
Management is a key source of accounting information for its shareholders, who 
should be kept up to date with the firm’s activities and performance. Nevertheless, 
management is motivated by self-interest, and incentives may exist to manipulate 
the information released to reach an earnings targets; for example, through the 
manipulation of accruals and operating activities such as sales, discretionary 
expenditures, and production costs. The findings of this thesis present evidence that 
real transactions through the manipulation of operating activities that directly affect 
cash flows contribute to increase net income. Shareholders may be misled if 
accounting information that does not truthfully represent the financial position and 
performance of the firm is provided. If earnings manipulation is undertaken within 
the bounds of GAAP rules, it is considered earnings management; if it takes place 
without recourse to GAAP rules; it is considered accounting fraud (Dechow and 
Skinner, 2000). However, earnings management may not actually be considered 
fraudulent; rather it may be a signal of opportunistic behaviour by management.  
Regulatory bodies such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the Financial 
Reporting Council in the UK (FRC) and the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) should enhance the disclosure system and financial report quality in the 
capital market to ensure that accounting information remains honest, transparent 
and relevant. This is to mitigate against financial fraud and to reduce information 
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asymmetry and agency conflict between managers and shareholders.63 In addition, 
the constraints on or scrutiny over accounting-based earnings management force 
managers to switch to real earnings management (Zang, 2012), which could burn 
the firms’ economic values in the long run, and some of the real activities 
manipulation may be costly to investors. That is, tightened accounting regulation 
may not reduce the overall level of earnings management, because of managers’ 
actions in substituting real activities for accrual manipulations. Thus, regulatory 
bodies may develop more effective enforcement mechanisms if they have sufficient 
knowledge about financial statement manipulation.64 
The results of this suggest that managers’ reporting incentives do affect the 
implementation of standards that allow for greater managerial discretion; 
subsequently they may be of interest to standard setters, who might reassess areas 
of high accounting discretion to restrict the possibility of earnings manipulations. 
7.4.2 Practical Implications  
This study has practical implications for firms that need to satisfy investors and 
existing shareholders. The findings of this thesis provide further evidence of the 
existence of earnings management through real activities manipulation and its 
impact on the firm’s future performance. Primarily, the current study reveals that 
                                                          
63 The nature of accounting standard introduces conflicts, which subsequently create additional 
agency concerns surrounding the free cash flow problems. 
64 There is an awareness among most managers that using accounting choice (e.g., accruals-based 
earnings management) to mislead stakeholders about their firm’s real economic performance is 
unethical. In their survey, Bruns and Merchant (1990) demonstrate that managers view managing 
earnings through operating activities as more ethical than utilising accruals-based earnings 
management. Therefore, a main issue for today’s regulators is to educate managers that adopting 
suboptimal business strategies such as operating activities with the purpose to achieve the desired 
level of net incomes is also deemed unethical. 
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managers are more likely to avoid opportunism and use their accounting discretion 
to convey their private information about the true value of the firm. Investors and 
existing shareholders may gain insights on the reliability of earnings figure when 
incentives for earnings management are strong and they should also consider real 
and accrual earnings management when they are making investments. 
7.5 Research Limitations and Further Research  
When drawing evidence-based conclusions, consideration should be paid to some 
limitations identified in this study. One limitation of this study is that I only 
investigated motivation for real earnings management, which is to meet/beat 
important earnings benchmarks such as avoiding report losses and sustaining recent 
profit performance was investigated in the present study. In reality, many other 
factors could drive earnings management such as compensation contract, avoiding 
violations of debt covenants, equity earnings, and smoothing earnings. The second 
limitation is a variety of factors that not investigated in this research can influence 
accrual earnings management and real earnings management in a number of ways:  
for example, audit quality, corporate governance or disclosure policies are less 
likely to engage in earnings management.  
Another limitation with the present study is that it examines the manipulation of 
common business activities, such as sales, discretionary expenditures and 
production, but does not investigate other less common types of real earnings 
management, including stock repurchases. Finally, as this study focuses on UK data, 
due to data access limitations, I do not explore the factors that mentioned above, 
which are considered important areas in the earnings management literature. 
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This review implies that the field of earnings management remains open to 
continued academic investigation. However, it is more likely that new insights will 
be generated if the research questions addressed in this thesis are expanded. 
However, real earnings management literature (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen 
et al., 2008; Zang, 2012; Kothari et al., 2016) is only about upward real earnings 
management. The question for the future is to study whether real earnings 
management is adopted to manage earnings downward. In addition, from 
reconciling conflicting findings on the effect of earnings management on stock 
prices, these results call into question what the consequences of income-decreasing 
real earnings management on future earnings and stock price are. A suggestion for 
future research would be this type of real earnings management in context with 
audit quality. Furthermore, a future research direction could also consider earnings 
quality and earnings management in not-for-profit organisations in the UK, which 













Variables required for my analysis and corresponding Datastream 





TA (WC02999) Total Assets. 
SR (WC01001) Sales Revenue. 
IBEI (WC01551) Income Before Extraordinary Items. 
CFO (WC04860) Cash Flows from Operations. 
COGS (WC01051) Cost of Goods Sold. 
INV (WC02101) Inventories. 




The Sum of Cost of Goods Sold and Change in Inventory 
of Firm 𝑖. 
R&D (WC01201) Research and Development Expenses. 
ADV and SG&A 
(WC01101) 




The sum of R&D, Advertising and Selling, General and 
Administrative Expenses (SG&A) of Firm 𝑖 ; as long as 
SG&A is available, advertising and R&D are set to zero if 
they are missing. 
Ab_CFO Abnormal Cash Flows from Operations, where Ab_CFO is 
measured by estimated residual from the regression 
equation (4.1). 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
Where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡  is cash flow from operations for firm 𝑖 in the 
year  𝑡 , defined as cash flow from operations divided by 
lagged total assets; 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  is the total assets at the 
beginning of period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the sales revenue 
during period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑖 is the 
firm; and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. 
                                                          
65 Annual Datastream data items are in parentheses. 
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Ab_DISEX Abnormal Discretionary Expenses, where Ab_DISEX is 




= 𝛼0 +  𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +  𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .  
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is the discretionary expenses that are 
defined as the sum of research and development (R&D), 
advertising, and selling, general and administrative 
expenses (SG&A) in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1  is the total 
assets at the beginning of period 𝑡 for firm 𝑖; and 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1  is 
the sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. 
Ab_PROD 
Abnormal Production Costs, where Ab_PROD is measured 
by estimated residual from the regression equation (4.7). 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. where  
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the cost of goods sold in year 𝑡 for 
firm 𝑖  and the change in inventory from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the total assets in firm-year 𝑖, 𝑡 − 1 ; 𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the sales 
revenue in year t for firm 𝑖; ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales 
revenue from year 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡; and ∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the change in 
sales revenue at the beginning of year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖. 
Ab_TACC Abnormal Total Accruals; where Ab_TACC is measured by 
estimated residuals from Kothari et al.’s (2005) model. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛽1 ∗ (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) +   𝛽2 ∗ (
∆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−∆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 ∗ (
 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4 ∗
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.  Where  𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is total accruals defined as 
the differences between net income before extraordinary 
items and cash flows from operations for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, 
𝑃𝑃𝐸i,t  denotes the gross value of property, plant and 
equipment for firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡, and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the return 
on assets measured as net income before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets at the beginning of year 𝑡. 
REM_1 The sum of Ab_DISEX * (-1) and Ab_PROD; the higher the 
values of this aggregate measure, the more likely it is that 
the firm is engaging in real activities manipulation. 
REM_2 The sum of Ab_CFO * (-1) and Ab_DISEX * (-1); the 
higher the values of this aggregate measure, the more likely 
it is that the firm is engaging in real activities manipulation. 
ROA Return on Assets; Income before extraordinary items scaled 
by lagged total assets. 
MVE (WC08001) The Market Value of Equity. 
BVE (WC05476) The Book Value of Common Equity. 
Market-to-book 
(MTB) 
The ratio of market value of equity-to-book value of equity 
of firm 𝑖, measured at the beginning of year 𝑡. 
LnMVE Logarithm of the market value of equity of firm 𝑖, measured 
at the beginning of year 𝑡. 
Suspect An indicator variable for suspect firm-years just 
beating/meeting important earnings benchmarks. 
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Suspect_zero An indicator variable that is set equal to one if firm 𝑖’s net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total 
assets is between 0 and 0.005, and is set equal to zero 
otherwise, based on Roychowdhury’s (2006) criteria to 
identify suspect firm-years. 
Suspect_last An indicator variable that is set equal to one if firm 𝑖 ’s 
change in net income before extraordinary items from the 
last year is between 0 and 0.01, and is set equal to zero 




Appendix B  
 
Table 6.4: Regression Analysis of Subsequent Operating Performance in Year Two 
of Firms Just Meeting/Beating Earnings Benchmarks  
Panel A: Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets (𝑨𝒅𝒋_𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕+𝟐) is a Proxy for Operating 
Performance of Firms that Meet or Just Beat Zero Earnings  
 
                                                                                      (The table is continued on the next page)
Dependent Variable = Two-Year-Ahead Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets 















































































































Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observation 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂𝟕 + 𝛂𝟗 0.4359 0.0823** 0.1754*** 0.0605 0.1191 
Mean VIF 1.52 1.48 1.33 1.25 1.56 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4805 0.4799 0.4855 0.4775 0.4679 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** 
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Panel B: Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets (𝑨𝒅𝒋_𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕+𝟐) is a Proxy for Operating 
Performance of Firms That Meet or Just Beat Last Year’s Earnings 
Dependent Variable = Two-Year-Ahead Industry-Adjusted Return on Assets 















































































































Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations 3,346 2,860 2,407 3,354 2,852 
𝛂𝟕 + 𝛂𝟗 0.2473 -0.0953** 0.0595** 0.0240 -0.0223 
Mean VIF 1.66 1.55 1.48 1.21 1.46 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4569 0.4775 0.4822 0.4850 0.4906 
F-value *** *** *** *** *** 
(The table is continued on the next page)
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Table 6.4 (continued) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance of the coefficient at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Note to Table 6.4: This table reports the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions; the total sample consists 
of 930 listed firms on the London Stock Exchange (4,487 firm-year observations) over the period 2009-
2013. The sample is extended to 2015 because of the requirement for data to measure a firm’s operating 
performance for two subsequent year.  
The table contains the results of the following regressions:  
𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2 ∗ 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑎4 ∗ 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎5
∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎6 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎8 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9
∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎10 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
In this model, the dependent variable ( 𝐴𝑑𝑗_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2)  Industry-adjusted ROA equals the difference 
between firm-specific ROA and the median ROA for the same year and industry during year 𝑡 +2 . 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡  refers to one of the five measures for abnormal real earnings management activities: the 
independent variables abnormal cash flow from operations (Ab_CFO), abnormal production costs 
(Ab_PROD), abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DISEX), and the aggregate real earnings measures 
REM_1 and REM_2; capture the main effects of abnormal real earnings management activities on future 
performance.  
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡  is an indicator variable for suspect firm-years just beating/meeting important earnings 
benchmarks. Each panel reports the estimation results using a different definition of suspect firm-years as 
discussed below. Panel A reports results for suspects just beating/meeting the zero earnings 
( 𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜) , which are firm-years with earnings before extraordinary items over lagged assets 
between 0 and 0.005. Panel B reports results for suspects just beating/meeting last year’s earnings 
(𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡), which are firm-years with the change in net income from the last year between 0 and 0.01. 
𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑀 is an interaction term and captures the incremental effects of abnormal real earnings 
management activities relative to in the presence of just beating or meeting important benchmarks. Six 
control variables - firm size, firm’s current-period financial profitability, firm growth, firm loss, return and 
firm financial health - are added to the model. The possible impact of a size effect is controlled by adding 
the natural logarithm of market value (𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑉𝐸) to the model. To control for firm performance, the return 
on assets (ROA) is added as a control variable calculated as the net income before extraordinary items 
divided by lagged total assets. In addition, in order to control for firm-specific growth opportunities the 
model includes market-to-book (MTB) computed as the market value of equity (MVE) divided by the book 
value of common equity.  𝑧_𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  measures the financial strength of the firm 𝑖 at the beginning of year 𝑡, 
computed as:  0.3 * (Net income before extraordinary items/Total assets) + 1.0 * (Sales revenue/Total 
assets) + 1.4 * (Retained Earnings/Total assets) + 1.2 * (Working Capital/Total assets) + 0.6 * (Market 
value of equity/Total liabilities). 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛to control for the association between stock performance and 
future net income, market-adjusted abnormal returns is a proxy for the firm’s market performance, 
calculated as the difference between monthly buy-and-hold raw returns and the monthly market buy-and-
hold return, compounded over 12 months of the fiscal year (𝑡). 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 is an indicator variable equal to one 
when net income before extraordinary items is negative, and zero otherwise. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the net income before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. To be consistent with the dependent variable, all 
continuous independent variables are industry-adjusted. Industry and year are included as indicator 
variables in the model. For brevity, the coefficients on industry and year dummy variables are not presented. 
Note that t-statistics are calculated using standard errors corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-
West procedure. They are reported in parentheses. To limit the influence of outliers, all continuous 
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